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Abstract 
 
De facto states, defined as entities that possess control over a defined territory, 
population, and government, but without recognition from other states, have become 
increasingly important over the past three decades.  Although the universe of cases is 
small (there have been 24 de facto states since the 1960s), de facto states play an 
important role in regional security and stability. Despite this relevance, we still know 
little about why de facto states emerge, how their preferences are formed, and what 
shapes their behaviour and decision-making.  Shedding light on these overlooked issues 
will allow us to better understand the role of de facto states in regional and international 
politics.  The existing literature, although insightful, does not fully explain the behaviour 
of de facto states.  In particular, the literature has fallen short in explaining the behaviour 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
 
In order to better understand the behaviour of de facto states, this thesis asks the 
following questions: What are the factors that shape and influence de facto state 
preferences and behaviour?  What are the factors that determine if a de facto state will 
declare independence or preserve the status quo?  More specifically, in terms of the cases 
under examination, why did Kosovo and South Sudan declare independence, while Iraqi 
Kurdistan has not?  The goal of this dissertation is to identify the conditions under which 
a de facto state may declare independence and when it may preserve the status quo.   
 
To address these questions, this thesis employs international relations theories and adopts 
a comparative analysis method to explain the behaviour of Kosovo, South Sudan, and 
Iraqi Kurdistan. Following extensive fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan, the thesis argues that 
de facto states will forgo independence when the parent state furnishes the de facto state 
with autonomy and offers sufficient economic incentives. Other mitigating factors 
include the domestic environment of the de facto state and the parent state, the role of 
regional and international governments, and the presence or absence of the old regime of 
the parent state.  The main point is that the preference for independence is neither fixed 
nor inevitable. 
 
 
Key Words: De facto states, Realism, Constructivism, Liberalism, Kosovo, South Sudan,   
Iraqi Kurdistan. 
 ii
Acknowledgments 
 
My greatest debt of gratitude is to my family. In particular I would like to acknowledge 
my mother who, as a single parent, fled war-torn Iraq with five children to settle in 
Canada. Her strength and love gave my siblings and me a safe and happy life in Canada. 
My brother and three sisters have all provided me with encouragement and support for as 
long as I can remember. My grandparents, aunts, and uncles, both in Canada and abroad, 
have also supported me throughout my journey.   
 
A special and warm acknowledgment goes to Renas Jano, who literally took me by the 
hand and walked me into the offices of more than a dozen officials and academics in Iraqi 
Kurdistan. He generously dedicated two months of his time and resources to assist me 
during my first extended trip to Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan.  I cannot thank him enough. He’s 
become like a brother. 
 
My uncle, Ali Jamil Bamerni, provided me with a home during my stay in Dohuk, Iraqi 
Kurdistan. During my time in Iraq (or Kurdistan, lest I upset people), he explained the 
many intricacies of the social, religious, and political life of Iraqi Kurdistan and arranged 
more than several interviews with politicians and academics. Said Bamerni facilitated 
introductions and arranged interviews with the Governor of Dohuk and other officials and 
former peshmerga. He also generously offered his home and time to my thesis supervisor, 
Adam Harmes and me in April 2014. 
 
My deepest gratitude goes to Adam, who has been a constant source of scholarly 
guidance and support. He has been patient, helpful, supportive, and encouraging. 
Although my topic is not Adam’s area of research, he has taken a keen interest in my 
research and even joined me on a trip to Iraq in April 2014 to observe Iraq’s federal 
election and to learn more about the Kurdish region.  Adam also graciously wrote 
countless reference letters on my behalf.  
 
Peter Ferguson introduced me to valuable methodological work in comparative politics 
when he provided me with supervision on a reading course and one section of the 
comparative politics comprehensive examination. He has also written countless reference 
letters. Beyond my immediate dissertation committee, I owe a great deal of gratitude to 
Bruce Morrison and Sam Clark. Bruce introduced me to classics of comparative politics 
and really pushed me on the readings during our discussions. Bruce also willingly 
supervised the second section of the comparative politics comprehensive examination. 
Sam Clark has been a source of guidance and support for about a decade. He took me on 
as a research assistant in 2006 and he has been a source of advice and encouragement 
ever since.  I would like to thank the other two examiners, Tim Donais from Wilfrid 
Laurier University and Joanna Quinn for their feedback and willingness to be read my 
work. 
 
I would also like to thank the Department of Political Science at the University of 
Western Ontario for providing the resources and support necessary for completing this 
 iii 
undertaking. Funding from Ontario Graduate Scholarship and Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council was also a great help. 
 
I want to thank the many people in Iraqi Kurdistan who, in one way or another, made my 
stay in the region much more comfortable. Mohammed Jano provided me with a home 
for two months during my time in Erbil and made my stay memorable by holding mini-
concerts in Ainkawa. I want to recognize the following people for going out of their way 
to help me: Rebaz Bapiri, Shno Ayub Mohammedamin, Rezan Bamerni, Izzet Bamerni. I 
also want to thank all the officials and individuals who gave their time for interviews and 
patiently answered my questions. 
 
Susan Khazaeli, my partner, girlfriend, best friend, and source of inspiration, has been by 
my side for the better part of a decade.  She has pushed and encouraged me to be better in 
every way. She is brilliant and I have been fortunate enough to have access to her sharp 
mind. She has spent countless hours editing, revising, and giving feedback on my work 
and ideas. ‘I could not have done it without you,’ Susan. 
 
  
 iv
Table of Contents 
 
  
ABSTRACT and KEY WORDS ................................................................................. i 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................... ii 
 
CHAPTER 1.  Introduction .......................................................................................... 1 
 
  Background on De Facto States ................................................................. 4 
  Methodology .............................................................................................. 8 
  Outline of the Argument ............................................................................ 14 
  Scholarly Contribution ............................................................................... 20 
    
CHAPTER 2.  Theorizing De Facto States .................................................................. 23 
 
  Realism and Neorealism ............................................................................ 24 
  Realism and the Origins of De Facto States .............................................. 27 
  Realism and the Behaviour of De Facto States .......................................... 34 
  Constructivism ........................................................................................... 37 
  Constructivism and the Origins of De Facto States ................................... 39 
  Constructivism and the Behaviour of De Facto States .............................. 44 
  Summary of Findings ................................................................................. 46 
  Liberal Theory of International Relations .................................................. 52 
  Identifying Preferences .............................................................................. 58 
  Liberalism and the Origins of De Facto States .......................................... 60 
  Liberalism and the Behaviour of De Facto States...................................... 65 
  Criticisms of Liberalism ............................................................................ 71 
 
CHAPTER 3.  Kosovo ................................................................................................. 74 
 
  Kosovo’s Early History .............................................................................. 78 
  The Origins of Kosovo as a De Facto State (Preferences) ......................... 81 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 93 
  The Behaviour of Kosovo (Preferences) .................................................... 95 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 105 
  Kosovo and Serbia: Looking Forward ....................................................... 109 
  Conclusion ................................................................................................. 114 
 
CHAPTER 4.  South Sudan ......................................................................................... 116 
 
  Sudan and South Sudan’s Early History .................................................... 120 
  The Origins of South Sudan as a De Facto State (Preferences) ................. 127 
  The First Sudanese Civil War .................................................................... 128 
  The Second Sudanese Civil War ................................................................ 142 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 151 
 v
  The Behaviour of South Sudan as a De Facto State (Preferences) ............ 153 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 159 
  Conclusion ................................................................................................. 164 
 
CHAPTER 5.  Iraqi Kurdistan I ................................................................................... 167 
 
  Iraqi Kurdistan’s Early History .................................................................. 168 
  The Origins of Iraqi Kurdistan as a De Facto State (Preferences) ............. 175 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 186 
  The Evolution of Iraqi Kurdistan: 1994-2003 (KDP-PUK Civil War) ...... 192 
  Conclusion  ................................................................................................ 202 
 
CHAPTER 6.  Iraqi Kurdistan II ................................................................................. 204 
 
  The Behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan as a De Facto State (Preferences) ........ 205 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 212 
  The Behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan Since June 2014 (Preferences)............. 227 
  Capabilities ................................................................................................ 234 
  Conclusion ................................................................................................. 243 
 
CHAPTER 7.  Conclusion ........................................................................................... 245 
 
APPENDICES  ........................................................................................................ 257 
 
 I.  Economy of Kosovo .......................................................................................... 257 
  Economy of Serbia ..................................................................................... 258 
 II.  Economy of South Sudan ................................................................................. 259 
  Economy of Sudan ..................................................................................... 260 
 III.  Economy of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq ............................................................. 261 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................ 262 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE .............................................................................................. 285 
 
 1
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The state has traditionally been the primary actor in the international system and the 
principal object of analysis in comparative politics and international relations.  The 
primacy of the state can be explained by two factors: States possess legal standing under 
international law and the state has been the dominant actor in the international political 
system since the mid-seventeenth century.  The state is defined as “a human community 
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a 
given territory.” 1  According to Max Weber’s definition, a state also possesses a 
population, territory, government, and recognition from other states.  Recognition is 
particularly important given that it provides states with a legal standing in the 
international system. Highlighting this importance has been the emergence of a growing 
number of ‘de facto states’ since the end of World War II.  
A de facto state can be defined as an entity that possesses control over a defined 
territory, population, and government, but does not possess international legitimacy in the 
form of recognition from other states.  (A more precise definition will be offered in the 
coming pages.)  De facto states often emerge following the outbreak of violent conflict 
between an ethnic group and the parent state.  Some recent examples include the conflicts 
between Kosovo and Serbia, South Sudan and Sudan, and the Kurds and Iraq.  Although 
the universe of cases is small (there have been 24 de facto states since the 1960s), de 
facto states play an important role in regional security and stability.  De facto states often 
possess stable political and economic systems and, according to the existing literature, 
aspire to de jure statehood.  The latter point will be the focus of this thesis. 
                                            
1
 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation. Translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1965), 2. 
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 In order to better understand the behaviour of de facto states, this thesis asks the 
following questions: What are the factors that shape and influence de facto state 
preferences and behaviour?  What are the factors that determine if a de facto state will 
declare independence or preserve the status quo?  More specifically, in terms of the cases 
under examination, why did Kosovo and South Sudan declare independence while Iraqi 
Kurdistan has not?  The goal of this dissertation is to identify the conditions under which 
a de facto state may declare independence and when it may preserve the status quo.  The 
thesis will examine the cases of Kosovo, South Sudan, and Iraqi Kurdistan.  The cases 
share similar historical and political trajectories, but diverging outcomes.  A comparative 
analysis of these cases, therefore, will allow us to identify the factors responsible for 
pushing Kosovo and South Sudan, but not Iraqi Kurdistan, towards independence. 
 The existing literature largely relies on realist and constructivist assumptions to 
explain the behaviour of de facto states.  From a realist end, the literature argues that de 
facto states are largely a product of self-help and the security dilemma facing groups in 
multiethnic states, which compel de facto states to view independence as a means to 
survival.2  Independence, therefore, is a fixed preference and the ultimate goal of de facto 
states.3  From a constructivist perspective, the literature argues that self-interested ethnic 
                                            
2
 Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); Nina Caspersen, 
“Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States,” The International Spectator: Italian 
Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 44, No. 4 (2009): 47-60; and Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in 
World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
3
 See Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics; Scott Pegg, International Society and the De 
Facto State; Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for 
Sovereignty (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, Unrecognized States 
in the International System (London: Routledge, 2011); Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s De Facto States: 
Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004); Pal 
Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 43, 
No. 6 (2006): 723-740. 
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elites exploit nationalism to advance their political and economic agendas. 4  This, in turn, 
can harden ethnic identities and lead to a self-fulfilling process towards ethnic conflict 
and demands for independence. The existing literature, although insightful, does not fully 
explain the behaviour of de facto states.  In particular, the literature has fallen short of 
explaining the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan.  To fill this gap, this thesis will employ a 
liberal approach, with a particular focus on political institutions, economic factors, and 
domestic politics, to explain the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan.  
Such an approach will demonstrate that the preference for independence is the result of 
the interaction between the de facto state and the parent state, and not inevitable, as the 
literature assumes. 
 I argue that de facto states will forgo independence when the parent state 
furnishes the de facto state with autonomy and offers sufficient economic incentives.  
Other mitigating factors include the domestic environment of the de facto state and the 
parent state, the role of regional and international governments, and the presence or 
absence of the old regime of the parent state.  The point is this: De facto states can be 
persuaded to forgo independence under the right political and economic conditions.  This 
argument leads to the following hypotheses.  First, a de facto state will pursue 
independence if it does not possess ‘sufficient autonomy’ within a democratic parent 
state.  Second, a de facto state will forgo independence if the economic benefits of a 
union with the parent state outweigh the potential benefits of independence. (These 
hypotheses will be explored in greater detail in the subsequent pages.) 
                                            
4
 Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States,” World 
Politics Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 2001): 524-552; Charles King, “Eurasia’s Nonstate States,” East European 
Constitutional Review Vol. 10 (2001): 99-102. 
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This project will add to the growing literature on de facto states, the ways in 
which they emerge, form preferences, and behave in the international system.  There are 
at least two reasons to study de facto states.  The first reason is that de facto states have 
become increasingly important actors in regional and international politics over the past 
several decades.  The increasingly important role of de facto states is evidenced by their 
impact on the global economy (e.g., Eurasia’s de facto states have a massive illicit 
economy) and in triggering regional conflicts.  Despite their relevance, we still know 
little about why de facto states emerge, how their preferences are formed, and what 
shapes their behaviour and decision-making.  Shedding light on these overlooked issues 
will allow us to better understand the role of de facto states in regional and international 
politics, including in Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia.  The second reason is that the 
existing literature simply does not provide a satisfactory explanation for why some de 
facto states declare independence and others do not.  More research is required to 
improve our understanding of de facto states. 
 
Background on De Facto States 
De facto states first emerged from the decolonisation period of the 1960s and 1970s.  
They were unable to achieve their political objectives of independence, but established de 
facto entities.5  For example, South Katanga (Democratic Republic of Congo) emerged as 
a de facto state in 1960 and Biafra (Nigeria) emerged as a de facto state in 1967.  The late 
1980s to early 1990s produced the greatest number of de facto states following the 
                                            
5
 There is an important difference between de facto states and other autonomous entities such as provinces 
or autonomous regions. Whereas autonomous regions must constitutionally answer to a central government, 
de facto states are no longer under the purview of a central government. 
 5
collapse of the Soviet Union.6  The literature has identified 24 de facto states since the 
end of WWII.  They include: Abkhazia, Anjouan, Biafra, Bougainville, Chechnya, East 
Timor, Eritrea, Gaguazia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Katanga, Kosovo, Montenegro, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Palestine, Republika Srpska, Republica Srpska Krajina, Sahrawi Arab 
Democratic Republic, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam, Taiwan, Transnistria, 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and South Sudan.7  Some have since graduated to 
full statehood, others have been reintegrated by the parent state, and still others continue 
to function as de facto states. De facto states have historically been marginalized and 
ignored by the international community due to their tenuous status. 
Scott Pegg was the first to systematically bring the term ‘de facto state’ into the 
international relations lexicon.8  It should be noted, however, that political scientists were 
using the term well before Pegg’s 1998 article.  For example, Sean Randolph used the 
term to refer to Taiwan in a 1981 article and, in a 1993 article, Michael Gunter used the 
term to refer to the creation of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 9   Before 
considering a definition, it is important to briefly discuss the conceptual framework 
regarding the de facto state.  There are several names that typically appear: ‘de facto 
state,’ ‘quasi-state,’ ‘semi-state,’ ‘unrecognized state,’ and ‘contested state.’  This project 
will use the term ‘de facto state’ for a couple of reasons.  First, the term would seem to 
                                            
6
 During this period, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Gaguazia Transnistria, 
Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina emerged as de facto states in Eastern Europe and the 
Caucusus region. 
7
 See Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics; Scott Pegg, International Society and the De 
Facto State; Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for 
Sovereignty; and Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, Unrecognized States in the International System  
8
 Scott Pegg, “De Facto States in the International System,” Institute of International Relations No. 21, The 
University of British Columbia (1998). 
9
 See Sean S. Randolph, “The Status of Agreements Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the 
Coordination for North American Affairs,” The International Lawyer Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981): 249-262 and 
Michael Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 14, No. 2 
(1993): 295-319 
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best encapsulate the entity under discussion in that de facto state possesses all the 
characteristics of a state, except recognition (de jure recognition).  It is, in fact, a state but 
lacks legal standing.  Second, the other terms mentioned above do not capture the entire 
universe of cases of de facto states.  For example, Deon Geldenhuys uses the term 
‘contested state,’ arguing that “most contested states find their very right of statehood 
being challenged by their original (or central) states and the broader international 
community.” 10   Geldenhuys’s reasoning assumes that all de facto states are seeking 
recognition.  But this is not wholly supported by the empirical record.  ‘Semi-state’ and 
‘quasi-state,’ meanwhile, suggest that the entity is a partial state or resembles one.  Such 
descriptions fail to accurately conceptualize de facto states, which are not half states, but 
rather states in practice but without legal recognition.   
In addition to the disagreement about terminology, there are also several competing 
definitions in the literature.  Scott Pegg offers what is perhaps the most useful starting 
point: 
A de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to 
power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has 
achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a 
specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period 
of time.  The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states 
and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a 
sovereign state.11 
 
A second definition, from Tozun Bahcheli et al. says de facto states are  
…regions which carry out the normal functions of the state on their territory, and which are 
generally supported by significant proportions of their population. They are not ‘de jure 
states,’ because they are not sanctioned by the international order.  Instead, other states and 
inter-state organizations…continue to recognize the authority of the state from which the 
secession occurred, even though its writ no longer runs in the break-away region, and 
though its legitimacy is rejected by the region’s population.12 
 
                                            
10
 Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics, 3. 
11
 Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, 26. 
12
 John McGarry, “Forward: De Facto States and the International Order,” in Tozun Bahcheli, Barry 
Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, x. 
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Much like Pegg’s definition, Bahcheli et al. view de facto states as secessionist entities by 
default.   
The issue with these and other definitions used in the literature is the inclusion of 
problematic concepts and conditions that do not accurately capture de facto states.  Nina 
Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield propose one such definition. They maintain that de facto 
states must possess the following: 
[One,] de facto independence, including territorial control, and have managed to maintain 
this for at least two years…[two,] have not gained international recognition, or even if 
they have been recognized by some states, they are still not full members of the 
international system of sovereign states…[and three,] [t]hey have demonstrated an 
aspiration for full, de jure, independence either through a formal declaration of 
independence, through the holding of a referendum, or through other actions or 
declarations that show a clear desire for a separate existence.13 
 
But the authors do not explain why they impose the two-year cut-off on de facto states, 
they do not clarify what is meant by full membership in the international system of 
sovereign states, nor do they explain what is meant by “a clear desire for a separate 
existence.”14  Pegg’s definition is also problematic.  For example, Pegg uses ‘popular 
support’ as a criterion of de facto statehood.  But it is not clear what is meant by ‘popular 
support’ and more importantly, he fails to justify why it is a prerequisite. 
In short, the existing definitions provide a useful starting point, but they fall short 
of capturing the essence of de facto states.  Most definitions offer ambiguous criteria that 
do not further our understanding of de facto states.  The literature requires a definition 
that is narrow and describes the entire universe of cases.  To this end, the project 
proposes and uses the following definition:  A de facto state controls a defined territory, 
provides an array of services to the population, and enters into diplomatic and economic 
                                            
13
 Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, Unrecognized States in the International System, 3-4. 
14
 Ibid. 
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relations with other states, but it does not possess de jure recognition.15  This definition 
intentionally avoids the claim that de facto states are always striving for independence 
and recognition given that the literature has not substantiated this claim.  To be sure, de 
facto states will exhibit varying degrees of the features stipulated in the above definition. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology employed in this dissertation will combine a detailed case study of 
Iraqi Kurdistan with the comparative historical analysis of South Sudan and Kosovo.  The 
aim of this project is to identify probabilistic rather than universal generalisations given 
the small universe of cases. Although social research cannot draw watertight conclusions, 
it can develop and test hypotheses by using the evidence that is available.  The objective 
of this project is less to develop and test generalizations and more to understand and 
explain particular outcomes. This project will use the comparative method to identify and 
explain the causes for the different outcomes between Kosovo and South Sudan on the 
one hand and Iraqi Kurdistan on the other.  It will do so by using the case study method 
and J.S. Mill’s method of difference. 
 The case study is advantageous, as it will allow for in-depth analysis and 
identification of causal mechanisms.16  John Gerring defines a case study as the “intensive 
study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases.  Case study 
                                            
15
 This definition borrows from Bahcheli et al. and Scott Pegg. 
16
 Darren Hawkins, “Case Studies,” in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), The Sage Handbook of 
Comparative Politics (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 59. There is a trade-off when choosing case 
studies: the project will gain depth versus breadth, construct validity versus generalizability, causal 
mechanisms versus causal effects, deterministic versus probabilistic arguments, and theory generating 
versus theory testing. 
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research may incorporate several cases.”17  Case studies allow researchers to identify and 
thoroughly ‘measure’ the pertinent indicators and concepts.18  Case studies identify new 
variables and lead to new hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and 
fieldwork.19  In addition, case studies identify the causal mechanisms (or intervening 
variables) responsible for an outcome.  One can reach generalization by increasing the 
number of observations, which can be achieved by observing “additional units similar to 
the unit under study.”20  
There are also disadvantages to the case study method.  One of the primary 
critiques against case study research is the issue of ‘selection bias.’21  This occurs when 
researchers select their cases on the dependent variable and therefore have the same 
outcome for all cases. This issue will be discussed further in the subsequent paragraphs.  
A second limitation is that case studies can make only “tentative conclusions on how 
much gradations of a particular variable affect the outcome in a particular case or how 
much they generally contribute to the outcomes in a class or type of cases.”22  A third 
criticism is that case study research is not representative of a larger universe of cases.  
That is, case study researchers are willing to trade-off generalizability “to develop 
cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of 
cases with a high degree of explanatory richness.  Case study researchers are more 
interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the 
                                            
17
 John Gerring, “The Case Study: What it is and What it Does,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 95. 
18
 John Gerring, “The Case Study,” 20. 
19
 Ibid., 21. 
20
 Darren Hawkins, “Case Studies,” 54. 
21
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 21. 
22
 Ibid., 25. 
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mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which 
those conditions and their outcomes arise.”23 
This project will use process-tracing to construct the case studies and to 
complement the comparative methods outlined below.  Process-tracing can be described 
as the exploration of the causal mechanisms, which are the intervening factors that occur 
between the causal variable(s) and the outcome.24  A particular advantage of this method 
is that the spatial and temporal context of the case study is considered and studied 
meticulously.  George and Bennett note that researchers will cite history, primary and 
secondary documents in the form of archival documents and interview transcripts in order 
to identify the causal mechanism between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable.25  Process-tracing is a complementary tool for other research methods such as 
Mill’s methods of agreement and difference.26  For example, George and Bennett note 
that “process-tracing can identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out 
variables that were otherwise left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for 
spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single 
case.”27 
The method here is explicitly comparative as it will highlight the similarities and 
differences across the three cases and will draw conclusions based on the outcomes of 
                                            
23
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
30. 
24
 James Caporaso, “Is there a Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Comparative Politics? The Case of 
Process-Tracing,” in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Comparative 
Politics (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 70. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
215. 
27
 Ibid. 
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each case.28  The case studies and process-tracing will be complemented by J.S. Mill’s 
method of difference (or the most similar systems design).  In A System of Logic, John 
Stuart Mill first outlined the method of difference and the method of agreement, which 
have since been used and reformulated by other social scientists.  Adam Przeworski and 
Henry Teune note that the method of agreement is perhaps the “dominant view” for 
comparative inquiry.29  With the method of agreement, researchers choose cases with the 
same outcome and identify the similar features or variables.  Once the independent 
variables are identified, the researcher then looks for the independent variables that are 
constant across the cases and will be considered the explanatory variables. 30   The 
independent variables that vary are not considered to be a factor in the outcome.   
 With the method of difference, researchers examine cases that do not have the 
same outcome (or dependent variable).  The researcher then identifies the possible 
independent variables (or causes) and looks for the independent variables that differ and 
the others that are constant across the cases.31  The independent variables that differ are 
considered to be the cause and will be further examined. The logic of each method is 
outlined in the tables below.  In Table 1, Variable X3 would be considered the 
explanatory variable and in Table 2, Variable X1 would be considered the explanatory 
variable. 
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Table 1: The Method of Agreement    
 Outcome Variable X1 Variable X2 Variable X3 
Case 1 1 0 1 1 
Case 2 1 1 0 1 
Case 3 1 0 1 1 
 
Table 2: The Method of Difference 
 Outcome Variable X1 Variable X2 Variable X3 
Case 1 1 1 0 1 
Case 2 1 0 0 1 
Case 3 0 1 0 1 
 
The issue of selection bias is particularly problematic in qualitative research.  
According to Barbara Geddes and others (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba) it is important 
to select cases with diverging outcomes in order to avoid bias.32  Selecting cases on the 
dependent variable will only highlight the differences between those cases without 
providing insight into cases with a different outcome.33  To explain why de facto states A 
and B have not declared independence and why de facto states C and D have done so, one 
must identify the factors present in cases A and B that are missing in C and D.34 In order 
to avoid the shortcomings of selection bias, this project has selected cases with different 
outcomes.   
Two of the de facto states (Kosovo and South Sudan) have declared independence 
and one (Iraqi Kurdistan) has not.  Kosovo and South Sudan are both relatively poor and 
landlocked countries that do not have a strong (neither political nor economic) 
institutional capacity to build effective states.  Despite these apparent limitations on their 
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33
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34
 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get,” 132. 
 13
wherewithal for independence, both Kosovo and South Sudan declared independence in 
2008 and 2011, respectively.  Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other hand, possesses a functioning 
democratic government, an increasingly strong economy, and the institutional capacity to 
function as an independent state, but it continues to function as a de facto state.   
Kosovo and South Sudan share many similarities, including recent declarations of 
independence.  Both cases represent economically poor regions with ineffective security 
and political apparatus. Both territories are landlocked and economically weak, factors 
that will contribute to the difficulties associated with independent statehood.  South 
Sudan possesses a ruined infrastructure, it is economically one of the weakest states in the 
world, and relies solely on oil for its revenue.  Kosovo’s infrastructure was damaged 
during the 1999 NATO bombings of Serbia’s forces and the nascent state faces issues of 
corruption, poor management, and weak economic and bureaucratic systems.  Despite 
their economic and political weaknesses, both pushed for independence.  What accounts 
for this behaviour? 
Iraqi Kurdistan is selected for three reasons. First, Iraqi Kurdistan shares many 
historical similarities with Kosovo and South Sudan. Like its counterparts, Iraqi 
Kurdistan fought bloody civil wars against the parent state and faced oppressive regimes 
and policies.  In this sense, Iraqi Kurdistan shares the same motivations as Kosovo and 
South Sudan for pursuing independence.  Second, Iraqi Kurdistan possesses a functioning 
democratic system that has been in place for decades and it has built, over three decades, 
the institutional capacity to govern its territory and population. Iraqi Kurdistan is also 
economically well off relative to Kosovo and South Sudan.  The region has experienced 
steady economic growth and it has rebuilt its infrastructure since 2003. In other words, 
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Iraqi Kurdistan is in a better political and economic position than other de facto states and 
therefore would stand a good chance of surviving as an independent state, but it continues 
to function in a federal Iraq.  Third, the existing literature has largely ignored Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  We know very little about the preferences and behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Iraqi Kurdistan, therefore, represents an interesting case, as it is an outlier that the 
literature has overlooked. 
A final and significant methodological component of this work is the use of data 
collected from elite interviews, which are particularly relevant for process-tracing.35  Elite 
interviews will accomplish three objectives. First, the information from the interviewees 
can strengthen the robustness of the findings gathered from existing sources.36  Second, 
data collected from elite interviews can also reveal new information about the research 
topic. 37   Third, data from elite interviews can be used to extrapolate the views and 
preferences of a small group to that of a larger population. 38   This is possible in 
democratic systems where politicians and other officials have been elected to represent 
the views and advance the preferences of the larger population.  
 
Outline of the Argument 
Despite their growing impact on regional security and stability, our understanding of the 
de facto state is limited and has progressed little over the decades due to the focus in the 
literature on Eurasia’s de facto states (i.e., Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia 
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and Transnistria). 39   The existing literature on de facto states does not adequately 
understand or explain cases outside of Eurasia.  For example, the de facto state literature 
fails to explain Iraqi Kurdistan and, in particular, it has failed to explain why the Iraqi 
Kurds have not declared independence. Given the similar historical experiences with 
South Sudan and Kosovo, the Kurds should be equally committed to independence.  The 
literature and its conceptual framework assume that all de facto states are secessionist in 
nature.40  The empirical record does not support this assumption.  The goal of the project, 
therefore, is to explain the variation in de facto state behaviour and to identify the 
conditions under which a de facto state will forgo independence.  In other words, why do 
some de facto states declare independence, while others do not? 
The existing literature lacks a theory that can fully explain the behaviour of de 
facto states.  The aim of this dissertation is to develop such a theory and to examine it 
empirically.  Grounded in existing theoretical and empirical findings on ethnic conflict 
and de facto states as well as primary data from interviews and participant-observation 
research in Iraqi Kurdistan, the dissertation has two primary objectives.  The first 
objective is to understand and explain de facto state preferences and behaviour in the 
cases of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan.  The second objective is to develop a 
set of generalisations that can help to explain not only the cases under consideration here, 
but also other similar cases.  
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 In addition, this dissertation will highlight the conditions under which de facto 
states emerge, how they function in the international system, and how we can better 
understand their behaviour.  The following questions will guide the project: First, why 
and how do de facto states emerge? Second, why do some de facto states pursue 
independence while others do not? And finally, what are the implications for Iraqi 
Kurdistan?  More specifically, I explain why Kosovo and South Sudan declared 
independence while Iraqi Kurdistan has maintained the status quo.  What explains the 
divergence in the outcomes?  Is it a group’s historical trajectory or is it geopolitical 
considerations on the part of regional and international powers?  Do de facto states make 
cost-benefit analyses before declaring independence or does the fervour of nationalism 
compel its leaders to push for independence?  These questions have not been adequately 
addressed by the literature.   
My findings, grounded in liberal theory from international relations, lead to the 
following hypotheses.  A de facto state will pursue independence when the parent state is 
unwilling to offer ‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of political institutions, such as 
autonomy and federalism.  This hypothesis suggests that secession is viewed as a last 
resort in order to attain the political rights and goals of a group.  Second, a de facto state 
will stop short of independence when it has secured autonomy from the parent state and 
the de facto status offers more economic and political benefits than full independence.  
This hypothesis suggests that material factors, including economic incentives and 
political conditions, shape and influence de facto state behaviour. The main point is that 
the preference for independence is neither fixed nor inevitable. 
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In addition, the case studies indicate that there are additional factors that can 
mitigate the demand for independence.  First, a de facto state will find it difficult to 
secure independence and survive without support from the international community and, 
in particular, a major power.  After all, it is difficult to secure widespread recognition 
without the backing of major powers.  Second, the presence of certain individuals can 
play an important role in assuaging the push for independence.  For instance, the 
unexpected death of John Garang, who was a federalist, left the door open for South 
Sudanese officials who were adamant on the South’s independence.  In Iraqi Kurdistan, 
former Iraqi President and high-ranking Kurdish official, Jalal Talabani, repeatedly 
voiced support for a democratic, federal, and united Iraq.  A final mitigating factor is the 
presence or absence of the old regime of the parent state.  A de facto state will be 
reluctant to enter into a political union with a regime that is responsible for its oppression 
and, in most cases, a regime that has committed violence against the de facto state’s 
population.  
The project consists of seven chapters including this Introduction, which outlines 
the definition and history of de facto states as well as the dissertation’s methodology, 
argument, and scholarly contribution. It is followed by Chapter 2, which has two primary 
functions.  First, it assesses the existing literature and its explanations for the emergence 
and behaviour of de facto states.  This will include an evaluation of the approaches 
employed to explain the emergence of de facto states, including the various approaches to 
ethnic conflict.  Second, the chapter will outline and evaluate the explanatory power of 
competing theories from international relations to the study of de facto states. The chapter 
outlines the ways in which realism, constructivism, and liberalism explain the origins and 
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behaviour of de facto states.  The objective is to account for the origins of de facto states 
and to identify the factors that shape and influence the behaviour of de facto states.  The 
chapter concludes that de facto states can emerge from ethnic conflicts and international 
interventions and that the preference formation and behaviour of de facto states is best 
explained by liberalism’s emphasis on political and economic institutions of the parent 
state and the domestic context of the de facto state.  
Chapter 3 examines the case of Kosovo and explains Kosovo’s decision to 
unilaterally declare independence in 2008.  The chapter begins by tracing Kosovo’s early 
history starting in the fourteenth century to the present. The historical account will 
provide the context necessary for understanding Kosovo’s tumultuous relationship with 
Serbia.  Next, the chapter examines the political relationship, beginning in the twentieth 
century, between Kosovo and Serbia and provides an explanation for the descent into 
violence.  The outbreak of war between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia ultimately 
compelled the international community to intervene and establish a de facto state in 
Kosovo.  The next section examines the factors that shaped Kosovo’s behaviour during 
its de facto status and its ultimate decision to unilaterally declare independence.  The 
chapter concludes by arguing that Kosovo’s independence was not inevitable if Serbia 
had initiated meaningful political and institutional reforms during the late 1980s to the 
early 1990s.  Although the old regime was removed from Serbia, the other two conditions 
were not met – Kosovo was not granted sufficient autonomy until it was too late and the 
union with Serbia offered Kosovo few economic incentives. 
Chapter 4 examines the case of South Sudan and identifies the conditions that 
allowed South Sudan to break away from Sudan in a constitutional referendum. The 
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chapter begins with a historical account of the Sudan and South Sudan.  It demonstrates 
that the early history and political makeup of Sudan played a major role in the conflict 
between Sudan and South Sudan.  Specifically, the chapter reveals that the early political 
and economic institutions of Sudan were responsible for the discontent in the South and 
the outbreak of civil war in 1955.  The chapter reveals that South Sudan emerged as a de 
facto state following two long and bloody civil wars that did not produce a clear winner 
and, as a result, the regime in Khartoum and South Sudan agreed to a peace agreement 
that laid the foundations for the South’s secession.  The chapter argues that South Sudan 
ultimately seceded from Sudan due to flawed political institutions, too few economic 
incentives, and the presence of the old regime in Khartoum. From South Sudan’s 
perspective, Khartoum did not undertake significant democratic reforms and the presence 
of the Omar al-Bashir regime created an environment of mistrust and fear among the 
South Sudanese.  As a consequence, South Sudan did not trust the old regime in 
Khartoum to uphold the autonomy granted to the South. 
Chapter 5 introduces the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.  It begins with a summary of 
Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan’s early history beginning in the early twentieth century with the 
creation of Iraq.  Like Sudan, the early history of Iraq highlights the importance of 
institutional design, especially in multiethnic states.  Iraq’s political and economic 
institutions excluded the Kurdish population and successive regimes in Baghdad adopted 
oppressive policies and harsh tactics in response to Kurdish requests for political rights.  
The chapter then examines the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto state in 1991 
following three decades of political and military conflict between the Kurds and 
Baghdad.  The chapter illustrates that Iraqi Kurdistan did not possess the capabilities to 
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establish a de facto state and, instead, the chapter argues, the intervention by the United 
States and the United Kingdom was imperative for the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan.  It 
concludes by arguing that Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and behaviour were shaped by 
the political institutions and economic incentives constitutionalized in the post-2003 Iraq.  
Chapter 6 examines the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan in two time periods.  The 
first section covers 2005 to June 2014 and the second section covers June 2014 to early 
2015.  The chapter examines the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan and outlines the reasons for 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to forgo independence in favour of a continued union with 
Iraq.  The chapter reveals that Iraqi Kurdistan passed on two windows of opportunity to 
secede from Iraq. The chapter relies on data collected from interviews with governmental 
and non-governmental officials from Iraqi Kurdistan and argues that Iraq’s post-2005 
constitution furnishes the Kurds with sufficient autonomy, significant economic 
incentives, and established a democratic political system.  These factors have thus far 
persuaded the Kurds to forgo independence.  Chapter 7 concludes by restating the 
primary objectives of the project, summarizing its main findings, and discussing the 
implications of the findings for the existing and future research and for policymakers. 
 
Scholarly Contribution 
The project is original and contributes to the existing literature on many levels.  At the 
broadest level, this dissertation is the first attempt to systematically examine the 
divergence in de facto state behaviour.  The thesis demonstrates that de facto state 
preference for independence is not predetermined, but rather a product of the parent 
state’s political institutional design, economic factors, and the de facto state’s domestic 
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context.  In doing so, the dissertation challenges the existing assumptions that the 
preference for independence is a constant in time and space.  The dissertation examines 
cases with three different outcomes, unilateral declaration of independence (i.e., Kosovo), 
negotiated secession (i.e., South Sudan), and peaceful reintegration (i.e., Iraqi Kurdistan), 
in order to identify the conditions that influence and shape de facto state behaviour. 
The project is also original in its application of international relations theory for 
understanding and explaining de facto states.  It will contribute to the existing literature 
by testing different international relations theories and by better situating the de facto 
state literature in the broader theoretical debate in international relations.  The existing 
literature implicitly uses realist and constructivist assumptions and concepts to explain 
the emergence and behaviour of de facto states.  On the one hand, the literature argues 
that the desire for security as well as military capabilities determine a de facto state’s 
preference for independence.  On the other hand, international norms of state sovereignty 
and territorial integrity often prevent de facto states from achieving independence.  This 
project argues that these explanations are incomplete and, instead, relies on liberal 
assumptions about the role of political institutions, economic incentives, and domestic, 
regional, and international factors in shaping the preferences of de facto states. 
The thesis also makes an empirical contribution to the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Much of the case of Iraqi Kurdistan relies on the analysis of data gathered from three 
fieldwork trips.  The first extended field trip was a two-month tour of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
mainly Erbil and Duhok provinces, which included interviews with high-ranking 
politicians, political party officials, academics, members of NGOs, and journalists.  In 
total, I conducted semi-structured interviews with over 30 officials from Iraqi Kurdistan.  
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The second field trip was a two-week visit to Iraqi Kurdistan in the lead up to the 
Kurdistan regional elections held in September 2013.  During this trip, I was able to 
observe the campaigning tactics of the political parties and I participated in the election 
as an international observer for the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq.  The 
final field trip was undertaken in the lead-up to the Iraq general election of April 2014.  
Over a ten-day period, I gained valuable insights into the electoral and campaigning 
process. I observed the campaign of a Kurdistan Democratic Party candidate, attended a 
political rally, and observed the election and the outcome results. 
Finally, the project makes an original contribution to our understanding of Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s preferences and behaviour.  As mentioned above, the existing literature has 
largely ignored Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is currently a footnote in the de facto 
state literature.  Focusing on Iraqi Kurdistan is particularly important given the uncertain 
realities in Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS also known as ISIS and ISIL 
and by a loose Arabic acronym Daesh).  Understanding the motivations of Iraqi 
Kurdistan will provide researchers and policymakers with information that will increase 
our understanding of the issues between the Kurds and Iraq.  This case is an important 
test case for the de facto state literature given the historical and political contexts.  Iraqi 
Kurdistan suffered decades of political and social oppression at the hands of successive 
regimes in Baghdad and yet it has not seceded from Iraq. From a policy perspective, 
therefore, the thesis will demonstrate that policymakers and the international community 
possess the tools and mechanisms required for containing violence between a de facto 
state and the parent state.   
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Chapter 2: Theorizing De facto states 
The purpose of this chapter is to review international relations (IR) theory and the 
existing literature to outline the explanations for the origins and behaviour of de facto 
states.  The argument presented by this research will rely on theory from IR. The project 
attempts to explain the variation in de facto state behaviour and, more specifically, to 
explain why Kosovo and South Sudan declared independence while Iraqi Kurdistan 
continues to function as a de facto state.  The existing literature inadequately addresses 
these issues. This project will try to explain and identify the conditions under which a de 
facto state will pursue independence and when it may preserve the status quo.  The 
objective of this section is to explain de facto state behaviour and preference formation. 
It will begin by outlining the general assumptions of realism (both classical and 
neorealism) and constructivism, how each theory explains the origins and behaviour of de 
facto states, and the ways in which preference formation and capabilities influence de 
facto states.  The objective is to demonstrate that realism and constructivism, although 
insightful, do not provide a thorough explanation for the emergence and behaviour of de 
facto states.  This will be followed by a general overview of liberalism, its core 
assumptions about international politics, a liberal account of the origins and behaviour of 
de facto states, and a discussion on how state preferences are formed and to what extent 
capabilities matter.  The theoretical section argues that liberalism, its explanation for how 
preferences are formed, and its emphasis on institutions, interests, and the domestic 
political system provides the best explanation for the behaviour and decision-making of 
de facto states.  It will conclude by identifying the weaknesses and criticisms of this 
approach and what, if any, implications this has for understanding de facto states. 
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The prevailing consensus, both from IR theory and the de facto state literature, is 
that groups engage in conflict, including ethnic and nationalist conflict, as a means to 
security and survival in an anarchic system.  According to realism, under such a system, 
threats from others are constant and therefore security is the overriding imperative for 
groups and states alike.  This approach uses the related concepts of the ‘security 
dilemma’ and anarchy to account for ethnic conflict.  Another explanation, offered by 
constructivism, suggests that nationalism is constructed and used by elites to advance 
their own interests, which can lead to ethnic conflict and the desire for independence.   
Both explanations overlook the role of institutional design and economic interests 
in explaining the emergence of intra-ethnic political competition and the creation of de 
facto states.  This dissertation relies on liberal theory from IR and focuses on how flawed 
political institutions and economic incentives also shape actors’ behaviour.  There is little 
doubt that most de facto states emerge as a consequence of ethnic conflict, but it is not 
clear what sparks ethnic conflict in the first place.  The existing literature contends that de 
facto states desire independence but it does not explain how or why the preference for 
independence materializes.  This chapter will argue that groups engage in conflict when 
institutions fail to assuage their political needs and when their economic interests are not 
being met.  
 
Realism and Neorealism 
Hans Morgenthau argues that: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for 
power.  Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the 
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immediate aim.”41  Classical realists such as Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr argue 
that the innate human desire to dominate others leads to conflict and wars.42  Realists 
believe that human nature, which is immutable, compels individuals and states to want 
power as an end in itself.43  Individuals cannot satisfy their desire for power due to the 
constraints imposed by societal rules and norms and, therefore, attempt to satisfy their 
desire for power through their nation or nation-state. 44   This is one of the motivations 
behind the struggle for statehood.  It provides groups with a means for satisfying the 
desire for power and for protecting their nation.45 
In addition to power, realism stresses the importance of the state, the notion of 
self-help, and survival.  Ethnic groups, or nations, want to establish their own state not 
only for power but also to ensure their survival.  Although a nation’s survival does not 
always depend on the creation of its own state, it is the most desirable political 
objective.46 According to realist thought, therefore, because states are in a competitive 
self-help system, they must be prepared for war at all times. 47   This reality causes 
perpetual insecurity within the state as ethnic minorities may pose a threat to the state’s 
internal and external security. 48   States will often persecute minorities if they are 
perceived as a potential threat to the its internal security.  Based on these assumptions, 
the preference for statehood is predetermined, as nations want power and security. 
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The central premise of all realist theories is that “the existence of several states in 
anarchy renders the security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete 
with each other for power or security.”49  Due to this insecurity international politics is 
viewed as a “self-help” system where states cannot rely on others for protection.  Power 
and its acquisition are essential for political actors.50  Neorealists agree that international 
politics is a struggle for power but disagree with the fundamental classical realist notion 
that the struggle for power is a result of human nature.51  Instead, neorealists argue that 
power is a means to security in an international system that is characterized by anarchy.  
Anarchy is the organizing principle of the international political system and is 
differentiated by the notion of hierarchy governing the domestic system.  The units in the 
international system are functionally similar but differ in capabilities and the relative 
distribution of power is therefore a key variable for understanding issues in world 
politics.   Kenneth Waltz argues that states are sensitive to the material capabilities of 
other states given the anarchical nature of world politics. 52   This sensitivity to the 
capabilities of others, Waltz believes, forces states to maximize security rather than 
power. 
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Kenneth Waltz argues that states (and by extension de facto states) have little say 
in how their preferences are formed.53  Waltz’s structural analysis of world politics argues 
that the structure restricts certain actions while propelling states toward others. 54  
Structural realism’s defining feature vis-à-vis classical realism is “the idea that 
international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure.”55  
It is the structure that allows neorealism to formulate a theory about the international 
political arena.   
Realists argue that interests are predetermined and “exogenous to social 
interactions.”56  That is, states enter into social interactions with their interests already 
formed and, as such, social interaction does little to influence interests.  This point is 
particularly important for how realists understand de facto states. From this perspective, a 
de facto state’s preference for independence is structurally determined rather than a 
deliberate policy decision.  The structure of anarchy and the goal of survival compel de 
facto states to pursue independence to ensure their survival. Preferences are 
predetermined and therefore what matters is whether or not actors possess the capabilities 
to advance their interests and secure their preferences. 
 
Realism and the Origins of De Facto States 
Neorealists argue that the distribution of capabilities across competing states is one of the 
key ordering principles of the anarchic system.  The relative distribution of power, 
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therefore, is a key variable for understanding issues in world politics.   Waltz argued that 
states are sensitive to the material capabilities of other states given the anarchical nature 
of world politics.  This assumption can also be applied to different ethnic groups in a 
multiethnic state.  Groups are particularly sensitive and feel at risk if one group controls 
the political, security, and economic apparatus of the state.  In such cases, groups begin to 
make political and economic demands that often lead to conflict.  
The existing literature has framed the onset of ethnic conflicts and the emergence 
of de facto states through a realist lens.  This position has garnered strong support from 
the academic literature and, in particular, from realists.57  Barry Posen argues that the end 
of the Cold War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia demonstrate that ethnic conflicts 
can be explained by the notion of the ‘security dilemma.’58  He notes that once groups 
became responsible for their own security in the early 1990s, they had to assess the nature 
of security threats emanating from their neighbours and determine what, if anything, 
could be done to mitigate the threats.  Realism’s emphasis on security and relative power 
may encourage the security dilemma where “what one does to enhance one’s own 
security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.”59  This is prevalent 
amongst groups that previously coexisted under a central authority but are expected to 
maintain their security and build states at the same time.60  The collapse of Yugoslavia 
and the subsequent ethnic wars is illustrative, according to Posen.  He examines the 
conflict between the Croats and the Serbs where each group viewed the emergence of the 
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other’s identity as a threat.61  This is equally applicable to the conflict between Serbia and 
Kosovo.  Kosovo viewed Serbian nationalism and actions as a threat to its identity and 
security.  Serbia was equally concerned that Kosovar nationalism and demands would 
lead to the breakup of Serbia. 
Chaim Kaufmann argues that ethnic conflicts will endure as long as rival groups 
exist under the same physical territory.  He argues that physical separation of groups into 
‘defensible enclaves’ is the only possible solution to ethnic conflict.62  Physical separation 
will reduce the security dilemma associated with ethnic conflicts.  Kaufmann views 
ethnic identities as fixed and extremely difficult to change in the short and medium terms.  
Kaufmann and Posen do not believe there can be any room for compromise because the 
security dilemma compels groups to harden their positions in order to protect the group.  
This approach leaves little room for agency, institutions, or material factors.  Instead, it 
prioritizes security and power.  It assumes that ethnic groups rebel and seek power and 
independence in order to survive in a system that pits one group against another. 
David Lake and Donald Rothchild also argue that ethnic conflict is a consequence 
of insecurity and uncertainty.  They argue that “ethnic conflict is most commonly caused 
by collective fears of the future.  As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series 
of dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them 
the potential for tremendous violence…Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs, 
operating with groups, reinforce these fears of physical insecurity and cultural 
domination and polarize society.” 63   They attribute ethnic conflict to “information 
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failures, problems of credible commitment, and incentives to use force pre-emptively 
(also known as the security dilemma).”64 
Similar to Posen and Kauffmann’s discussion of the effects of the security 
dilemma on ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz notes that group apprehension about 
survival and subordination highlights the “importance accorded to competitive values: a 
group that cannot compete will be overcome or will die out.”65  Horowitz outlines the 
ways in which group comparison influences group relationships. The fear of 
subordination is a main feature of group interaction in multiethnic systems and can lead 
to fear of extinction.66  The threat (or even perception of a threat) to a group’s survival 
can lead to ‘extreme demands,’ which from the perspective of an outside observer may 
seem disproportionate.67  Finally, in some cases the threat may be perceived as imminent 
and severe that it may prompt exclusivist demands that can lead to confrontation and 
violence.68 
In terms of de facto states, the literature argues that civil wars and security 
concerns explain the emergence of de facto entities.  Daniel Byman and Charles King 
note that de facto states emerge from civil wars, particularly in cases where there is a 
weak parent state.  Michael Rywkin adds that all de facto states have emerged as a result 
of “ethnic or religious conflicts or state disintegration.”69  Deon Geldenhuys, likewise, 
emphasizes secession as “the single most common” cause for the emergence of de facto 
states.70   Charles King notes that Eurasia’s de facto states (i.e., Abkhazia, Nagorno-
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Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria) emerged as a result of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the ensuing ethnic and separatist wars.71  In these cases, civil war broke 
out between the minority group and the parent state as a consequence of the state’s 
weakness (and with the support of outside states such as Armenia in the case of Nagorno-
Karabakh and Russia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the minority group creates a de 
facto state.  Once it has secured its status, the de facto state is able to build institutions 
that allow it to function like a de jure state. 
According to this position, de facto states emerge from ethnic conflicts or civil 
wars that break out when an ethnic group feels threatened by another group or the parent 
state.  Often times, the conflict does not produce a clear winner and the ensuing stalemate 
leads to the creation of a de facto state.  Neighbouring and regional states are reluctant to 
intervene or recognize the incipient state as such an intervention would violate the 
international norm of territorial integrity. 72   Additionally, states fear that recognizing 
secessionist movements may lead to their own territorial breakup.73 The norm of non-
intervention thus prevents other states from recognizing secessionist entities.   
Neorealism’s concepts of anarchy, self-help, security dilemma, and power 
(capabilities) are thus very relevant to the study of de facto states.  First, much like 
sovereign states, de facto states want to survive and, some, desire full independence.  As 
mentioned earlier, neorealism assumes that states have little agency due to the pressures 
thrust upon them from the anarchic system of self-help and competition.  As such, state 
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identity and interests are fixed and stable.  That is, states are rational and self-interested 
actors whose main objectives are security and survival.  Second, the ability of de facto 
states to advance their preferences largely depends on their capabilities.  Capabilities play 
a central role in the emergence, survival, and resolution of de facto states.  Much like 
sovereign states, de facto states must possess sufficient power, or capabilities, not only to 
establish a de facto state, but also to survive and to gain independence.  Capabilities as 
understood here refer to the power, both military and economic, that a de facto state 
requires to ensure its survival.  Without sufficient capabilities, de facto states stand little 
chance of surviving, let alone successfully seceding from the parent state. 
As mentioned above, neorealism is often used by the existing literature to explain 
de facto states.  The literature emphasizes that de facto states exist in an international 
system that prefers state sovereignty and disapproves of secessionist entities.  De facto 
states must attain enough power to preserve their status while trying to secure recognition 
and independence.  Sovereignty is therefore seen as the ultimate goal of de facto states.  
Neorealism’s emphasis on power and capabilities, anarchy, and self-help also explain the 
emergence of de facto states.  In a neorealist international system, states are left to their 
own devices for security and survival.  When a domestic group challenges the authority 
of the parent state and the state does not possess the capabilities to put down the 
rebellion, a de facto state can emerge.  The conflict can only be resolved if one actor 
possesses the capabilities to defeat the other.  
Although realism’s notions of capabilities, security, and anarchy provide valuable 
insights, they do not fully explain the onset of ethnic conflicts or the emergence of de 
facto states.  First, if ethnic conflict is a consequence of the ‘security dilemma’ then what 
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explains the absence of ethnic conflict in certain multiethnic states?  For example, there is 
an absence of violence between various ethnic groups and the central government of 
India and the Catalans and the central government in Spain despite the presence of the 
conditions outlined by realism.  In these cases, institutional frameworks (e.g., federalism, 
autonomy, power-sharing, and democracy) have mollified the demands of ethnic groups 
in a multiethnic state.  The effects of the security dilemma are either absent or reduced 
with the suitable institutional setup.   
Second, realism’s focus on security and capabilities overlooks the role of material 
factors that drive the demands of ethnic groups.  Many ethnic conflicts are a result of a 
state’s unwillingness to meet a minority group’s political and economic demands.  As a 
consequence, groups resort to violence in order to gain the political and economic 
institutions necessary to meet their demands.  Third, if the system is one of anarchy and 
self-help then what explains the endurance of de facto states?  De facto states often have 
a long life span despite their military and economic weakness.  Finally, neorealism 
underestimates the role of international law and organizations and their influence on the 
emergence and outcome of de facto states.  The international norm of sovereignty 
prevents most de facto states from acquiring recognition from the international 
community and compels them to settle for de facto statehood until their status can be 
resolved.  Although neorealism can explain the role of power and force, it overlooks the 
role of interests, institutions, and material factors in understanding the emergence and 
persistence of de facto states.74 
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Realism and the Behaviour of De Facto States 
From a realist perspective, de facto state behaviour would be very similar to the 
behaviour of sovereign states.  First, de facto states will prioritize security and survival.  
These imperatives are thrust upon states by the self-help system, which compels states to 
prioritize survival over other imperatives.  De facto state preference for statehood, 
therefore, is fixed under the anarchic structural environment.  Institutional arrangements 
such as federalism and power-sharing are unlikely to engender cooperation between the 
de facto state and the parent state.  Realism argues that the fixed preference for statehood 
and survival is the primary objective of de facto states.  Achieving independence, 
however, is a difficult task without sufficient capabilities.  In short, de facto states desire 
independence, but achieving this goal largely depends on capabilities. 
As mentioned earlier, from a realist perspective de facto state preferences are 
formed exogenously.  Preference formation is a result of the interaction between the 
anarchic structure, the self-help system, and the desire for survival.  These key features of 
realist theory dictate that states and de facto states will pursue security, power, and 
independence in order to survive.  Domestic politics have little influence over how 
preferences are created in an anarchic international system.  Ethnic conflict, also a 
consequence of the security dilemma, reinforces the preference for independence. States 
and other actors have little agency in an anarchic international system that compels states 
to pursue security and survival.  Under such constraints, de facto states prioritize 
independence to ensure their survival.  Because preferences are predetermined, a de facto 
state’s behaviour is dictated by its capabilities. Without adequate power, a weak state 
may face existential threats from a more powerful and aggressive state.  Similarly, a de 
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facto state must possess enough capabilities to simultaneously defend itself against the 
parent state and to pursue the goal of independence.   
These realist assumptions provide useful insights into de facto state behaviour.  
For instance, the regional setting in which the de facto state finds itself shapes and 
influences its behaviour.  Iraqi Kurdistan is a case and point.  It is surrounded by states 
that strongly oppose Kurdish independence.  Given this setting, Iraqi Kurdistan is unable 
and unwilling to push for independence lest it provoke Turkey and Iran.  South Sudan, on 
the other hand, received support from neighbouring and regional states in its struggle 
against Khartoum. Similarly, Kosovo’s demand for independence was influenced by the 
support it received from regional European powers. 
However, it should be noted that regional and/or international support does not 
determine whether a de facto state declares independence.  In fact, most de facto states 
(i.e., South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, Taiwan, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam, Transnistria, and Biafra) have declared 
independence even though they have little support from the international community and 
regional governments.  Indeed, most states condemn or ignore de facto states due to 
instability associated with them.  For example, Charles King has argued that Eurasia’s de 
facto states pose a serious security problem to the region’s stability.  That is, unlike 
Taiwan and the TRNC, Eurasia’s de facto states contribute to conflict, corruption, and 
crime.75  As a consequence, the likelihood of cooperation between the de facto state and 
the parent state is further diminished. 
The anarchic international system and security imperatives make cooperation 
between states, and by extension de facto states and the parent state, difficult to achieve.  
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Joseph Grieco argues that realism with its emphasis on conflict and competition offers a 
comprehensive understanding of cooperation.76  Realists assume that “the fundamental 
goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their 
relative capabilities.”77  This builds on Waltz’s assertion that: “If an expected gain is to be 
divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to 
implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.”78  Robert Jervis also argues 
that cooperation under anarchy remains difficult due to the lack of enforcement in the 
international arena.79  As a result, states are unwilling to risk their security and economic 
well being even though cooperation can be mutually beneficial.  This is the same line of 
reasoning Kaufmann provides regarding the behaviour of ethnic groups. Cooperation is 
risky for realists not only because of the fear of cheating but also because of the fear that 
cooperation might spread benefits disproportionately.  
In an anarchic and self-help international system, it follows that ethnic groups and 
de facto states would be unwilling to cooperate or negotiate with the parent state to 
resolve the conflict.  The de facto state does not want to lose its de facto status and the 
parent state fears the breakup of its territorial integrity.  Both actors view cooperation in 
terms of relative gains.  That is, both sides fear that the other actor will gain more from an 
agreement or settlement of the conflict.  The ensuing security dilemma perpetuates the 
conflict and compels the de facto state to seek independence.  Security and survival 
become paramount for both actors reducing the potential for a negotiated settlement. 
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According to Kaufmann, power-sharing or federalism are unlikely to permanently 
resolve ethnic conflicts.80  Power-sharing cannot mitigate the intractable differences or 
the security dilemma which characterize ethnic conflict.81  Ethnic groups are unlikely to 
submit to a power-sharing agreement under the conditions of ethnic violence and 
heightened security threats from other groups or the parent state.82  Kaufmann argues that 
ethnic conflicts harden ethnic identities and the security dilemma deepens the divisions 
and the conflict.  These conditions, says Kaufmann, make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
resolve ethnic conflict “until or unless the security dilemma can be reduced or 
eliminated.”83  Kaufmann proposes ‘physical separation’ as the best method for ending 
and resolving longstanding ethnic conflicts. 84   Under such conditions, there is little 
chance that de facto states would agree to cooperate with and function in a political 
arrangement under the control of the parent state. 
 
Constructivism  
The following section will outline and examine the ways in which constructivism 
explains the origins and behaviour of de facto states.  Constructivism can be divided into 
the ‘conventional’ and the ‘critical’ strands. Ted Hopf notes that conventional 
constructivism shares methodological and epistemological assumptions with traditional 
theories such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.85 Conventional constructivism 
grew out of first-wave critical theory but differs in an important way: conventional 
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constructivism accepts and indeed adopts empirical analysis.86 Critical constructivism, on 
the other hand, rejects the fundamental epistemological and methodological assumptions 
of traditional IR theories.  This thesis will discuss the assumptions and applicability of 
conventional constructivism to the study of de facto states.87 
Constructivism’s opening emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War, an event that called into question the supposedly explanatory 
powers of the mainstream theories, neorealism and neoliberalism. There are three 
important constructivist assumptions that will be discussed here.  First, in addition to 
material structures, constructivists believe that ideational and normative structures (i.e., 
systems of shared ideas, values, and beliefs) shape and influence behaviour.88  Second, 
constructivists argue that identities influence interests and actions. Unlike the realists, 
constructivists do not view interests as exogenously determined, but instead attempt to 
show how actors develop their interests in order to understand international phenomena.89  
Third, constructivists believe that “agents and structures are mutually constituted.”90  In 
other words, actors have more agency than realists claim. Instead of taking structures as 
constant, constructivists believe that structures and actors produce and reproduce one 
another through norms. 91   Actions have no meaning without the intersubjective 
understanding formed by these norms and ideas. Furthermore, abstract structures such as 
anarchy, the state system, and sovereignty, which seem to be natural, are socially 
constructed by ideas and these too can change. 
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On the issue of anarchy, constructivists believe that it is ‘indeterminate’ and 
mutually constituted by actors adopting norms.  Anarchy exists because states accept its 
implications and constraints. Neorealism’s notions of anarchy and self-help are 
applicable, therefore, only when a state faces ‘catastrophic consequences’ for not 
possessing the capacity to defend itself.  But when states are willing to cede control over 
outcomes to other actors, it demonstrates that neorealism’s notion of anarchy is 
‘imaginary.’92  In short, the difference between neorealist and constructivist notion of 
structure is that “[n]eorealists think it is made only of a distribution of material 
capabilities, whereas constructivists think it is also made of social relationships.”93  As 
Alexander Wendt has noted, anarchy does not have any consequences other than what 
states accept.  If states choose to interact with each other as allies rather than as 
adversaries then anarchy would not have any consequences.  Wendt says the international 
arena is characterized by the “beliefs and expectations that states have about each other, 
and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures.”94  Self-help 
and the security dilemma, therefore, are not consequences of the structure of anarchy, but 
rather products of the interaction of the units in the system.95 
 
Constructivism and the Origins of De Facto States 
Constructivism, as outlined by Alexander Wendt, largely accepts the statist approach of 
neorealism but disagrees with the implications of anarchy on state identity, preference 
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formation, and interests.  Constructivists disagree with the structural and deterministic 
worldview of the neorealists.  Wendt argues that the notion of self-help is a result of the 
interaction between states rather than anarchy.96  Anarchy, from a constructivist point of 
view, is not a determining cause of self-help, but rather a permissive one.  Wendt notes 
that “structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process.  Self-help and 
power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.”97  Essentially, Wendt 
believes that the international arena is characterized by the “beliefs and expectations that 
states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than 
material structures.” 98   Furthermore, Wendt argues that the materialist approach to 
structure fails to recognize how the international system constructs state identities and 
interests.  That is, the system affects and constitutes state identities. 
Constructivists are also concerned with the ways in which state identity and 
interests are formulated.  According to constructivists, state identity and interests are not 
predetermined or fixed, but are malleable.  State identity and interests take shape through 
interactions and ideas. Martha Finnemore argues that the identities and interests of states 
are a product of their interactions with each other in the international system.  Finnemore 
says, “We cannot understand what states want without understanding the international 
social structure of which they are a part…States are socialized to want certain things by 
the international society in which they and the people in them live.”99  It follows then that, 
if identities are constructed, they can also be changed and reshaped.  Such an 
understanding of international politics also assumes that states can learn to cooperate. 
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These assumptions can also be applied to the interests and behaviour of ethnic 
groups. Constructivists view identity in terms of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined 
communities.’  That is, modern technology and a modern economic system have made it 
possible for individuals to conceive of a larger and ‘imagined’ ethnic community.  
Modernity provides groups with a wider communal base and institutionalizes ethnicity.100  
Although constructivists view ethnicity as constructed, they recognize that ethnicity is an 
enduring concept and difficult to dismantle once it takes deep roots.101  Constructivists 
also view identity and ethnicity as an instrument that can be exploited by elites.  From 
this view, ethnicity is a purely instrumental tool used by elites for political or economic 
goals.  This position argues that political elites may promote peace in some places and 
drive conflict in other places to advance their interests.102  Instrumentalists view ethnicity 
as a means to an end rather than an inherent and fixed trait.  Although constructed, ethnic 
identity has powerful emotional appeal to individuals and organisations.  David Laitin 
argues that although some ethnic identities are relatively deep, as primordialists say, it is 
culturally and more contingently constructed.103 
Constructivists argue that ethnicity is neither natural nor completely open, but 
rather a social phenomenon.  Based on this perspective, ethnic violence is caused by 
‘social systems’ and it is the socially constructed nature of ethnicity that leads to 
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violence.104  Ethnic conflict occurs, and de facto states emerge, when elites use the idea of 
identity and nationalism to advance their own personal interests.  Constructivists believe 
that “ethnic conflicts are the result of pernicious group identities created by 
hypernationalist myth-making” subsequently used by ethnic entrepreneurs striving for 
power.105  According to this reasoning, if ethnic identities can be forged and manipulated 
by ethnic entrepreneurs, then individuals and groups can also be influenced to adopt less 
exclusive identities and cooperate.106  Chaim Kaufmann, however, argues that even if 
ethnic identities are created, it is impossible to reverse the consequences of ethnic 
conflicts and to create peace following an ethnic conflict.107  The violence from ethnic 
conflicts creates fear and hatred between groups that cannot be reconstructed to create 
peace. 
The constructivist interpretation of nationalism and ethnic conflict demonstrates 
the importance assigned to the role of agency.  Whereas realists emphasize the structure 
of the international system in dictating state preferences, constructivism argues that 
individuals and groups can also influence and shape state preferences and policies.  It 
follows then that state preferences are not exogenously given by the structure.  Rather, 
preferences are often a reflection of the extent to which elites and individuals have the 
power to influence government.  This does not mean that ideas are more important than 
power and interest, which remain as important as they were, but that power and interest 
have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.   
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According to constructivism, traditional capabilities such as, military power and 
economic resources can facilitate a group’s fight for independence, but the power of ideas 
underpinning the struggle for independence is also important.  When a group does not 
possess capabilities, it will be forced to accept de facto independence.  In addition to the 
role of capabilities and ideas, international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention 
make it difficult for aspiring states to seek support and recognition from other states.  
From a constructivist viewpoint, de facto states are a by-product of the international norm 
against recognizing unilateral secession and the sanctity of state sovereignty.  Lowering 
the threshold for secession would encourage other discontented minorities to seek 
independence rather than to accept autonomy.108  
Constructivist assumptions offer valuable insights into the origins of ethnic 
conflict and the emergence of de facto states.  In particular, the idea that leaders of ethnic 
groups use nationalism as a pretext for advancing their personal interests is an interesting 
concept.  Still, constructivism does not adequately explain ethnic conflict for two reasons.  
First, nationalist identities cannot simply be created without a historical foundation with 
which to work.  The historical and cultural foundations of ethnic groups demonstrate that 
nations have some common past that binds their members.  Ethnic identity and loyalty to 
one’s ethnic group is often strong, particularly after a conflict, that it matters little 
whether it is constructed or ancient. Whereas realism ignores the role of agency; 
constructivism overstates its importance on ethnicity.  Second, like realism, 
constructivism ignores the role of interests and material factors in explaining the 
behaviour of ethnic groups and the emergence of de facto states.  Ethnic entrepreneurs 
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would not be successful at mobilizing ethnic groups for war or secession if those groups 
are economically and politically content.  
 
Constructivism and the Behaviour of De Facto States 
According to constructivism, de facto state behaviour is shaped by ideas, international 
norms, and the role of elites in constructing preferences.  De facto states are not 
constrained by anarchy or capabilities, but by the ideas and international norms that 
influence and shape the behaviour of states and state-like entities.  First, in terms of 
international norms, de facto states must consider how the international community 
would respond to a declaration of independence.  (The international community prefers to 
maintain the territorial integrity of its constituent states and therefore frowns up 
secession.109 ) Second, ideas about anarchy and survival only matter if de facto states 
accept such ideas and the implications and constraints associated with them.  That is, de 
facto states can choose to pursue security by acquiring military capabilities or they can 
choose to pursue dialogue with the parent state and neighbouring states to arrive at a 
negotiated settlement.  
The role of agency is also an important feature of constructivism.  Individuals and 
other actors possess agency and can influence and shape the behaviour and preferences of 
states and de facto states.  For example, if elites mobilize ethnic groups for their own 
ends, then state preferences and policies can reflect the interests of such elites. De facto 
states are also susceptible to the influence of elites and agency.  Ethnic conflict may 
create strong nationalist feelings that will be difficult to change in the short-term and may 
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encourage ethnic groups to demand independence, but the point is that preferences are 
not fixed.  Indeed, institutional arrangements such as power-sharing or autonomy may 
encourage the de facto state to forgo its bid for independence.  Preferences can change.  
This is particularly true given international norms and partiality for the territorial integrity 
of states.  De facto states must be prepared to endure opposition and disapproval from the 
international community.  Even when a de facto state possesses the capabilities to break 
away from the parent state and provide security to its territory and population, 
recognition and independence are not assured.  For example, Taiwan possesses all the 
capabilities (military and economic) necessary for functioning as an independent state, 
but it is unable to secure recognition and support from other states in the international 
system.  
Like realism, constructivism is insightful for explaining some aspects of de facto 
state behaviour.  For instance, one could argue that de facto states learn to pursue 
security, power, and independence due to institutions such as anarchy and self-help and 
ideas surrounding power and security.  In addition, constructivism demonstrates that 
identities and interests are not given or fixed, but are constructed and constantly 
renegotiated.  The identities and interests of de facto states can also change.  For 
example, rather than pursuing independence, de facto states may prefer to institutionalize 
the status quo.  Still constructivism cannot fully explain the behaviour of de facto states. 
First, constructivism’s emphasis on ideas, institutions, and norms overlooks the 
importance of the institutional structures and material considerations that influence de 
facto states.  For example, Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to participate in a federal Iraq is 
shaped by the political autonomy and economic incentives offered by the union.  Second, 
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although institutions such as anarchy and self-help may be constructed, states and de 
facto states must possess sufficient power and capabilities to maintain order.  A de facto 
state, meanwhile, must possess sufficient capabilities to defend itself from an aggressive 
parent state that wishes to reintegrate the territory.  
 
Summary of Findings 
The overview and discussion of realism and constructivism reveals gaps in how the 
existing literature explains ethnic conflict and the origins and behaviour of de facto states.  
Realism’s emphasis on anarchy, structure, and power overlooks the role of the domestic 
political structure and especially economic interests and institutional design.  Economic 
interests and effective political institutions provide the incentives for a disaffected ethnic 
group or de facto state to stay with the parent state.  Realism fails to consider that under 
the right conditions preferences can change. Constructivists, meanwhile, overstate the 
power of elites have in mobilizing ethnic groups.  The power of nationalism can ebb and 
flow to reflect the short to medium-term interests of an ethnic group or de facto state.  
Finally, constructivists also overstate the extent to which international norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention will deter de facto states from seeking recognition from 
other states (and possibly from unilaterally declaring independence).  For example, 
Kosovo understood that its unilateral declaration of independence would not be 
recognized by many states including powers such as, China and European states such as, 
Spain and Greece. Governments will ignore norms of sovereignty and non-intervention 
for various reasons such as, pressure from domestic groups to advance their strategic 
interests. 
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Existing explanations do not sufficiently account for the emergence of de facto 
states.  International interventions have contributed to the emergence of de facto states, 
yet the scholarship has paid little attention. The literature does acknowledge intervention 
as a factor, but it does not adequately evaluate the significance of interventions.  De facto 
states can emerge from military intervention taken by individual states or the 
international community.  Pegg identifies foreign invasions (e.g., Turkey’s invasion of 
Cyprus to establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and external humanitarian 
interventions (e.g., the US and UK imposition of the safe zone in northern Iraq and the 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999) as contributing factors for the emergence of de facto 
states.110  Contrary to the notions of the norm of non-intervention and the inviolability of 
a state’s sovereignty, the international community has demonstrated its willingness to 
intervene in certain cases where gross human rights violations have taken place.  Indeed, 
two of the cases here (i.e., Kosovo and Iraqi Kurdistan) are examples of de facto states 
that emerged as a direct consequence of interventions from the international community. 
Although interventions are uncommon in the international community, they are 
nonetheless responsible for ending conflicts and establishing de facto states.  Most 
recently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) undertook an air bombing in 
Libya to pre-empt a massacre and to oust the former dictator Muammar Gaddafi from 
power.  It is true that the international community has been accused of selectively 
choosing to intervene in order to protect particular economic and/or security interests.  
However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the merits or intentions of 
the international community when it chooses to intervene.  Instead, the focus here is the 
role of international interventions in creating a de facto state.  That some de facto states 
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emerge as a result of international interventions does not contradict the idea that all de 
facto states originate from self-determination movements.  It would be more accurate to 
claim that the interplay between domestic and international factors leads to the creation of 
de facto states.  The case of South Sudan is illustrative.  Initially, the conflict was a 
domestic issue between the South and the government in Khartoum until regional states 
and outside powers (e.g., the US) were dragged into the conflict.  Outside governments 
provided covert military support to the South and eventually helped both sides reach a 
peace settlement in 2005. 
The goal here is not to challenge explanations regarding the origins of de facto 
states, but rather to highlight the importance of external interventions.  I hope to 
demonstrate that international interventions played a significant role in the emergence 
Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo.  Furthermore, the thesis will argue that ethnic groups rebel 
and sometimes resort to violence to protect their interests (political, economic, etc.).  
Most de facto states emerge from civil wars that do not produce a clear winner and the 
secessionist entity establishes a functioning political unit that possesses the features of a 
state but it is not recognized.  Weak states do not possess the capability to prevent the 
establishment of de facto states and do not possess the capabilities to bring the de facto 
state back into the fold.  De facto states can emerge from the actions of a group seeking 
autonomy or secession from the parent state, but they can also emerge from international 
interventions.  Indeed international intervention can help to mitigate the intensity of 
ethnic conflicts, especially in cases where there is a group that is at risk against a 
militarily strong state.111  
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Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo faced strong parent states, in Iraq and Serbia 
respectively, that were prepared to use overwhelming force to end the conflict.  Neither 
the Kurds nor the Kosovars possessed the military power to compel the parent state to 
establish an autonomous region.  Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo were in the midst of 
uprisings against the central government and both faced imminent threats and the 
possibility of massacres at the hands of the governments of Saddam Hussein and 
Slobodan Milošević, respectively.  International interventions were undertaken in both 
cases to stop the parent states from continuing to inflict violence against the weak 
minorities.  Following the imposition of the no-fly zone against Saddam Hussein’s 
regime over the Kurdish region in 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan created a functioning political 
unit that closely resembles a state.  International organizations such as, the European 
Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and NATO, established a de facto state in Kosovo 
(from 1999 to 2008) when they created and supervised administrative, legal, and security 
apparatus for Kosovo. 
The empirical record also puts into question the literatures’ assumptions regarding 
the behaviour and evolution of de facto states.  Nina Caspersen argues that some de facto 
states gain recognition and secure independence (e.g., Eritrea and Kosovo), but most 
(e.g., Chechnya and Tamil Eelam) are forcefully reintegrated by the parent state.112  The 
record, however, does not support this argument.  In fact, from the 24 de facto states 
listed in this work only five have been forcibly reintegrated by the parent state.  This is 
often achieved with a thorough military defeat of the de facto state.  The most recent 
example of this was the military defeat of Tamil Eelam by Sri Lanka in 2009.  Other 
                                            
112
 Nina Caspersen, “Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States,” The 
International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 44, No. 4, (2009), 47. 
 50
examples of forced reintegration include Chechnya (1999), Serbian Krajina (Croatia) 
(1995), Biafra (1970), and South Katanga (1963).  Peaceful reintegration is also rare 
(Anjouan 2008, Bougainville 1997, Gagauzia 1994, Republika Srpska (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina) (1995)).  Much of the existing literature argues that gaining independence 
is very difficult for de facto states.  But the empirical evidence suggests that graduating to 
independence is as common as a military loss or a negotiated settlement.  To date, five de 
facto states have graduated to full independence (i.e., Eritrea 1993, East Timor 2002, 
Montenegro 2006, Kosovo 2008, and South Sudan 2011).    
The most common outcome for de facto states is a stalemate.  That is, in most 
cases de facto states maintain the status quo and are neither defeated nor induced into re-
joining the parent state.  Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla argue in favour of maintaining the 
status quo when it comes to the question of de facto states. 113  They note that “the status 
quo may offer various forms of normalisation even when legal recognition has not been 
granted. Especially, when the political nature of the ‘recognition game’ leaves no space 
for evolving opportunity structures and does not enable de facto states to legalize their 
practices.”114  Svante Cornell’s article dispels the long-held notion that autonomy can 
mitigate ethnic tensions between a minority and its parent state.  Cornell’s article 
examines the role of an autonomous framework in reducing conflict between Eurasia’s de 
facto entities and the parent states.  He concludes, “autonomy has been a source of 
conflict and not a solution to it…secessionism is likely to be significantly higher among 
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autonomous minorities than among nonautonomous minorities.”115 
Berg and Toomla notwithstanding, much of the emerging literature overlooks the 
idea of the status quo as a potential solution.  This dissertation argues that de facto 
statehood, or the status quo, is seen as a legitimate medium to long-term goal for some de 
facto states.  Given the international community’s reluctance to recognize these entities 
and the parent state’s inability to forcibly reincorporate them back into the fold, it is not 
unlikely that these entities may continue to function as de facto states.  Nagorno-
Karabakh, a de facto state in Azerbaijan, for example, has turned its focus away from 
gaining recognition in favour of internal development.  Its leadership believes that its de 
facto “status is sustainable and can fulfill [its] goals of security and independence.”116  
The case of Taiwan is also illustrative.  Taiwan has functioned as a de facto state for four 
decades with a functioning democracy and a strong economy.  In a recent 2009 poll in 
Taiwan, more than 60 percent of the population over 20 voted for maintaining the “status 
quo.”117  Taiwan is not the only case in which the status quo is appealing.  The Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus has functioned as a de facto state for over three decades, 
while Iraqi Kurdistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have done so for 
over two decades.  Under the right conditions, de facto statehood can provide stability for 
the parent state and the neighbouring states.  For example, rather than pushing for 
secession from Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan demanded that its autonomous status, or de facto 
statehood, be entrenched in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution.  This has, to date, satisfied 
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Kurdish demands for autonomy, Iraq’s desire to maintain its territorial integrity, and 
Turkey and Iran’s need for stability in the region. 
 
Liberal Theory of International Relations 
Liberal theories in international relations stress the importance of institutions, 
preferences, information, and the domestic political system in shaping and influencing 
state behaviour.  In fact, Andrew Moravcsik argues that preferences and interests are 
more important than capabilities in explaining state behaviour.118  Helen Milner, like 
Moravcsik, emphasizes the role of institutions, preferences, and interests in influencing a 
state’s foreign policy and shaping state interests.119  Milner argues that the domestic 
political system and the relationship between citizens and the state are more important 
than the international structure of anarchy in shaping state behaviour.120  She further 
argues that states look for information and institutions to mitigate issues related to 
anarchy.  It should be noted that liberals (e.g., neoliberal institutionalists), although not 
all, accept many of the fundamental ontological and epistemological assumptions of 
neorealists regarding the primacy of the state and the presence of anarchy.  The 
difference is that liberals believe institutions, preferences, material factors, and the 
domestic political system to be important, particularly in mitigating the effects of 
anarchy.  
In addition to institutions, information, and domestic political pressures, liberals 
also give attention to the effects of material factors on state behaviour.  Although states 
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are influenced by the anarchic system, institutions, information, and cooperation can 
mitigate these effects. Given liberalism’s preference for institutions, domestic politics, 
and ideas, states are not bound by the effects of anarchy and therefore possess more 
latitude in their preference formation. According to liberalism, states pursue objectives 
that are largely determined by domestic factors rather than the anarchic structure of the 
international system.  This does not mean that anarchy does not have any consequences 
for states.  Indeed, liberals argue that although state preferences are largely formed at the 
domestic level, the pursuit of such preferences is constrained by the preferences and 
actions of other competing states.  The state is viewed as the aggregation of interests from 
individuals and groups in society.  A state’s interests, therefore, are not determined by its 
place in the structure of the international system, but by the many interests and ideals of 
the members who capture governmental institutions.121 
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi outline general liberal (what they call pluralism) 
assumptions.  First, nonstate actors play an important role in international relations. This 
includes the role of international organizations (IO), nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC).122  Second, the state is not a unitary actor.  
Instead, it is comprised of various individuals, groups, and institutions that compete for 
influence over the decision-making processes.  Third, the rationality of the state is 
challenged by the competition of various individuals and groups at the domestic level.  
The particular interests of domestic actors can shape and influence the state’s foreign 
policy.  Finally, the research agenda of pluralists goes beyond the major issues related to 
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the military-security domain. 123   The assumptions outlined by Viotti and Kauppi 
encompass the various strands of liberal theories in IR.  I believe that these assumptions 
and liberalism in general provide the best theory to explain the behaviour of Iraqi 
Kurdistan and de facto states more generally. 
In “Taking Preferences Seriously,” Andrew Moravcsik outlines a liberal theory 
free from normative and ‘utopian’ ideals. Liberal theory of IR (hereinafter liberalism) 
believes the relationship between the state and its domestic and international contexts has 
a fundamental impact on its behaviour. 124   The ‘configuration of state preferences,’ 
according to liberals, matters most in world politics.125  Using this idea as the foundation, 
Moravcsik’s article outlines ‘positive’ liberal assumptions that, like other IR theories, 
will allow researchers to formulate hypotheses, provide explanations, and make 
predictions.126  Moravcsik’s goal is to present a general and parsimonious liberal theory 
that can be used to connect otherwise disparate issue areas.127  Liberalism, he argues, 
offers a distinct research program and it is progressive “in the sense of explaining a broad 
and expanding domain” of empirical phenomena.128 
Liberalism emphasizes the impact of domestic politics on a state’s behaviour at 
the international level.  It argues that ideas and domestic interests and institutions 
influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences.  For liberals like Moravcsik, state 
preferences matter more than state capabilities.129  Liberal theory’s basic premise is that 
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“the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society 
in which they are embedded critically shapes state behaviour by influencing the social 
purposes underlying state preferences.” 130   The state is not viewed as a unitary and 
rational actor constantly at war; instead, liberals view the state as the aggregation of 
interests from individuals and groups in society.131  Moravcsik defines ‘state preferences’ 
as “a set of fundamental interests defined across ‘states of the world.’” 132   He also 
provides an important point of clarification regarding preference and strategy.  He says 
that 
[I]t is essential to avoid conceptual confusion by keeping state ‘preferences’ distinct from 
national ‘strategies’ that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. State 
preferences, as the concept is employed here, comprise a set of fundamental interests 
defined across ‘states of the world’.[…] By contrast, strategies and tactics are policy 
options defined across intermediate political aims, as when governments declare an 
‘interest’ in ‘maintaining the balance of power’, ‘containing’ or ‘appeasing’ an adversary, 
exercising ‘global leadership’, or ‘maintaining imperial control’.133 
 
State preferences are formed by the interaction of competing individuals and 
groups at the domestic level, which in turn shapes state behaviour on the international 
stage.  To explain this process, Moravcsik presents three core assumptions connected to 
the fundamental principle that “the relationship between states and the surrounding 
domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state 
behaviour by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences.” 134  
Assumption one asserts that, “the fundamental actors in international politics are 
individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who 
organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under 
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constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal 
influence.”135  This assumption presumes that the preference configuration of individuals 
and societal groups occurs independently of politics and that there is competition as a 
result of scarcity and differentiation.  In addition, the assumption claims that because 
individuals are on average risk-averse, “they strongly defend existing investments but 
remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains.”136  Some 
individuals, of course, may be more risk tolerant. 
Assumption two declares that, “states (or other political institutions) represent 
some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define 
state preferences and act purposively in world politics.”137  According to this assumption, 
the state is an institution prone to capture by competing groups in society looking to 
advance their particular interests.  Such ‘societal pressures’ can formulate or alter ‘state 
preferences.’138  Liberals view the state as a representative institution that is subject to 
“capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social forces.”139  
State preferences and action, therefore, are contingent on the preferences of “powerful 
domestic groups enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.”140  Liberalism 
prioritizes state-society relations as it examines the relationship between the government 
and the individuals and groups that it represents or controls.  State behaviour, according 
to this belief, is a reflection of the relationship between the government, its citizens, and 
the international system.141  According to the first two assumptions, state interests and 
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preferences are not fixed, but instead determined by the social context.142 
Assumption three says that, “the configuration of interdependent state preferences 
determines state behavior.”143  Essentially, liberals believe that states pursue their policy 
preferences under the constraints imposed by the preferences and behaviour of other 
states.144  Moravcsik uses the concept of ‘policy interdependence’ to explain the link 
between state preferences and state behaviour.  Policy interdependence is “the set of costs 
and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek 
to realize their preferences.”145  In short, liberals believe that state policies are largely 
determined by the preferences governments establish.   
This principle is often criticized for seemingly ignoring the international system 
and for being a domestic level theory.  Moravcsik dismisses these criticisms on two 
grounds.  First, liberalism accepts that state preferences are formulated in response to the 
domestic and international contexts (i.e., it does not draw a firm line between domestic 
and international levels of analysis).  Second, the behaviour of any state reflects not only 
its own preferences, “but the configuration of preferences of all states linked by patterns 
of significant policy interdependence.”146  States pursue their policies and preferences 
under the constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.  For liberals the 
variation in state preferences is privileged over capabilities and information.147 
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Identifying Preferences 
The concept of preferences is key to liberal theory.  Jeffrey Frieden provides a strategy 
for researching preferences and interests in world politics.  In order to identify and assess 
the role of preferences in state behaviour Frieden makes two suggestions.  First, 
preferences must be kept separate from other factors, especially the “strategic setting” so 
as not to confuse “between the causal role of actors’ interests and that of their 
environment.” 148   Second, researchers must be explicit about how they determine the 
preferences of actors.  That is, preferences must be clearly identified as “variables of 
interest or control variables.”149  Preferences are not tangible and therefore researchers 
can never know the true motivations of actors.  He says, “an actor prefers some outcomes 
to others and pursues a strategy to achieve its most preferred possible 
outcomes.”150  Frieden believes that researchers are more interested in how preferences 
influence choices (i.e., preferences are examined for the behaviour they cause).  Both 
preferences and the environment shape an actor’s behaviour.151  An actor establishes its 
preferences, and then formulates strategies according to the constraints presented by the 
environment.152 
Preferences can be identified by way of assumption, observation, and 
deduction.  Assumption is the simplest way to obtain an actor’s preferences.  For 
example, one can say that states look to maximize their welfare.  Observation, or 
induction, can take the form of studying an actor’s statements and actions to arrive at a 
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conclusion regarding its preferences.  Frieden is rather pessimistic about the utility of the 
above two approaches.  The third, and according to Frieden, the most effective method 
for identifying preferences is through deduction or by using existing 
theory.153  Deduction, however, is hampered by the quality of the available theories.  To 
circumvent this shortcoming, Frieden suggests that researchers present their “own prior 
theory of preferences, perhaps by analogy to some roughly similar problem.”154 
This project will employ observation (induction) and deduction to identify Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s preferences.  First, the study will observe Iraqi Kurdistan’s policies and 
rhetoric as a baseline for its preferences.  There are ample primary resources such as 
governmental documents, news material, and media interviews with Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) officials.  Such information will shed light on the policy objectives 
(and preferences) of the KRG.  This will be complemented by interviews with KRG 
representatives and other political and non-governmental officials in Iraqi Kurdistan.  The 
objective of the interviews is to obtain direct answers from policymakers and 
governmental representatives of the KRG regarding its preferences and interests.  
Second, the project will use liberal theory to identify Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences.  By 
examining the preferences and interests of powerful individuals and groups in the 
Kurdish region one can determine how these actors will influence the preferences of the 
de facto state.  After all, the domestic political scene often shapes the state’s foreign 
policy and preferences. 
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Liberalism and the Origins of De Facto States 
Liberal assumptions also help explain the origins of ethnic conflicts and de facto states.  
Like states, ethnic groups cannot ignore institutions, interests, and the preferences of its 
members.  Instead of relying on the security dilemma or socially constructed ideas to 
explain ethnic conflict and the origins of de facto states, liberalism emphasizes the 
institutional demands and material interests of groups.  That is, ethnic groups will often 
engage in violence when they face an oppressive parent state and they do not possess the 
political and economic institutions necessary for advancing their interests. Conflict 
breaks out when the demands of ethnic groups are not met by the parent state.  Contrary 
to the prevailing view, ethnic groups seem to view violence as a last resort.  For example, 
the South Sudanese, Kosovars, and Kurds repeatedly requested political autonomy before 
resorting to violence against the parent state.  The appropriate political institutions and 
economic incentives could have assuaged the grievances of these groups. 
The central debate here is the way in which a group’s preference for 
independence is constructed.  Is the preference for independence fixed or is it a deliberate 
decision taken based on rational interests?  Whereas realists argue that the preference for 
independence is fixed, liberals contend that material and institutional factors influence 
actors’ preferences.  According to Ashutosh Varshney, institutional explanations provide 
the best explanation for ethnic conflict. 155   The basic institutional argument is that 
political institutions play a significant role in either mitigating or causing ethnic 
conflict. 156   Institutionalism argues that ethnically diverse societies require political 
institutions that can manage the differences and mitigate tensions.  That is, ethnic 
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pluralism requires political institutions that lessen tensions related to sharing political 
power and economic resources.  The crux of the argument is that there are clear links 
between ethnic conflict or peace, on the one hand, and political institutions, on the other.  
For example, Arend Lijphart argues that consociational power-sharing can reduce ethnic 
conflict by instituting compromise between elites.157  Others, including Brendan O’Leary 
and John McGarry, have argued that some form of federalism can mitigate ethnic conflict 
and the demand for secession.158 
Secession is defined as: “an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to 
withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part.”159  
Although there are cases of groups demanding full independence (e.g., Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in Georgia), there are also cases of groups demanding autonomy.  One of 
the reasons that autonomy is more desirable than secession is that secession is much more 
difficult to achieve.  One barrier to secession is the high costs associated with it.  For 
instance, Robert Young argues that seceding from an advanced industrial economy could 
impose heavy economic costs on the secessionist entity.160  In such cases, secession is a 
matter of costs and benefits and secession becomes unattractive when the government can 
impose “large costs on citizens” (including those who want to secede) and “all citizens 
and firms must be fearful of transition costs.” 161   It is also worth mentioning that 
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independence is not the end-goal of all nationalist movements.  Michael Keating notes 
that independence is “only one possible outcome of the national claim and that there are 
many other constitutional formulas that can accommodate it.”162  In its place, a number of 
formulas have emerged, including autonomy and independence-lite, which maintain the 
unity of the parent state. 
Another impediment to secession is that the domestic and international traditional 
paradigm in dealing with secessionist movements is governed by a “disapproval of 
secession.”  A possible explanation is that a lowered threshold for secession would 
motivate an inordinate number of discontented minorities to seek independence.163  This 
has two consequences.  First, governments fear that they too could face the threat of 
secession and therefore oppose unilateral secessions.  Second, recognizing unilateral 
secessions would create international instability, particularly in view of the correlation 
between secession and violence.164  Disapproval of secession is particularly strong when it 
is unilateral; that is, without the consent of or an agreement with the parent state.165  The 
disapproval against unilateral secession is highlighted by domestic and international laws, 
which emphasize the indivisibility of state sovereignty. 166   Stéphane Dion notes that 
although there is not an international law against unilateral secession, this does not 
suggest that there is a “positive right to secession” that would compel governments to 
accept or recognize a unilateral secession. 167   In addition to the domestic laws and 
international norms against secession, Dion notes that states are “extremely reluctant” to 
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recognize unilateral secession unless it falls under decolonization. 168   Given the 
challenges associated with secession, it is not uncommon for ethnic groups to 
request/demand political autonomy.  
There are alternative political arrangements other than independence that can 
settle the status of de facto states.  This is supported by the empirical data.  Liam 
Anderson identifies three possible outcomes for de facto states: independence, forced 
reintegration, and peaceful reintegration.169  A fourth possible resolution to de facto states, 
largely overlooked by the literature, is the status quo, or continuing as a de facto state.170  
Scott Pegg categorizes the status quo or the continuation of de facto statehood as a 
solution for managing de facto states.  He says, “one distinct possibility for these entities 
is a continuation of the status quo.”171  The status quo is also implicitly outlined by Pal 
Kolstø who suggests a federal arrangement with the parent state as a way for resolving 
the conflict.172  Kolstø argues that a federal arrangement tends to foster the least tension 
between the various factions.  John McGarry, meanwhile, proposes “a negotiated re-entry 
resulting in a decentralized federal system combined with consociational power-
sharing.”173   
Others such as, Eiki Berg, argue that the federal structures put in place to preserve 
a state, often encourages the “formation of territorial administrative structures which lack 
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democratic governance and/or do not represent the will of sovereign people.”174  Martin 
Dent counters Berg and calls for the decentralization of states that encompass a 
region/group of people that wish for independent statehood.  That is, secessionist groups 
must be afforded with a ‘status’ that is something like statehood.  He argues that “this 
status must have something of the same discrete nature as independent statehood, it 
cannot be just a bit more autonomy.”175   For instance, Dent argues against the breakup of 
Iraq.  Instead, he calls for a federal or ‘super-federal’ system, which, according to him, is 
“entirely compatible with national unity.”176 
Liberal theory’s assumptions about institutions, economic factors, and the 
domestic political system provide valuable insights for understanding the origins and 
behaviour of de facto states.  De facto states often emerge as a result of the parent state’s 
unwillingness to implement the institutional framework necessary to mollify a minority 
group’s political and economic grievances.  The institutional framework can take the 
form of providing political representation (e.g., representation in the executive or 
legislature of the state) where it did not exist previously, granting the minority with 
political and economic rights previously denied, or adopting a federal system that 
furnishes the minority with political and economic autonomy.  Often times, federalism is 
the most effective means for managing minority grievances.  In fact, the groups from all 
three cases under consideration here demanded autonomy and a federal framework from 
the parent state as a precondition for maintaining the unity of the state.  From the 
perspective of the minorities, institutions such as federalism and a democratic 
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constitution provide sufficient political and economic safeguards against an oppressive 
central government.  This notion is supported by the liberal assumption that institutions 
can help attenuate actors’ apprehensions regarding cooperation with others.177 
 
Liberalism and the Behaviour of De Facto States 
According to liberal assumptions, actors’ preferences are neither predetermined nor fixed.  
Instead, preferences are contingent on and shaped by economic interests, institutional 
design, and domestic politics.  Similarly, de facto state preferences are not fixed and as 
with other actors, de facto states are influenced by economic interests, institutional 
factors, and domestic political pressures.  In addition, according to liberal theory, de facto 
states behave in a rational way to advance their interests and preferences despite the 
anarchic structure of the international system.  That is to say, nationalism and the dream 
of statehood will not compel de facto states to behave in a way that is counterproductive 
to their interests and long-term objectives.  Under the right political and economic 
conditions de facto states will cooperate with the parent state and shelve the goal of 
independence.  Liberals believe that, despite the presence of anarchy, cooperation in 
international politics is possible under the right conditions. 
Preferences are created by the interaction between economic interests, 
institutional design, and domestic politics.  First, de facto state preferences are shaped by 
the potential economic costs of breaking away from the parent state.  Independence is 
less appealing if the economic costs associated with secession are too high.  Conversely, 
de facto states will consider a union with the parent state if there are economic incentives.  
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Second, poor institutional design (both political and economic) can be a centrifugal force 
that pushes the de facto state to demand independence.  At the same time, effective 
institutional design that considers and addresses the grievances of the de facto state can 
reduce the likelihood that the de facto state will push for independence.  Finally, de facto 
states, like sovereign states, are constrained by the pressures from their domestic 
constituencies.  The political parties and governments of de facto states are not immune 
to the feedback and pressures from the population.  For example, many Kurdish officials 
indicated that although their constituents desire Kurdish independence, their primary 
concerns are economic development and security. 
The point is that the domestic context matters, even for a de facto state.  Kristin 
Bakke et al. maintain that, in addition to the abovementioned reasons, de facto states 
endure as a result of internal legitimacy. 178   They define internal legitimacy as both 
regime legitimacy and the population’s approval of the state’s social order. 179  The latter 
refers to the people’s belief that the de facto state is an independent entity from the host 
state and the former refers to the people’s confidence in the government of the de facto 
state.180  Bakke et al. find that “people’s concerns about the provision of public goods 
such as democracy, economic development, and health services, are, in addition to 
insecurity associated with criminal violence, important determinants for internal 
legitimacy.”181  To gain legitimacy de facto states will often adopt democratic practices 
and provide security for their population.  Nina Caspersen argues that because 
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recognition is one of the main priorities, de facto states attempt to establish democracy 
and order to gain legitimacy not only domestically, but also internationally.182  In their 
quest for independence, de facto states will emphasize the democratic institutions they 
have built and the empirical statehood they have achieved.183 
States require a certain measure of capabilities and power in order to protect and 
advance their interests and preferences.  Liberalism does not dismiss the importance of 
power and capabilities as imperative assets for state security.  After all, some de facto 
states (e.g., Tamil Eelam and Chechnya) cannot survive without sufficient capabilities.  
However, power and capabilities are not the only tools with which de facto states can 
advance their interests and preferences.  For example, South Sudan reached a negotiated 
settlement with Khartoum and peacefully seceded from the rest of Sudan.  Kosovo did 
not possess the capabilities to militarily challenge Serbia, but it successfully seceded 
from Serbia as a result of support from key international actors and powerful states.  
These examples demonstrate that capabilities can matter, but they also show that de facto 
states can secure their survival and advance their interests through institutions and 
cooperation with the parent state or other member states of the international community.  
Liberalism acknowledges the importance of structural constraints and the importance of 
capabilities, but it also recognizes that agency plays role in an actor’s behaviour and 
decision-making. 
De facto state behaviour is a reflection of the interaction between domestic 
pressures, economic interests, and political institutions. The case studies will demonstrate 
that de facto states are willing to forgo independence if their economic and political 
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demands are met by the parent state.  Institutional frameworks such as autonomy, power-
sharing, and federalism can encourage otherwise secessionist groups to reconsider 
independence.  Economic interests also contribute to a de facto state’s behaviour vis-à-vis 
the parent state and its decision regarding independence.  The appropriate institutional 
arrangement and economic incentives from such an arrangement can convince de facto 
states to stay with the parent state.  Finally, the governments of de facto states must, to 
some degree, consider the demands and interests of its domestic population and groups.  
De facto state political parties and governments cannot ignore the feedback from citizens, 
elites, and other interest and societal groups.   
These factors can facilitate cooperation between the de facto state and the parent 
state to preserve the unity of the state.  Democracy and its associated institutions are 
significant in maintaining the unity of ethnically divided states.  Research has 
demonstrated that secession from well-established democracies (i.e., states with “at least 
ten consecutive years of universal suffrage”) is rare.184  The reason, according to Stéphane 
Dion, is that well-established democracies are unlikely to engender fear in the union and 
confidence in secession simultaneously. 185   Fear refers to a group’s concern for its 
cultural, language, and economic and political situation in the union and confidence is a 
group’s belief that it will be better off by seceding from the union.186 
Cooperation does not imply a state of harmony, but rather a condition with 
converging and diverging interests between states.187  Liberal explanations of cooperation 
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rely on both the domestic and international level.  At the domestic level, Helen Milner’s 
work illustrates how domestic politics shape foreign policy and cooperation.  Milner 
outlines three factors that contribute to a state’s decision regarding international 
cooperation: interests, institutions, and information. 188  Milner argues that the structure of 
domestic politics – comprised of the interests of actors, the dominant institutional 
arrangements, and the information possessed by actors – will determine whether or not 
cooperation will emerge.  This explanation provides a sounds basis for understanding the 
behaviour of de facto states in relation to the parent state.  Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad, 
for example, have a cooperative, albeit at times discordant, political arrangement.   
The liberal explanation underlines the importance of interests and institutions in 
mitigating fears about cooperation.  Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane identify three 
factors that facilitate cooperation under anarchy.  First, mutuality of interests (or payoff 
structure) demonstrates that a convergence of preferences can lead to cooperation.189  
Second, the shadow of the future can promote cooperation with long time horizons, the 
reliability of information about other actors, and quick feedback about in the other actors’ 
actions.190  Third, the number of actors can influence cooperation.  It is easier to monitor 
and sanction others if the number of actors is smaller.191  The decision to cooperate is not 
always shaped by objective factors; actors’ expectations are an important consideration.   
One way to attain cooperation is through institutions.  International institutions 
can solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the issues related to the three aforementioned 
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factors.  Robert Keohane has defined institutions as a “human-constructed arrangement, 
formally or informally organized…with persistent and connected sets of rules, (formal or 
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”192  
Institutions are characterized by rules that set expectations of its members and therefore 
can reduce the uncertainties and risks associated with cooperation.  Robert Keohane notes 
that institutions and regimes reduce transaction costs and uncertainty and “tie 
governments to the mast” by generating costs for reneging.  Keohane argues that, “in 
general, regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being 
double-crossed.”193 
A liberal lens will provide a more insightful understanding of the behaviour of de 
facto states.  By opening the ‘black box’ of the de facto states, we can identify the 
sources of their preferences and in turn explain de facto state behaviour.  Such an 
approach emphasizes the role of domestic politics, interests (i.e., economic), and 
institutions.  The role of domestic politics is a valuable source of information for 
understanding the behaviour of states and de facto states.  In addition, liberalism 
considers the regional and international context.  That is, a de facto state cannot pursue its 
preferences without consideration for its environmental setting and without considering 
the preferences of other states.  Liberalism considers the domestic and international 
spheres as inextricably linked and views states as transparent entities whose relations 
with other states are shaped by its internal structure.194  Liberals tend to view individuals, 
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groups, and other non-state actors as primary actors in the domestic and international 
political arena. 195   As such these actors largely shape state behaviour through their 
relationship with the governments representing them.  Finally, a liberal account of de 
facto state behaviour reveals that the preference for statehood is not fixed and instead 
largely contingent on economic and material interests and domestic politics and 
institutional design.   
 
Criticisms of Liberalism 
Liberalism is criticized for underestimating the influence of the international system, 
eliminating the role of normative elements, and assuming actors have stable preferences 
prior to politics.  Christian Reus-Smit, for one, contends that the reformulation of liberal 
theory in IR has “undermined its status as a political theory.”196  According to Reus-Smit, 
the new liberalism has two weaknesses: “It expels normative reflection and argument 
from the realm of legitimate social scientific inquiry; and it embraces a rationalist 
conception of human agency that reduces all political action to strategic interaction.”197  
Gerry Simpson offers two critique of Moravcsik’s liberalism.  First, Simpson 
questions Moravcsik’s notion that actors possess preferences ‘prior to politics’ (i.e., 
actors come to the table with predetermined interests).  These preferences are then 
brought into the political arena where they face competition from the preferences of other 
‘preconstituted’ actors.198  Simpson asks whether there is a ‘feedback loop’ that may 
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shape actors’ preferences.  Moravcsik agrees with the notion that individuals are 
embedded in and influenced by the domestic and transnational society.  Liberalism, as it 
is used here, does not suggest that individuals and social groups are “unencumbered by 
nation, community, family, [and] and other collective identities but only that these 
identities enter the political realm when individuals and groups engage in political 
exchange on the basis of them.”199  
Second, ‘new’ liberalism understands state preferences to be shaped by the 
interaction of domestic actors and such preferences “remain largely unmodified by the 
operation of other actors in the international system.”200  A shift in a state’s preferences is 
possible, but it occurs as a result of change at the domestic level.  Simpson questions this 
notion for demarcating the domestic and international levels as mutually exclusive.201  
Moravcsik’s liberalism clearly states that although state preferences are shaped by 
domestic politics, this does not suggest that “each state simply pursues its ideal policy, 
oblivious of others; instead, each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under 
varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.”202  The notion of ‘policy 
interdependence’ demonstrates that liberalism does not view the domestic and 
international levels are mutually exclusive.203 
Beate Jahn also criticizes Moravcsik for presenting a liberal IR theory that is 
‘ideological.’ 204  Moravcsik responds that critics, and Jahn in particular, have 
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misinterpreted the theory.  He clarifies that “variation in ‘preferences’ is the fundamental 
cause of state behaviour in world politics.”205  He further notes that whereas realism 
stresses resources and an anarchic structure and institutionalism stresses information and 
transaction costs, liberalism identifies the variation in state preferences as a fundamental 
feature of international relations.206 
Despite the criticisms, I believe liberalism is appropriate for identifying the 
origins and explaining the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan (IK), Kosovo, and South Sudan.  
In order to understand the behaviour of these entities, one has to identify and observe 
their preferences.  In particular, liberalism’s focus on the role of individuals and groups, 
the importance of domestic politics, and the international context will allow for a 
systematic and thorough explanation of the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and 
South Sudan.  Liberalism’s broad approach to international politics and state behaviour 
and preferences is particularly advantageous because it does not constrain the researcher 
to a single variable or actor.  With liberalism, researchers have the ability to examine the 
role of individuals, groups, and the domestic and international contexts. 
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Chapter 3: Kosovo 
The existing literature tends to take a realist approach when explaining the behaviour of 
de facto states.  This is particularly the case on the issues of survival and independence.  
The existing literature contends that all de facto states want to survive and to secure 
independence from the parent state.  In short, the literature assumes that all de facto states 
always want independence.  At the same time, the parent state attempts to reassert its 
authority over the de facto entity.  The potential outcomes of de facto states, therefore, 
are limited to secession or reintegration into the parent state.  This project asks if there are 
conditions under which de facto states may forgo independence in favour of the status 
quo.  In the case of Kosovo, we know that it moved forward with a unilateral declaration 
of independence (UDI) in 2008.  What we do not understand is why Kosovo did not 
accept a political arrangement short of independence.  That is, why did Kosovo rebuff 
Serbia’s proposal for an arrangement that would have furnished Kosovo with significant 
autonomy?  The conventional wisdom argues that the goal of independence in itself is 
sufficient for explaining the decision-making of de facto states in general and Kosovo in 
particular.  Such an explanation is informed by the core assumptions and concepts of 
realist theory. 
While providing strong insights, realism does not adequately explain the 
behaviour of Kosovo.  After all, Kosovo did not always demand independence.  Indeed, it 
was willing to participate in a federation with Serbia until the mid-1990s following 
decades of political and social oppression.  This chapter argues that the independence of 
Kosovo was not inevitable and that, rather than the security dilemma, greater explanatory 
emphasis must be placed on the failure of Serbia to offer sufficient political autonomy 
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and economic incentives as well as on the role of the international community in 
supporting Kosovo’s bid for independence.  In other words, Serbia was unable to 
persuade Kosovo to accept a federal framework within a united Serbia. The argument is 
grounded in liberal theory and its emphasis on institutions, material factors, and the role 
of regional and international geopolitics provides a more complete explanation for the 
behaviour of Kosovo’s UDI.   
The case of Kosovo presents interesting comparative insights into the behaviour 
of de facto states.  Kosovo is a landlocked territory with weak political institutions and 
few economic prospects and yet, despite weak capabilities, it unilaterally declared 
independence in 2008.  This raises questions about the motivations behind Kosovo’s 
decision to declare independence despite its weaknesses and the challenges associated 
with independence. Specifically, what explains Kosovo’s decision to declare 
independence when it does not possess the institutional or economic capacity to function 
as an effective state? This question becomes more interesting when Kosovo is compared 
to the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Unlike Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan possesses strong 
institutional capacity, including an effective government and judiciary, and a booming 
economy that boasts vast natural resources.  In other words, Iraqi Kurdistan possesses the 
wherewithal to function as an independent state, yet it has not declared independence. 
Kosovo’s decision will be explained by examining the role of political institutions, 
economic factors, and the domestic and international factors in shaping de facto state 
behaviour and decision-making.  
Kosovo is an example of a de facto state that was established following an 
international intervention by the UN, the EU, and NATO against an aggressive parent 
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state.  The international community hoped to resolve the increasingly violent dispute 
between the Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and Serbia in the 
late 1990s.207  In 1999, the international community presented Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević with an ultimatum: to evacuate his forces from Kosovo or face NATO military 
forces. 208   Despite international pressure, Milošević refused to accept the terms of a 
negotiated settlement.  NATO responded to Serbia’s incursion into Kosovo with a 
bombing campaign and subsequently passed Resolution 1244, which established a joint 
body – the Kosovo Force (KFOR), responsible for maintaining peace and the UN 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), responsible for the civilian administration of Kosovo.209   
Negotiations over the future status of Kosovo between the European Union, the 
United States, and Russia followed these events.  It was revealed in February 2007 that 
Serbia would be willing to concede significant autonomy to Kosovo. 210   Such an 
arrangement would have provided Kosovo with a high degree of autonomy under the 
framework of a federal Serbian state.  It meant that the Assembly of Kosovo could 
govern the province autonomously, but Belgrade would reserve the right to oversee 
foreign and defence policy. 211   Kosovo refused this offer.  Kosovo’s refusal for a 
negotiated settlement demonstrates that it was unwilling to accept any arrangement short 
of complete independence. 212   Kosovo’s political leadership identified the lack of 
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mutually acceptable terms for its unwillingness to continue with a political arrangement 
in Serbia. 
The case of Kosovo and its unilateral declaration of independence divided the 
international community on the issues of international law and secession.  As of January 
2014, over 100 UN member states have conferred recognition, but over 80 UN member 
states refuse to recognize Kosovo.  Many states (e.g., Cyprus, Argentina, Spain, Greece, 
and Singapore) fear that Kosovo’s secession and recognition could set a dangerous 
precedent for future secessions, especially their own secessionist groups.  Others (e.g., 
Brazil, Vietnam, China, and Russia) have cited the principle of territorial integrity and the 
breach of international law for their unwillingness to recognize Kosovo.  States that 
conferred recognition argued that Kosovo was a unique case and therefore it does not 
establish a precedent for future secessions.  It is said that Kosovo’s secession is justified 
based on its unique historical trajectory and the human rights violations it suffered. 
This chapter will explore the case of Kosovo and is outlined as follows.  The first 
section will present a brief account of the early and modern historical relationship 
between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia and the political context in which this 
relationship has evolved.  The historical account will highlight the main reasons for the 
conflict between Kosovo and Serbia.  The remainder of the chapter will focus on the 
origins and behaviour of Kosovo.  The second section will trace Kosovo’s emergence as a 
de facto state.  In particular, it will attempt to identify Kosovo’s preferences prior to de 
facto statehood in order to demonstrate that the appropriate political institutions and 
economic incentives could have resolved the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia.  The 
third section will examine Kosovo’s evolution as a de facto state with a particular focus 
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on its bid for independence and behaviour post-de facto statehood.  This section will 
examine Kosovo’s behaviour and will offer an explanation for Kosovo’s decision to 
declare independence.  The fourth section will examine the Kosovo-Serbia relationship 
post-2008 following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. 
 
Kosovo’s Early History 
Kosovar Albanians trace their ancestry to the ancient Illyrian tribes who inhabited 
Kosovo before the arrival of the Serbs.213   This is one of the ways in which Kosovar 
Albanians make the claim to modern day Kosovo.  Miranda Vickers notes that the 
Serbian medieval empire, which included Kosovo, absorbed much of the Albanian 
population and many converted to Serbian Orthodox and in fact Albanians and Serbs 
were united in the battle against the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century.  The 
‘Battle of Kosovo’ in 1389 signalled the decline of the Serbian kingdom and, more 
importantly, paved the way for Ottoman expansion into the Balkan region.214  The Battle 
of Kosovo is a symbol of Serbian identity under threat; one that is often used by Serbian 
nationalists to mobilize against the breakup of Serbia.215  Kosovo is significant for Serbia 
given its history as the ‘cradle of Serbia’ and due to the presence of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in Kosovo.216  
The Ottomans controlled Kosovo from the fifteenth until the twentieth century 
and in the process altered the religious and the demographic makeup of Kosovo in favour 
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of the Albanian population.217  This outcome, argue Vjeran Pavlakovic and Sabrina Petra 
Ramet, resulted in competing claims for Kosovo: The Serbs presented a historical claim 
to the territory, while the Albanians pointed to their majority and the reality on the 
ground.218  A significant number of Serbs, estimated at 185,000, migrated to the north into 
Serbia proper – a move that significantly reduced the Serbian population in Kosovo.219 
This is one of the explanations for the majority Albanian population in Kosovo.   
The demographics shifted again in the late nineteenth century with the arrival of 
approximately 155,000 Albanians in Kosovo.220  This issue became significant when the 
Ottoman Empire was defeated and Kosovo fell under Serbian rule.221  James Ker-Lindsay 
notes that despite the historical claims from both sides that date back centuries, the 
contemporary conflict between the Albanian Kosovars and Serbia can be traced back to 
the early twentieth century.222  Kosovo remained under Serbian rule following the end of 
World War I and the creation of Yugoslavia in 1929.223  By the end of World War II 
(WWII), the Albanian population viewed Kosovo as its native homeland and its proper 
place was with greater Albania.224   
In 1939 Mussolini’s Italy invaded and captured significant territory to form 
Greater Albania, which included Kosovo and western Macedonia.  During this short 
period (1939-1943), large numbers of Albanians settled in Kosovo, while the Serbian 
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population was forcibly expelled from their homes further widening the demographic 
disparity.225  According to Serbian officials and nationalists, tens of thousands of Serbs 
were expelled from Kosovo during the 1940s. 226  Italy’s capitulation in 1943 led to the 
collapse of Greater Albania and paved the way for the emergence of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) under Josip Broz Tito.  In 1945, Kosovo became a 
constituent of the SFRY and was recognized as an autonomous region, a position the 
Albanian Kosovars found unacceptable.  They believed that Kosovo ought to possess the 
same degree of sovereignty as the six republics that constituted SFRY.   
In addition, while the six republics constituted Yugoslavia’s official nations, the 
Kosovar Albanians were viewed as a minority.227   This unequal status prompted the 
Kosovars to request recognition as a nation equal to the other republics throughout the 
1950s.228  These appeals were rejected on the grounds that republic status would pave the 
way for Kosovo to secede from Yugoslavia to join neighbouring Albanian.229  Not all 
Kosovar Albanians desired a union with Albania, however, as many demanded 
independence for Kosovo. 230   From the early 1960s until the constitution of 1974, 
Yugoslavia underwent political reforms that provided the republics with increased 
sovereignty. While Kosovo was granted more autonomy; its demands for republic status 
were ignored.231  Extended autonomy was insufficient from Kosovo’s perspective as it did 
not include the right to self-determination and it did little to improve Kosovo’s poor 
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economic position.232  As a result, Kosovo’s political and economic grievances intensified 
beginning in the 1980s with the death of Tito.  
 
 
The Origins of Kosovo as a De Facto State 
Preferences 
This section will outline the emergence of Kosovo’s preference for independence and 
will demonstrate that meeting Kosovo’s autonomy requests (i.e., republic status) could 
have moderated its demands for independence. Granting republic status to Kosovo could 
have reduced political tensions and the likelihood of violence between the Kosovars and 
Serbia. Throughout the 1980s, Kosovo requested republic status to protect its political 
and economic interests against an increasingly hostile central government in Belgrade.  
Rather than accommodating Kosovo’s requests, Serbia repealed Kosovo’s constitutional 
autonomous status and thereby pushed Kosovo to demand independence. 
One of the main consequences of the instability brought on by Tito’s death in 
1980 was the rise of Albanian nationalism and the backlash against the Serb population in 
Kosovo.  The ethnic tensions forced many Serbs in Kosovo to leave and resettle in Serbia 
proper. This once again dramatically altered Kosovo’s demographics in favour of the 
Albanian population.233  Whereas the Albanian proportion of Kosovo’s population soared 
from 67 percent in 1967 to 84 percent in 1991, the Serb population decreased from 27 
percent to 10 percent during the same period.234  The demographic shift, according to 
Lazslo Gulyas, was distressing to Belgrade and fuelled its fear of the disintegration of 
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Serbia.235  Serbian fear and Kosovo’s demands for more political rights, including the 
right to self-determination, set the stage for the conflict between the Kosovar Albanians 
and Belgrade.  
Kosovo’s increased demands for autonomy and republic status began with student 
demonstrations in 1981. 236  A contributing factor to the unrest in Kosovo was the 
increasingly worsening economic conditions of Kosovar Albanians who viewed federal 
officials as the reasons for Kosovo’s poor economic performance.237  The protests were 
initially conducted by students demanding improved conditions at the universities, but 
soon included other groups such as miners, teachers, and civil servants.238  When the 
protests turned violent, the federal government declared a state of emergency and arrested 
suspected leaders.239  The root cause of the conflict, including the protests of 1981, was 
that Kosovo did not believe it possessed the recognition and political status that it desired 
and deserved.  According to Julie Mertus, the demonstrations were initiated by an 
educated group of Kosovo Albanians which demanded greater political autonomy for 
Kosovo.240  The main grievance was Belgrade’s unwillingness to bestow republic status 
on Kosovo.241  Dennison Rusinow notes that Serbia feared that recognizing Kosovo as a 
republic would set a precedent for the other federal units and would ultimately lead to the 
collapse of the federation.242 
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Kosovo’s increased resistance, protests, and demands for republic status and, at 
times, independence only heightened Serbian insecurity about its position in the 
confederation and its territorial integrity.  Kosovo’s historical significance to Serbia 
should not be understated.  After all, Serbians fervently believe that Kosovo has 
historically been Serbian land and must remain so.  Serbia’s president, Slobodan 
Milošević, exploited the historical beliefs and the political crisis in the former Yugoslavia 
to fuel Serbian nationalism by arguing that Serbia deserved more power within 
Yugoslavia.243  Academics generally agree that Milošević was a political opportunist who 
exploited the Kosovo issue for his personal power.244 
Political and ethnic tensions between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs increased 
from the mid-1980s to the late 1980s.  The Albanian population was accused of using 
terror tactics, including murder, rape, and the desecration of Serbian churches and 
cemeteries to drive out the Serbian population from Kosovo.245  In addition, the Kosovar 
Albanians targeted Yugoslav administration and Serbian officials as retaliation for 
Serbia’s repression against Kosovo.  In response to the violence, Serbia, under Milošević, 
continued policies that Kosovar Albanians viewed as oppressive and intended to weaken 
Kosovo’s autonomy.  Beginning in the late 1980s, Slobodan Milošević replaced 
Kosovo’s provincial leadership with his own representatives, undertook reforms that 
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rescinded Kosovo’s right to pass legislation, and finally in 1990, placed Kosovo directly 
under Serbian rule.246  In effect, Kosovo’s autonomy was constitutionally abolished by 
Serbia in 1989.247  Miranda Vickers notes that this measure was accompanied by “strong 
police and legal repression by the Serbian state” as well as Serbian oversight of political 
and economic decisions in Kosovo. 248   Instead of furnishing Kosovo with political 
autonomy and economic development, Belgrade under Milošević imposed further 
centralization and thereby pushed Kosovo to either accept its position or respond in some 
way.249 
Kosovo responded to Serbia’s policies by shifting its preference from autonomy 
to independence.  This is evidenced by the emergence of the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK or Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës in Albanian).  Founded in 1989 as a 
Pan-Albanian nationalist movement, the LDK initially called for ‘full’ autonomy for 
Kosovo and by 1990 demanded equal status to the other republics.250  The leader of the 
LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, was a former Paris-trained academic and Gandhi-like figure to 
the Kosovar population for his unrelenting but peaceful efforts to secure Kosovo’s 
independence.251  He would become the first president of Kosovo from 1992 to 2000 and 
again from 2002 to 2006.  As a Kosovar nationalist and political leader, Rugova sought to 
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establish ties with Western Europe and the US and established a non-violent movement to 
achieve Kosovo’s independence.252   
Rugova and other Kosovo political leaders, including elected officials in 
Kosovo’s provincial assembly, responded to Serbian policies by unilaterally declaring 
Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia (separate from Serbia but still a constituent of 
Yugoslavia) in 1990.253  In a subsequent referendum on the issue of sovereignty and 
independence over 99 per cent of voters supported independence.254  This was followed 
by the 1991 declaration of independence by Kosovo’s parliament from Serbia, a move 
that was rejected by Serbia and Belgrade.255  All of this was unfolded in the midst of 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991.  Following the secession of Croatia, Macedonia, 
Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
collapsed and was succeeded by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (renamed Serbia-
Montenegro in 2003).  Even the new republic, formed by Serbia and Montenegro, refused 
to recognize Kosovo’s former autonomous status.256   
In 1992, Kosovo organized and held parliamentary and presidential elections and 
under the leadership of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), it began to establish its 
own political and social institutions. 257   Kosovo’s attempt at independence went 
                                            
252
 Vehbi Miftari, “Rugova: The Symbol of Independence,” Democratic League of Kosovo, 44. Available 
at: http://www.ldk-ks.eu/public/uploads/pdf/tresh-1352471021.pdf 
253
 That is, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and declared itself as a member of the Yugoslav 
republic.  
254
 Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took up Arms against the Serbian Regime,” Europe-Asia 
Studies Vol.62, Issue 7 (2010), 1138; Elena Pokalova, “Framing separatism as terrorism: Lessons from 
Kosovo,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 5 (2010): 429-447. In a 1991 referendum in 
Kosovo, 87 percent of eligible voters produced a 99 percent vote in favour of independence as a result of 
Serbia’s repressive policies. 
255
 Vjeran Pavlakovic and Sabrina Petra Ramet, “Albania and Serb Rivalry,” 86. 
256
 Colin Warbrick, “I. Kosovo: The Declaration of Independence,” 676. 
257
 Keiichi Kubo, “Why Kosovar Albanians Took up Arms against the Serbian Regime,” 1138; Chris 
Corrin, “Developing Democracy in Kosova: From Grass Roots to Government,” Parliamentary Affairs 
Vol. 55, No. 1 (2002), 99.  
 86
unrecognized by the international community, however, as it required Serbia’s 
cooperation for resolving the Balkan wars and the EU did not want to further destabilize 
the Balkans by recognizing Kosovo’s independence.258  Despite being rebuffed by the 
international community, the Kosovar Albanians began to view independence as the only 
viable solution.259  The disintegration of Yugoslavia further heightened Serbia’s unease 
and, at the same time, intensified Kosovo’s desire to follow the path of Croatia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina towards independence.  In response to the 
deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, an ‘International Contact Group’ 
(comprising the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) was established to 
manage the disintegration of the republic.  This same Contact Group would later mediate 
the final status negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia between 2004 and 2008. 
Despite the violence and unrest in the Balkans, the situation in Kosovo and Serbia 
was largely contained in the early 1990s.  There are perhaps two reasons for peace in 
Kosovo at a time when war was raging in most of Yugoslavia.  First, Serbia was far too 
strong militarily for Kosovo to mount an effective challenge.  Kosovo did not possess the 
military capabilities to seriously challenge the Serbian military.  Second, as mentioned 
above, the Kosovars were inspired by the notion of democracy and peaceful resistance 
taking hold of Eastern Europe at the time and in particular Poland’s Solidarity 
movement.260  As a result, Kosovo’s political parties, led by the LDK, adopted non-
violence as a means for achieving their political objectives.261   
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The peace did not last, however.  The Dayton Accords, signed in 1995, ended the 
war in Bosnia, but ignored Kosovo’s demands for a political resolution.  Many Kosovar 
Albanians viewed this as unacceptable and did not believe that the status quo (i.e., 
Serbian oppression) could be overcome with Rugova’s peaceful approach.  James Ker-
Lindsay suggests that Kosovo resorted to violence in part to highlight the international 
community’s unwillingness to consider its call for statehood in the early 1990s.262   By the 
mid-1990s, therefore, ethnic and political tensions turned violent in Kosovo and sparked 
the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or Ushtria çlirimtare e Kosovës, 
UÇK in Albanian).263  In 1996, the KLA attacked Serbian security forces stationed in 
Kosovo and sparked the onset of violence between Kosovo and Serbia.  
The fragile peace was broken largely because many Kosovar Albanians no longer 
believed that peaceful resistance could work and therefore supported the KLA, while 
neighbouring Albania also supported and encouraged Kosovar Albanians to resist against 
Serbia. Two additional factors contributed to the KLA’s emergence and its use of 
violence. First, Serbia’s oppressive policies in Kosovo radicalized and forced many 
Kosovar Albanians to seek refuge in European countries where they formed organizations 
to resists Serbia’s policies.264  Many of these individuals did not believe that peaceful 
resistance could work. 265   Second, the ability of the refugees to form anti-Serbia 
organizations was largely unimpeded in Western Europe where they enjoyed the freedom 
of expression and association.266  
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The KLA escalated its activities in 1998 as a response to the killing of Adem 
Jashari and his clan by Serbian police.267  Jashari was a founding member of the KLA and 
a popular figure amongst the Kosovar Albanians.  The killing of Jashari and his family 
incited the Kosovar Albanians to support the KLA and led to backlash from the 
international community.268  Serbian retaliation against the KLA’s activities only served 
to rally and unite the Kosovar population to bolster its support for the KLA and its violent 
tactics.269  The KLA’s strategy was to gain support from the Kosovar Albanians and to 
draw international attention to Kosovo by inciting military action from Serbia.  The 
effectiveness of the KLA, according to Elena Pokalova, was that the international 
community viewed it as a “legitimate representative of the Kosovo Albanians,” rather 
than a terrorist organization.270  James Pettifer supports this notion.  Pettifer describes the 
KLA as rather unsuccessful as a fighting force, but highly skilful and savvy political 
strategists.271   
One of the primary aims of the KLA was to lobby the West to intervene in the war 
between the Kosovars and Serbia. The political and ethnic tensions quickly turned into 
military confrontations. Following attacks from the KLA, the Serbian army retaliated by 
launching attacks against Kosovar civilians and in one particular incident the Serbs 
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launched attacks against several villages killing 80, many of whom were civilians.272  The 
war between the KLA and Serbian authorities was marred by accusations of ethnic 
cleansing by the Serbian forces against the Kosovar population.273  Serbia’s error in its 
fight against the KLA, argues Henry Perritt, was the ethnic cleansing against the 
Kosovars.274  Some political parties within Serbia voiced their willingness to provide 
Kosovo with extensive rights and even autonomy, but Slobodan Milošević was unwilling 
to make such concessions to Kosovo.  As Miranda Vickers notes, “Milošević’s central 
aim was to avoid really weakening Serbia and the federation through either serious 
autonomy or independence.”275 
On the international front, in 1998 the UN passed resolution 1160, which stated 
that the Kosovo conflict posed a threat to international peace and security and condemned 
both sides for their use of violence.276  This move was followed by NATO’s call for 
Kosovo’s autonomy and the cessation of violence.  While much of the international 
community’s focus was turned to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo 
continued to deteriorate to the point where Kosovo accused the Serbian military of 
massive human rights violations and war crimes. 
The growing civilian casualties (and in particular the Račak massacre of 1999) 
and a large-scale refugee exodus prompted a response from the international 
community.277  Key EU members and the US held the Rambouillet Conference, which 
resulted in the Rambouillet Agreement signed in 1999 by the UK, the US, and Albania, 
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but did not include Russia or Serbia.  Under the framework of the accords, Kosovo would 
become a NATO-administered province within Serbia.  Milošević and Belgrade rejected 
the proposal as a violation of Serbia’s territorial integrity and instead called for the 
presence of unarmed UN observers.278  Serbia’s refusal to accept the NATO mandate 
prompted military action to end the war between the KLA and Serbian forces.  The goal 
of the three-month NATO campaign was to expel Serbian forces from Kosovo and bring 
in international peacekeepers.  The end of the bombing campaign brought with it UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244, which established a joint body – the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to maintain peace in the province.279 
  Resolution 1244, passed in 1999, effectively suspended Serbian administration in 
Kosovo in favour of the internationally mandated UNMIK and KFOR.  Resolution 1244 
included a clause outlining the long-term resolution of Kosovo’s status. The resolution 
was also contradictory as it simultaneously supported Kosovo’s right to self-
determination while calling for the preservation of Serbia’s sovereignty.280  Russia and 
Serbia argued that Kosovo’s secession would be a violation of both international law and 
Resolution 1244, which called for Kosovo’s autonomy and self-determination but not 
independence.281  Kosovo, on the other hand, argued that Serbia had forfeited its right to 
sovereignty over Kosovo by systematically directing violence against the civilian 
population.  In addition, the proponents of independence argued that Resolution 1244 and 
its calls for autonomy and self-determination referred to the interim arrangements 
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following Serbia’s expulsion from Kosovo and not the future status of Kosovo.282  From 
1999 to 2008 there was little progress regarding the status of Kosovo and instead, during 
that period, both sides became further entrenched in their respective positions.283 
Similar to South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo’s early and modern history 
has been characterized by political conflict and, occasionally, violence with the parent 
state.  The political conflict mainly revolved around Kosovo’s demands for republic 
status.  From the 1960 to the 1980s, Serbia refused to grant Kosovo the autonomy it 
desired and indeed undertook policies to rescind the existing political autonomy Kosovo 
possessed. Republic status, from Kosovo’s perspective, was essential for Kosovar 
Albanian security, the preservation of its language and culture, and political recognition 
to which it was entitled. Belgrade’s behaviour during this period demonstrated to Kosovo 
that increased autonomy was necessary to check Serbia’s increasingly oppressive policies 
and tendencies.  Even after the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, academics have noted that 
Kosovar Albanians were willing to accept autonomous status as coequals along with 
Serbia and Montenegro until the mid-1990s.284  However, the preference for autonomy 
shifted to independence in 1996.  The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
and the onset of large-scale violence in 1996 marked the point of no return for Kosovo. 
As of 1996, therefore, Kosovo would not settle for anything short of independence.285 
What explains Kosovo’s desire for independence?  Realist assumptions argue that 
Kosovo’s desire for independence can be best explained by examining the security 
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dilemma that emerged in the Balkans following the collapse of Yugoslavia.  The common 
security no longer existed and each group in the former Yugoslavia became responsible 
for its own security.  Self-help and the security dilemma compelled each ethnic group to 
mobilize militarily in order to provide security against potential threats.  Furthermore, the 
independence of former Yugoslav republics, including Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia, 
demonstrated to Kosovo that the best form of security is independence.  Independence, 
therefore, is a fixed preference that derives from the structure of anarchy, self-help, and 
survival. These realist assumptions provide strong insights into the preferences and 
behaviour of Kosovo, yet they are incomplete. In addition to concerns over security, 
Kosovo’s preferences were shaped by Serbia’s unwillingness to adopt the appropriate 
political institutions and its poor economic development. 
Constructivists also provide some insights into the preferences and emergence of 
Kosovo.  In particular, the constructivist notion that ethnic identity and violence are not 
predetermined, but rather tools employed by ethnic entrepreneurs for political or 
economic ends. As mentioned earlier, Slobodan Milošević is described as an ethnic 
entrepreneur who used the idea of Serbian nationalism for his own political ends and to 
expand Serbia’s powers.  Kosovar leaders also exploited Kosovo’s ethnic identity for 
political ends and used violence as a strategy to garner support for independence.  The 
onset of ethnic violence in the 1990s was not a result of fixed and enduring ethnic 
differences, but rather produced by certain actors with political and/or economic 
objectives. 
Liberalism provides perhaps the most compelling explanation for the emergence 
and behaviour of Kosovo until 1999.  The historical narrative demonstrates that Serbia 
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rebuffed Kosovo’s decades-long request for republic status and in fact rescinded 
Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989.  Yugoslavia’s flawed political institutions and 
nonexistent economic incentives compelled Kosovo to intensify its demands.  In addition, 
the role of agency was important in shaping Kosovo’s preference for independence.  
Specifically, domestic groups in Kosovo, the LDK and Rugova and the KLA, promoted 
independence as a viable option for Kosovo.  From the early to the mid-1990s Kosovar 
Albanians largely supported a peaceful approach to the resolution of the conflict.  It is 
possible that Kosovo would have accepted an autonomous framework until the mid-
1990s. The emergence of the KLA in 1996, however, dramatically altered the domestic 
landscape in Kosovo.  The KLA persuaded Kosovar Albanians to support a militant 
approach to the conflict with Serbia.  Serbia’s unwillingness to provide Kosovo with 
political autonomy pushed the Kosovar Albanians to demand independence. 
 
Capabilities 
The military intervention by the international community established a de facto state in 
Kosovo in 1999.  Kosovo possessed limited capabilities in the mid to late 1990s with the 
emergence and growth of the KLA.  Such capabilities, however, were insufficient for 
mounting an effective military challenge against a larger and superior Yugoslav army 
(comprised of Serbia and Montenegro).  Much like the Iraqi Kurds in 1991, Kosovo was 
the beneficiary of an international intervention that removed the Serbian military threat 
and created a de facto state in Kosovo.  Following the international intervention in 1999, 
Kosovo fulfilled all the criteria of de facto statehood as defined in this project.  Recall 
that a de facto state controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the 
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population, and enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but it 
does not possess de jure recognition.  Although Kosovo was under the administration of 
UNMIK, it also held elections for the Kosovo Assembly and formed a unity government 
to oversee Kosovo. 
Although Kosovo did not possess the internal capabilities to achieve de facto 
statehood and independence, it was successful at building international support from the 
EU, the UN, and NATO.  The actions and agency of the KLA garnered sufficient 
international support to establish a de facto state but not independence.  Despite this 
perceived failure, the international administration allowed Kosovo to build and 
administer political and economic institutions that would ultimately serve as the 
foundations for an independent Kosovo.  In addition, the presence of international 
organisations prevented Serbia from taking any political or military action against 
Kosovo.  These events lend support to the realist assumption that capabilities are 
important.  Without capabilities – albeit in the form of support from the international 
community – Kosovo could not have established a de facto state in 1999.  
Realism provides a strong explanation for this period of Kosovo’s history.  
Kosovo’s behaviour and preferences were largely dictated by security imperatives and 
capabilities.  As Barry Posen and Chaim Kauffmann would argue, the security dilemma 
in the Balkan region compelled Kosovo to strengthen its military capabilities in the face 
of the Serbian threat.  With limited military capabilities, Kosovo, and in particular the 
KLA, petitioned the international community for support.  In doing so, Kosovo’s 
capabilities were substantially bolstered when the US and the UN responded by providing 
it with military backing against Serbia.  Capabilities, therefore, were significant for 
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establishing a de facto state in Kosovo.  Constructivism, meanwhile, argues that notions 
of security dilemma are largely a result of the interaction between actors and not a 
product of anarchy or self-help.  Kosovo’s preference for independence, therefore, was 
shaped by Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia and neighbouring groups that successfully 
achieved independence.  
 
The Behaviour of Kosovo 
Preferences 
Kosovo’s decision to pursue independence since 1996, and especially post-1999, is partly 
explained by the agency of the leadership, including Ibrahim Rugova and the KLA.  The 
Kosovar leadership overwhelmingly preferred independence to de facto statehood or a 
federal arrangement with Serbia following repeated breaches of trust on the part of 
Belgrade.  In a 2000 interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Rugova indicated 
that Kosovo would not settle for a political arrangement short of independence and that 
Resolution 1244 did not prohibit Kosovo’s independence.  He said: “In it [Resolution 
1244], the independence of Kosovo is not excluded. The door to this remains open.  
Anything other than independence is inconceivable for us.”286  When asked how Kosovo 
would respond if the international community preserved the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia with Kosovo as an autonomous province, Rugova replied that “there will be 
another war. All of us, the entire population of Kosovo, will go take up arms.”287  It is 
clear that Kosovo’s political leadership now viewed independence as the ultimate goal. 
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This preference is largely a reflection of the flawed political institutions created 
by Serbia, which, from the Kosovar Albanian perspective, were created to oppress 
Kosovo.  In addition, Kosovo’s political and economic requests were not met by Serbia.  
The combination of these factors coalesced and encouraged Kosovo to demand 
independence.  Once this preference was set, there was no turning back despite Serbia’s 
newfound efforts to persuade Kosovo with significant autonomy.  Kosovo received few 
economic benefits from the union with Serbia and its requests for economic development 
were ignored for decades.  As a result, seceding from Serbia would not pose any 
economic costs to Kosovo and its economic viability did not depend on Serbia.  
Kosovo’s preferences following its de facto status were also shaped by the 
international community’s tacit support for its independence bid. Academics have 
demonstrated that the international community’s willingness to provide Kosovo with 
military and political support encouraged Kosovo to insist on secession from Serbia.  
Spyros Economides, for one, argues that the decision of the international community to 
intervene in Kosovo and establish a protectorate region helps to explain Kosovo’s 
intransigence on the independence issue. 288   According to Economides, the Kosovar 
Albanians interpreted the West’s intervention and subsequent actions in Kosovo as tacit 
support for their right to self-determination. 289   For instance, during a 2005 Senate 
Committee hearing, then Senator of Delaware, Joe Biden indicated that a solution to 
Kosovo would require difficult negotiations and compromises from both sides.  Biden 
noted that, “Serbia…will find a future of frustration and isolation if it persists in clinging 
to the territorial artifacts of its bloody past. Serbia does not have the political stature or 
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practical ability to govern Kosovo…Independence for Kosovo, when it comes, will come 
because of Kosovars’ willingness to seek compromise.”290  In other words, Serbia would 
have to accept the secession of Kosovo, but at the same time Kosovo must be willing to 
negotiate with Serbia. 
It was believed that negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo would help to settle 
Kosovo’s uncertain status following a few years of UNMIK’s administration.  However, 
no such progress was made. Instead UNMIK turned to improving the internal conditions 
of Kosovo while waiting for negotiations to begin.291  In its search for a permanent 
solution, the international community initiated the Kosovo status process in 2005 led by 
former Finnish President and UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.  Negotiations were led 
by the UN, but largely controlled by the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, the 
Russian Federation, the UK and the United States), which provided Russia with the 
ability to play an important role in the final settlement.  It was clear that Serbia’s main 
objective was to reaffirm its territorial integrity even to the point that it was willing to 
accept Kosovo’s autonomy and the aforementioned Rambouillet accords that called for 
the presence of NATO in Kosovo.292 
Serbia’s position, during the negotiations, was that Kosovo will be furnished with 
significant autonomy, but it should remain within a united Serbia.  Indeed, Serbia was 
willing to equip Kosovo with all the prerogatives of a state except national defence and 
foreign policy.293  By this point, however, Kosovo was no longer willing to settle for 
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autonomy and insisted on its right to full independence.  Although Kosovo willingly 
participated in the negotiations, it did so regarding issues related to its internal 
governance and especially the presence of the Serbian population in Kosovo. The 
opening rounds of negotiations concentrated mainly on technical issues such as minority 
rights and the powers of municipalities, with little progress related to the status of 
Kosovo.294   
Belgrade pushed for talks on the status of Kosovo and offered “wide-ranging 
autonomy for 20 years.”295  A July 2006 meeting scheduled for negotiating Kosovo’s 
status illustrated the hardened positions taken by Belgrade and Pristina.  The former 
insisted on a decentralized framework and the latter maintained that progress could be 
achieved through independence.296  Facing a deadlock, the Contact Group requested the 
Special Envoy to prepare a ‘comprehensive proposal’ regarding the status of Kosovo in 
order to encourage the negotiations to move forward.  Kosovo’s status settlement, 
therefore, was largely decided by the work of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.   
Ahtisaari was tasked with presenting an acceptable solution to the conflict and, on 
March 2007, the UN forwarded the findings entitled the ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the 
Kosovo Status Settlement’ (also referred to as the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’).  In it, Ahtisaari 
provides a framework for Kosovo’s political, social, and economic future and provides 
the international community with oversight regarding the implementation of the 
settlement. 297  Although the Plan required Kosovo to create a Constitution that recognized 
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its multi-ethnic population and adherence to the rule of law, the proposal also conferred 
Kosovo with “supervised independence.”  In the proposal, Ahtisaari states that:  
I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to 
be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive 
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international 
supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is 
viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a 
peaceful and dignified existence…The international community shall supervise, monitor 
and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this 
Settlement.”298   
 
The Ahtisaari Plan called for the “international community [to] supervise, monitor 
and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this 
Settlement.”299  Unsurprisingly, of course, the plan was rejected by Serbia and Russia and 
created an impasse at the UN Security Council.  Ahtisaari defended his recommendations 
for Kosovo’s eventual independence by arguing that: 
Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for 
other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security 
Council responded to Milošević’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its 
governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and 
envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of 
these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.300 
 
He added, “A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority 
without provoking violent opposition.  Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia 
– however notional such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable.” 301   Ahtisaari’s 
recommendation for ‘supervised independence’ satisfied Kosovo’s short-term demand for 
independence given that full independence was merely a matter of time.  The period of 
international supervision was meant to provide Kosovo with the time to develop its 
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political institutions and to allow for Kosovo and Serbia to negotiate the transition to 
Kosovo’s full independence. 
Few analysts and policymakers were surprised when Kosovo moved ahead with a 
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in February 2008.  Although the Ahtisaari 
Plan did not provide a definite timeline regarding Kosovo’s ‘supervised independence,’ it 
was understood that Kosovo and Serbia would engage in negotiations to find some 
middle ground before Kosovo’s secession.  From Pristina’s perspective, however, 
Belgrade would never agree to Kosovo’s secession and therefore a mutually acceptable 
outcome was never within reach.  Kosovo’s leadership was undoubtedly buoyed by 
Ahtisaari’s recommendations and must have been confident that the US and major EU 
powers would recognize its declaration of independence.  In its UDI Kosovo accepted the 
conditions of the Ahtisaari Plan.  Many of the states that conferred recognition did so 
based on the notion that Kosovo is a unique case or sui generis.302  The Assembly of 
Kosovo official declared independence 17 February 2008 by noting that: 
Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not a 
precedent for any other situation…We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people, 
hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects 
the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN 
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement.303 
 
Serbia responded by pressuring the UN General Assembly to refer Kosovo’s secession to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to provide an advisory opinion on the legality of 
Kosovo’s UDI under international law.  The ICJ determined that its task was to resolve 
only “whether or not [Kosovo’s] declaration of independence is in accordance with 
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international law.”304  The ICJ made clear that its decision was about the legality of 
secession and not the political implications attached to the UDI.  It stated: 
In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated. 
The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the 
declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about 
the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not 
Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the 
recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent 
State.305 
 
By a ten to four majority, the ICJ concluded that “the adoption of the declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security 
Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework.  Consequently the 
adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law.”306  In 
making its decision, the ICJ does not compel any state to recognize Kosovo and therefore 
leaves the political act of recognition to the government of each state. 
Kosovo’s first month of independence highlighted the major issues confronting 
Pristina to this day.  Kosovo has not received recognition from some of the world’s major 
powers, including China and Russia, and tensions between Pristina and Belgrade 
continue.  The major domestic issues include a poor economy, weak political institutions, 
and the Serb minority (approximately 70,000) in north Kosovo (this issue will be 
discussed later in this chapter).307  Serbia’s unwillingness to recognize Kosovo ensures 
that Russia and China will also withhold recognition and thereby block Kosovo from 
joining the UN.  Serbia’s objective is to prevent Kosovo from gaining UN recognition 
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and to continue to stall recognition from other states.308   
In the meantime, Kosovo is pursuing recognition from other governments and 
building institutions while trying to rebuild its relations with Serbia.  Russia also 
continues to be a major barrier to Kosovo’s status.  As Serbia’s strongest ally, and with 
its own separatist region, Russia is staunchly opposed to Kosovo’s independence.  Russia 
is concerned that Kosovo’s secession could set a precedent for other secessionist groups 
to follow.  But, as a permanent United Nations Security Council member, Russia’s veto 
blocks Kosovo’s entry into the UN.  As a reaction to the recognition of Kosovo by 
Western states, Russia recognized the secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
in Georgia. Ironically, Russia referenced the Kosovo case as justification for its 
recognition of the breakaway territories of Georgia.  China has also opposed Kosovo’s 
independence.  China’s decision is explained by Taiwan’s immediate recognition of 
Kosovo. It also faces its own domestic sources of secession, and has a strict policy of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. 
As of early June 2015, more than 110 states have recognized Kosovo, including 
108 UN member states and 23 EU member states.  At the same time, more than 80 states, 
including Russia, China, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and Greece, have withheld recognition.  
Given the recognition from the large number of governments, one could argue that 
Kosovo’s secession and its subsequent recognition has been a success.  However, one 
could also argue that Kosovo’s diplomatic efforts have largely failed.  Gordon Bardos 
argues that the US and the EU’s diplomatic efforts to bring Kosovo into the international 
community of states has been a diplomatic failure given that over 80 states have withheld 
recognition.  States have refused to recognize Kosovo, Bardos argues, because the 
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unilateral declaration of independence is a clear violation of the territorial integrity of 
Serbia.309  Additionally, James Ker-Lindsay notes that the sui generis argument has not 
been accepted by much of the international community.310   
Realism offers strong insights into Kosovo’s preferences and behaviour since 
1999.  The ethnic differences, a history of animosity, and the security dilemma between 
Kosovar Albanians and Serbs heightened following Yugoslavia’s disintegration.  Kosovo 
viewed Serbia’s expansionist rhetoric as a threat to its security. In turn, Serbia – believing 
independence to be imminent – viewed Kosovo’s desire for increased autonomy as an 
existential threat to Serbia.  The ensuing civil war was in many ways a consequence of 
the uncertainty and security threats facing both groups.  Chaim Kaufmann argues that the 
only way to mitigate the effects of the security dilemma on ethnic groups is physical 
separation.  Kosovo adopted such a position by arguing that only independence would 
provide it with security and political autonomy from Serbian oppression.  
Constructivism also provides some insights into the preferences and behaviour of 
Kosovo.  Constructivists argue that elites exploit ethnic differences to advance their own 
political and economic ends.  This notion can be applied to the behaviour of Rugova and 
the KLA who exploited Kosovar Albanian nationalism for their own ends.  After all, 
Rugova was effectively the first president of Kosovo from 2002 to 2006 and one of the 
founders of the KLA, Hashim Thaci, was the first prime minister of the Republic of 
Kosovo from 2008 to 2014 and was succeeded by another KLA founder Isa Mustafa.  
The point is to demonstrate that the Kosovo leadership benefitted economically and 
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politically from an independent Kosovo.  On the other hand, constructivism cannot 
explain why the international community broke international norms by violating the 
territorial integrity of Serbia.  As mentioned earlier, there is a strong norm of territorial 
integrity and preference for state sovereignty in the international system.  However, in the 
case of Kosovo, the international community ignored these norms and laws in favour of 
recognising Kosovo’s independence.  
Finally, from a liberal perspective, Kosovo’s independence was not inevitable, but 
rather a consequence of flawed institutions and a regime in Belgrade that refused to adopt 
the appropriate institutional measures.  I argue that the institutional and economic factors 
outlined by liberal theory provide a strong explanation for Kosovo’s decision to declare 
independence.  First, Belgrade could have made a more concerted and genuine effort to 
bring Kosovo back into the fold.  Rather than conciliatory and meaningful dialogue, 
Belgrade vacillated and at times refused to negotiate with Kosovo and the international 
community.   The case of Kosovo is further explained by the importance of the domestic 
context and the economic factors.  As mentioned earlier, Kosovo’s leadership failed to 
seriously consider alternatives to independence post-1996.  Instead, the leadership 
persuaded the population that independence was the best route for Kosovo and, in turn, 
the domestic population pressured the leadership to move towards independence, even 
though it may not have been the best option for Kosovo.  Finally, a union with Serbia did 
not offer Kosovo any economic incentives.  In fact, Kosovo stood to lose very little by 
seceding from Serbia. 
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Capabilities 
How did a militarily, institutionally, and economically weak Kosovo successfully secede 
from Serbia?  Without sufficient capabilities, de facto states should not be able to secure 
independence and yet Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008 and has 
garnered widespread international support.  The Kosovo war from 1998-1999 revealed 
the Kosovar Albanians, led by the KLA, did not possess strong military capabilities.  
However, Kosovo acquired the capabilities necessary for seceding from Serbia through 
international support. Kosovo’s internal weakness, therefore, was inconsequential given 
that powerful states, including the US and key EU members, provided Kosovo with 
military, economic, and diplomatic support. 
 From 1999 to 2008, Kosovo’s leadership lobbied and worked with the 
international community to provide Kosovo with the support necessary for independence.  
Kosovo pursued this policy on two tracks.  First, Kosovo was clear to the international 
community that a union with Serbia was not an option.  The leadership convinced the 
international community, including the UN and its special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, that 
independence was the only real solution to the conflict in Kosovo.  Second, Kosovo 
cooperated with the international community and participated in the negotiations intended 
to solve Kosovo’s uncertain status.  In doing so, Kosovo demonstrated its commitment 
and willingness to participate with the international community’s efforts at resolving the 
longstanding issue and that independence was morally justified and strategically 
preferable to a return to violence.   
The Kosovo case partially upholds both hypotheses.  Hypothesis one states that a 
de facto state will pursue independence when the parent state is unwilling to offer 
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‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of political institutions, such as autonomy and 
federalism (or in this case, republic status).  Secession, therefore, becomes a last resort 
following the parent state’s unwillingness to provide the minority group with autonomy.  
This hypothesis is supported by the Kosovo case.  Kosovar Albanians declared their 
desire for independence, but also indicated that they would settle for republic status in a 
united Serbia.  This was true even after Serbia rescinded Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989.   
However, following a decade of Belgrade’s repressive political and economic policies, 
Kosovo viewed independence as the only way to attain political and economic rights.   
The notion of autonomy for Kosovo was unacceptable given that Serbia had 
previously revoked its autonomous status.311   In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
Kosovo was struggling for autonomous status and then republic status within Yugoslavia, 
but Belgrade appeared to be pushing for control over Kosovo.  Belgrade’s rhetoric and 
actions regarding Kosovo’s status emboldened Kosovo to demand independence.  
Following Serbia’s decision to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and its subsequent 
decisions to further alienate it, Kosovo could not trust Serbia to uphold its promise of 
furnishing the Kosovars with political autonomy.   
At the same time, the Kosovo case opposes hypothesis one if we consider 
Kosovo’s behaviour post-1999.  Serbia earnestly offered Kosovo broad autonomy within 
a federal Serbia in the negotiations following 1999.  Kosovo was unwilling to 
compromise and rejected Serbia’s offers.  But as discussed above, Kosovo gained 
significant leverage over Serbia following the international intervention and 
administration of Kosovo.  From Kosovo’s perspective, it did not make sense to forgo 
independence and settle for autonomy within Serbia when the US and major EU powers 
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were willing to support Kosovo’s bid for independence.  Politically, therefore, 
independence was more appealing than extensive autonomy within Serbia.   
Hypothesis two contends that material factors, including economic incentives and 
political benefits, can persuade a de facto state to forgo independence.  That is, de facto 
states will forgo independence if it has secured autonomy from the parent state and the de 
facto status offers more economic and political benefits than full independence.  De facto 
independence and the offer of autonomy were insufficient for convincing Kosovo to 
forgo independence. The political and economic benefits under an autonomous 
framework would not have benefitted Kosovo in any meaningful way.  Although Serbia 
offered significant political autonomy to Kosovo, independence always seemed more 
reassuring especially given Serbia’s past willingness to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy.  
Additionally, there were few economic incentives for remaining with Serbia. Appendix I 
presents the economic performances of Kosovo and Serbia from 1990 to 2012 using data 
collected from the UN and the World Bank.312  In terms of economic benefits, therefore, 
Kosovo stood to gain little from a union with Serbia.  Based on the data, Serbia has 
experienced modest growth to its economy and did not possess any economic means with 
which to entice Kosovo to remain with Serbia. 
There were also two contributing factors that shaped Kosovo’s decision.  The first 
factor is the government and regime in Belgrade.  Kosovo felt uneasy that, although the 
old regime of Milošević was removed from power in 2000, his party survived and by 
2003 it was gaining popularity among Serbian voters. 313   Furthermore, Milošević’s 
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successors could not be trusted as key officials in the secret police and military, 
responsible for the war against Kosovo, maintained their positions.314  In short, although 
moderates replaced the Milošević government, the Kosovars were uneasy about an 
administration they felt was “little different from the previous regime.”315  Milošević and 
his Social Party of Serbia (SPS) were succeeded by Vojislav Kostunica as president and 
Zoran Djindjic as the prime minister in 2000.316  Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia 
(DSS) and Djindjic’s Democratic Party (DS) formed a coalition government in 2000 
under the banner of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).317  Although Kosovar 
Albanians were pleased with the removal of Milošević in 2000, they did not believe there 
was much difference between Milošević and Kostunica on the Kosovo issue.318 
The second contributing factor was the role of the international community, 
especially that of the US and key members of the EU (UK, France, and Germany).  
International support provided Kosovo with the assurance that it would be economically 
and militarily viable against a recalcitrant Serbia.  International support, however, 
appears to be less significant than the conditions of autonomy and economic benefits.  
That is, Kosovo’s leadership had decided that independence was the only viable option 
for Kosovo as early as 2000 (refer to Ibrahim Rugova’s interviews above).  In the case of 
Kosovo, therefore, it would be more accurate to claim that international support is an 
important but not necessary condition for de facto states to declare independence.  The 
point is that the presence or absence of international support alone does not determine a 
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de facto state’s decision for declaring independence.  After all, as mentioned in previous 
sections, de facto states have declared independence despite the lack of international 
support. 
Recent events in Kosovo suggest that independence may have been a political and 
economic miscalculation.  Since January 2015, Kosovar Albanians have been migrating 
en masse to neighbouring countries to escape Kosovo’s failing political institutions and 
high unemployment rates.319  Some estimates claim that approximately 100,000 Kosovar 
Albanians have fled Kosovo since January 2015 and that unemployment is over 30 
percent (55 percent for people aged 15-24).320  The underlying assumption of this project 
is that independence may not be the best outcome for de facto states.  An independent 
Kosovo will face a difficult process in developing effective political institutions and 
providing economic growth for the population.   
 
Kosovo and Serbia: Looking Forward 
Kosovo and Serbia’s intransigence exacerbated the divisions between the two sides and 
likely fostered the secession of Kosovo.  The strained relationship will not be easily 
repaired but there are positive developments.  After all, Kosovo has seceded from Serbia 
and it is not coming back.  Serbia will have to accept this reality if normal relations are to 
be established.  The Kosovo-Serbia relationship faces many challenges as both sides try 
to manage the issues between them.  On the one hand, for example, the two sides have 
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come to an agreement on border management and Serbia recognizes Kosovo’s vehicle 
license plates.  On the other hand, tensions remain due to the presence of the Serbian 
minority and the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo.321  In resolving 
Kosovo’s status, the US and the EU had hoped it would lead to stability in the Balkans.322  
Yet Kosovo’s borders remain unstable and this will continue to impede Kosovo’s 
economic and political development.323  Ultimately, Kosovo’s independence may create 
more problems than it solves. 
Much of the tension between the two sides is related to the Serb populated area of 
north Kosovo.  While it tacitly concedes the areas south of the Ibar River to Kosovo, 
Belgrade hopes to maintain influence over, and if possible to annex, the north.  Kosovo, 
meanwhile, wants to consolidate its control over the north and secure its border. 324  
Kosovo’s northern municipalities, therefore, represent one of the most serious areas of 
contention and insecurity between Pristina and Belgrade.  Kosovo does not practice 
effective control over the north and its Serb-majority population rejects integration into 
Kosovo.  As it is, the north possesses parallel institutions from Serbia and Kosovo.  
Belgrade’s influence in the north is largely maintained by its financial support for the 
Serb-led institutions in the region. 325   Serbs in northern Kosovo determinedly reject 
Kosovo’s independence and any form of integration.326  The social, economic, political, 
and legal issues in the north are a consequence of the parallel institutions.  The existing 
institutions do not effectively deliver services or maintain law and order.  Any attempt to 
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integrate the north into Kosovo’s institutions would likely exacerbate the issues.   
The 2011 violent clash between the Kosovo police and Serbs in the north 
demonstrate the potential for instability and further violence between Kosovo and Serbs.  
The violence was sparked by clashes at the Kosovo-Serbia border, but it is largely a 
symptom of the Belgrade-Pristina dispute over sovereignty and territorial integrity.327  
The EU, for its part, has offered Serbia candidate status in exchange for concessions 
towards Kosovo.  Despite discussions and meetings aimed at improving bilateral 
relations, Belgrade and Pristina remain divided over the issue of sovereignty and the 
northern area.  The EU-facilitated bilateral talks led to Belgrade’s willingness to open its 
borders to Kosovar documents and goods.  In practice, however, Belgrade did little to 
change its behaviour vis-à-vis Kosovo until December 2012.328  The EU continued to 
push for high-level talks between Belgrade and Pristina in an effort to resolve the 
political impasse.  The central issue in these talks will be Kosovo’s status (and its north) 
and its ability to join regional and international organizations.329  The concern for the EU 
and the region is that the isolated incidents of violence in northern Kosovo could spark 
widespread ethnic conflict between the Serbs and Albanians.  Kosovo’s status and the 
uncertainty hanging over it contributes to the disputes between Kosovar Albanians and 
the Serb minority.   
From Kosovo’s perspective, the political dialogue is meant to complete the 
process of independence by achieving membership in the UN and obtaining recognition 
from more states.  In addition, Pristina hopes to integrate the northern municipalities into 
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its administration and receive recognition from Belgrade.330  Serbia, meanwhile, is willing 
to accept Kosovo’s administration of the northern territories, which would be furnished 
with “broad self-governing powers” within a de facto Kosovo.331  Belgrade’s approach 
continues to view Kosovo as an autonomous region within Serbia.332  In effect, Serbia is 
seeking to weaken Pristina’s sovereignty by demanding the establishment of autonomous 
communities where Serb-majorities exist in Kosovo.  According to Serbian officials, 
Belgrade is unwilling to recognize Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.333 
Despite the challenges, there has been progress.  On 19 April 2013, following 
meetings chaired by the EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, Kosovo’s Hashim 
Thaci and Serbia’s Ivica Dacic signed a historic agreement.  The agreement is aimed at 
normalizing relations between Pristina and Belgrade and is a precondition for Serbia’s 
EU accession and Kosovo’s partnership with the EU.334  As a result of the landmark 
agreement, the EU will open accession talks with Serbia January 2014.  Although the 
EU’s enlargement commissioner Stefan Fuele indicated that the Kosovo factor would not 
be a roadblock, it is largely understood that one of the conditions for Serbia’s admission 
into the EU will be its recognition of Kosovo.335  EU membership may prove to be the 
game changer for this relationship.  Serbia’s desire to join the European bloc may 
ultimately shift its stance on Kosovo’s independence or at least provide a basis from 
which normal relations can be forged. 
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In the meantime, Kosovo’s status will continue to be contested, as it exists on the 
“margins of the international community.” 336  Kosovo’s uncertain status is likely to 
persistent into the foreseeable future but it is not a feasible solution in the long term.337  
The international community cannot provide economic and military backing indefinitely 
and the Kosovars want a final solution to the issue.  Economically, Kosovo faces hurdles 
to growth as a consequence of its past and present uncertain status.  Daniel Silander and 
John Janzekovitz argue that the decades of unrest and violence, the poor infrastructure, 
and Kosovo’s unresolved political status has meant that the “overall economic and social 
situation is very fragile.”338  As a result, the economy is rampant with a black market and 
relies heavily on the international community for aid.  For example, about 30 percent of 
Kosovar Albanians live below the poverty line and the unemployment rate is in the 
region of 45 percent.339    
Another major challenge is political development.  In addition to a weak 
economy, Kosovo’s political system is fragile and unable to achieve fundamental 
institutional competence and quickly losing the confidence of the population.340  A 2009 
Gallup Poll shows that perceptions of independence were less positive following the first 
two years since Kosovo’s declaration.  The Gallup Balkan Monitor survey shows that 75 
percent of Kosovo Albanians believe that independence is a good thing, down from 93 
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percent a year earlier.341  And though over 60 percent of Kosovars are satisfied with 
Kosovo’s progress since independence, large numbers of Kosovar Albanians have 
relocated or plan to emigrate out of Kosovo. 342  Finally, over 90 percent of Kosovar 
Albanians and Serb minorities are dissatisfied with the economy and especially the lack 
of employment in Kosovo.343  This is hardly a sign of support for Kosovo’s economic and 
political progress since independence.344 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter relied on empirical and theoretical research to argue that Kosovo’s decision 
to declare independence from Serbia was the product of Serbia’s unwillingness to make 
concessions to Kosovo.  Empirically, the chapter demonstrated that the decision-making 
of Kosovo and Serbia and the flawed political institutions ultimately resulted in Kosovo’s 
independence.  The chapter outlined Serbia’s unwillingness to provide Kosovo with 
sufficient political autonomy until it was too late.  Furthermore, Kosovo’s relationship 
with Serbia was the product of decades of conflict for power and control over Kosovo.  
From the perspective of Kosovo, Serbia could not be trusted to administer Kosovo given 
Belgrade’s track record of broken promises and repressive policies.  Belgrade refused to 
assuage Kosovar Albanian fears regarding Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia.  In 
addition, Kosovo’s demands for political autonomy were not met until Kosovo was in a 
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position to become an independent state.  Following de facto statehood, autonomy within 
a federal Serbia was less attractive than full independence for Kosovo.  The chapter 
argued that Kosovo’s ultimate decision to declare independence was not inevitable.  
Instead, the decision was a result of the culmination of a series of political decisions 
taken by Serbia that pushed Kosovo to the point of no return. 
Theoretically, the chapter argued that realism and constructivism provide strong 
insights into the preferences and behaviour of Kosovo, but that liberalism offers the most 
complete and compelling explanation.  Realism’s emphasis on security and capabilities 
explains how Kosovo, although weak, acquired international support to secure de facto 
statehood and subsequently, independence.  Constructivism also provides insights into 
the role of ethnic elites in mobilising support for a particular political objective. 
Liberalism and the emphasis on political institutions, economic factors, and the 
importance of agency provide the final pieces to the explanation.  The chapter outlined 
the ways in which political institutions and economic incentives influence the preferences 
and behaviour of actors.  Kosovo’s declaration of independence was a response to 
Serbia’s unwillingness to develop a political system that would meet Kosovo’s requests 
and provide it with economic development.  These theoretical ideas will be pursued in the 
next chapter, which will examine the case of South Sudan. 
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Chapter 4: South Sudan 
The existing literature argues that de facto states are a way station towards the ultimate 
goal of independence and that all de facto states want independence and all parent states 
want to reintegrate the de facto entity.  According to this literature, the potential 
outcomes for de facto states are limited to secession from or reintegration (peaceful or 
forceful) into the parent state.  Existing research takes the preference for independence as 
a given, overlooking the possibility of status quo option (i.e., de facto statehood).  This 
research asks if there are conditions under which de facto states may forgo independence 
in favour of the status quo. 
 In 2011, South Sudan held a referendum to ask its citizens whether they should 
continue in a union with Sudan or become an independent state.  The South Sudanese 
overwhelmingly voted for independence. One would assume that South Sudan’s 
secession substantiates the notion that de facto states always want independence.  A 
closer examination of the historical and political dynamics, however, demonstrates that 
South Sudan was willing to maintain the unity of Sudan on the condition of a democratic 
and federal constitution and economic development for the South.  For decades the South 
requested autonomy and a federal structure for a united Sudan.  The South’s decision to 
secede, therefore, requires a careful reading of Sudan’s historical and political turmoil 
and the relationship between North and South.  The following questions will guide the 
historical analysis: What precipitated the two civil wars between Khartoum and the 
South?  What were the South’s political demands and why did Khartoum ignore the 
South’s appeals? 
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Based on a cursory glance, one could conclude that realism provides a full 
explanation for the case of South Sudan.  However, a thorough examination of the case 
reveals that realist notions of security and capabilities, although insightful, do not provide 
a complete explanation. This chapter argues that the secession of South Sudan was 
neither a consequence of the security dilemma nor an inevitable outcome.  Instead, the 
chapter will argue that the South’s secession is best explained by examining Khartoum’s 
failure to provide the South with sufficient political autonomy, the lack of economic 
incentives, and the role of domestic, regional, and international actors.  To this end, the 
project adopts liberal theory to account for the behaviour South Sudan and this chapter 
situates the case of South Sudan within the broader aims of this dissertation.   
The objective of this project is to identify if there are conditions under which a de 
facto state will forgo independence and accept a framework that furnishes it with broad 
autonomy but also preserves the territorial integrity of the parent state.  In other words, 
are there conditions under which a de facto state will maintain the status quo and shelve 
the goal of independence?  The case of South Sudan will further demonstrate that de facto 
state preferences are not fixed or predetermined.  It will argue that, in addition to political 
institutions and economic incentives, domestic, regional, and international dynamics 
shape de facto state preferences and decision-making. 
South Sudan shares important parallels with Kosovo.  First, South Sudan has also 
experienced a turbulent and bloody history under a central government that has often 
been oppressive and unresponsive to political requests.  Second, it is poor and 
underdeveloped and, although South Sudan does possess vast oil reserves, it does not 
possess the infrastructure yet to reap the benefits of its oil.  Third, like Kosovo, South 
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Sudan is landlocked and politically weak.  South Sudan’s political institutions are neither 
effective nor stable enough to administer a volatile population.  Finally, South Sudan also 
seceded from the parent state following decades of conflict and civil war.  Yet there is an 
important difference: South Sudan made a genuine effort to preserve the unity of Sudan.  
One of the goals of this chapter, therefore, is to identify the reasons for South Sudan’s 
willingness to stay in a united Sudan. 
South Sudan shares similarities with Iraqi Kurdistan.  Historically, the South 
Sudanese and Kurds endured successive oppressive regimes and undertook military 
action to gain political and economic rights in their respective states.  More recently, 
South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan both agreed to constitutional arrangements with their 
parent states in 2005.  Much like the Iraqi constitution, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) outlined broad political and economic autonomy for South Sudan and 
provided the South with representation in Khartoum.  South Sudan emerged as a de facto 
state in 2005 with the signing of the CPA that ended the second civil war between 
Khartoum and the South Sudan.  The CPA delineated South Sudan, much like the 
Kurdish region of Iraq, as an autonomous region with a government, army, and 
administrative jurisdiction.   
However, whereas the Iraqi constitution has preserved the unity of Iraq, the CPA 
failed to maintain Sudan’s unity.  One reason for the failure of the CPA is the key 
difference between South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan.  The post-2005 Iraq is governed by 
a new group of political officials following the complete removal of the old regime.  In 
Sudan, however, the old regime persists.  To be sure, the Iraqi Kurds are uneasy about a 
political partnership with officials in Baghdad.  However, the removal of the old regime 
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has made partnership between the Kurds and Arabs a reality that would have otherwise 
been impossible.  The South Sudanese did not have the luxury of forging a political union 
with new officials in Khartoum.  Instead, the South was expected to forge a partnership 
with a regime that was responsible for the oppression and violence targeted against the 
South Sudanese. The presence of the old regime in Sudan contributed to the secession of 
South Sudan. 
The chapter will begin with a brief description of Sudan’s early history until it 
gained independence from Britain and Egypt. It will then discuss the events that preceded 
the two civil wars.  By identifying and discussing the root causes of the civil wars, I will 
demonstrate that the civil wars were a direct result of Khartoum’s unwillingness to 
address the South’s political and economic grievances.  The objective is to provide 
context for the secession and to identify the factors that influenced the South’s decision to 
declare independence.  In addition, identifying the root causes of the two civil wars will 
shed light on the South’s preference formation and its relationship with the government in 
Khartoum.  It is important to note that the Southerners were demanding federalism 
throughout Sudan’s tumultuous political history.  Indeed, South Sudan was always 
willing to function within a democratic and federal Sudan, one that recognized the 
South’s unique historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences. The final sections 
will provide an explanation for South Sudan’s behaviour post-2005.  The discussion will 
highlight Khartoum’s unwillingness to uphold a federal Sudan, one that would guarantee 
the South’s autonomy. It will also reveal that domestic factors, both within Sudan and in 
the South, shaped South Sudan’s decision to declare independence. Finally, the 
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explanation will discuss the role of regional and international actors in contributing to the 
South’s successful secession.  
 
Sudan and South Sudan’s Early History 
The Sudan is geographically and politically divided between two distinct parts – the 
North and the South – and it is culturally and religiously divided between the Arab and 
Islamicized North and the African and largely traditional South.345  Today, the official 
language of South Sudan is English, but the people can be categorized into three 
linguistic groups known as the Sudanic, Western Nilotes, and Eastern Nilotes.346  The 
South is described as self-contained tribes based on linguistic and traditional ties.  The 
1956 population census of Sudan, conducted by the British, found that 39 percent of the 
population had Arab ancestry, while 30 percent were Southerners, 13 percent were 
Westerners (including Darfur and Kordofan), and the remaining 18 percent comprised of 
Nuba, Beja, Nubians, and foreigners.347   
Southern Sudan is often described as a case of ‘regional nationalism’ as opposed 
to a movement based on linguistic and ethnic similarities or a shared history.348  That is, 
the key difference between Northerners and Southerners is that “one group looks 
primarily towards the Arab Middle East [Egypt] and the other mainly towards Africa 
south of the Sahara. And yet, although the division between North and South is mainly 
cultural, differences of culture are not by themselves a complete explanation.” 349  
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Northerners and Southerners are distinguished by “a sense of belonging which has its 
roots in history and is conferred by birth.”350  Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed 
note that the perception of the Sudan conflict as a struggle between the ‘Arab-Muslim 
North and the Christian/animist South’ is incorrect.351  Instead, they argue that the origins 
of conflict lie in socioeconomic disparities between the North and the South and the 
relationship between the Sudanese state and the population in the South.352  
Sudan became a Turko-Egyptian colony in the nineteenth century when 
Muhammad Ali Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt and later Sudan, conquered much of what is 
modern day Sudan. Ali Pasha, motivated by the slave trade and finding the source of the 
Nile, discovered the South late and therefore was unable to thoroughly control it during 
his reign.353  From the early to the mid-nineteenth century, Egypt and Europeans vied for 
influence over the South as both established trading forts and military and commercial 
networks in the South.354    European missionaries (e.g., Austrians and Italians) and 
traders, for example, became disillusioned with the South and had to use force and tribal 
divisions in order to maintain their economic interests. 355   Ultimately, Europeans 
abandoned the South and were replaced by Northern Sudanese and Arabs.356  The South 
has historically been mistreated relative to the North.  For example, although Ismail 
Pasha, Ali Pasha’s successor, eventually abolished the slave trade following an agreement 
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between Egypt and Britain in 1877, it was largely ignored in the South because they were 
viewed as ‘infidels.’357 
European powers entered the struggle for South Sudan when Great Britain, 
France, and Belgium competed for control over the White Nile.  Britain’s conquest of 
Egypt in 1882 meant that it also inherited Sudan.358  Britain hoped that by conquering 
Egypt it could control the Suez Canal and prevent its European rivals from gaining 
passage to India and the Far East.359   The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1899 outlined joint 
authority over Sudan and effectively divided the region between the North and the 
South.360  The British administration divided the South into three administrative states: 
Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, which were further divided to form the ten 
states in South Sudan.361   
Under British administration, the North developed considerably in economic, 
political, and educational terms while the South languished in underdevelopment.362  
British policy in the South focused on “maintaining law and order,” rather than on 
education and economic development.363  During this period, the North and South existed 
as almost two separate entities under British rule. Beshir Mohammed Said, a journalist 
from the North, suggests that unrest in the South has been a feature of the region since the 
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presence of European traders and missionaries.364  Said contends that British policy in the 
South was to “build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units based upon 
indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.”365  Such a policy ensured that the 
South remained politically and economically behind the North, including in political 
activism and nationalism. 
By the 1940s Sudanese nationalists, particularly from the North, demanded 
Sudanese independence from Britain. Spearheaded by the intelligentsia, Sudanese 
nationalism first manifested itself in the 1920s and became a powerful force by the end of 
World War II.366  Britain faced tremendous pressure from Northern Sudanese political 
parties such as the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party to grant Sudan 
independence. 367   Britain eventually acquiesced to Sudanese nationalists, partly to 
prevent Egypt from regaining control of Sudan.368  Initially the British envisioned two 
separate Sudans due to the differences in culture and development between the North and 
the South.  However, pressure from both Egypt and Northern Sudanese nationalists, in 
addition to geographic and economic considerations,, compelled the British to preserve 
the unification of the South and the North.369   
The British Civil Secretary of the Sudan held a conference in Juba in 1947 to 
ascertain the position of Southerners regarding its position in an independent Sudan.370  
Southern representatives were persuaded to assent to the proposed Legislative Assembly 
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of an independent Sudan with little information about the nature of the arrangement and 
without any “special safeguards for the South.”371  Southern hopes for special safeguards 
were reinforced when the North agreed to “specific safeguards for the South” following 
the Juba Conference.372  Southerners, therefore, were misled as they were made to believe 
that certain safeguards (i.e., a federal status for the South) would be included in the 
creation of Sudan’s Legislative Assembly.  With the belief that federalism would be 
constitutionalized, the South’s representatives willingly agreed to a union with the North 
at the Juba Conference.373   Abel Alier, a Southern lawyer who was instrumental in 
pushing the peace agreement between the North and the South in 1972, argues that 
Southern representatives at the Juba Conference asked that the South be given the 
“opportunity to prepare herself before joining hands with the North.”374  Rather than 
providing the South with an opportunity to consider its options, the proposed union 
moved ahead at a rapid pace with the formation of a 93-member legislative assembly, 
thirteen of which were from the South.375 
During the 1951 Constitutional Amendment Commission, the South had a single 
representative (Buth Diu Thung of the Liberal Party) whose proposals for Southern 
safeguards were rejected and, although a provision for safeguards was included in the 
Draft Constitution, Northerners deleted it at a later conference held in Egypt.376  The 
agreement between Egypt and Sudan excluded Southern representatives on the grounds 
that only organized political parties could be invited.  Parties such as the NUP and the 
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Umma Party insisted on the removal of the special safeguards to ensure a strong and 
centralized Sudan would emerge from independence.377  Elections were held in 1953 to 
elect the first governing parliament and to implement the Sudanization policy (the 
process of replacing all foreign governmental and military officials with Sudanese 
officials) in the lead up to Sudan’s independence.  Among the parties to compete in the 
elections were the newly formed Liberal Party, the Umma Party, and the National 
Unionist Party (which advocated union with Egypt).378  The Liberal Party won a majority 
of the seats in the South, but the NUP won the largest number of seats and was able to 
form the government led by Ismail al-Azhari.379  The Liberal Party maintained its calls 
for the federalization of Sudan throughout the negotiations in the lead up to Sudan’s 
independence.380  Only six months after Sudan’s independence, the NUP-led government 
of al-Azhari was overthrown by a coalition of the Umma Party and the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP).   
The new government was not any more inclusive of the South than the previous 
government.381  For example, the Umma-PDP government passed the federalism issue to 
a subcommittee of a parliamentary committee (only three members were Southerners) 
responsible for drafting a constitution. In January 1956, Sudan officially gained 
independence from Britain without a permanent constitution and with a discontent South.  
The North repeatedly refused to implement a federal system claiming that federalism 
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would be the first step towards the breakup of Sudan.382  This encouraged the South to 
become better politically organized and, as a first step, the Southern Federal Party (SFP) 
was established and competed in the 1957 election. 383  With a growing political 
consciousness and improved organisation, the South demanded a federal constitution that 
recognized both Christianity and Islam as state religions and Arabic and English as 
official languages.384  In the next election, the SFP won a majority of the seats in the 
South and immediately began to push for federalism.385   
The unwillingness of Khartoum to accommodate Southern appeals for special 
safeguards in the form of federalism contributed to growing tensions between North and 
South.  This was exacerbated by the implementation of the Sudanization policy wherein 
Khartoum appointed an overwhelming majority of Northerners as officials and 
administrators – even in the South.  This policy prompted the South to view Sudan’s 
independence as the start of its subjugation by the North. 386   These developments 
increased the uneasiness and discontent brewing in the South and resulted in violent 
demonstrations from Southerners who feared economic and social exploitation.387 The 
combination of Khartoum’s repressive policies and Southern fears resulted in the first 
civil war between the regime in Khartoum and the South. 
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The Origins of South Sudan as a De Facto State 
Preferences 
South Sudan’s preferences were clearly laid out by its political representatives before and 
immediately after the independence of Sudan. The South Sudanese insisted on federalism 
and economic development for the South as a precondition for its union with the rest of 
Sudan.  The civil wars between South Sudan and the government in Khartoum were a 
direct result of Khartoum’s unwillingness to equip the South with federalism and 
economic development. Realist interpretations, however, would frame the general 
conflict between the South and Khartoum in terms of security and survival.  From this 
perspective, the conflict is a result of the fixed and enduring ethnic differences between 
the South and the North.  The conflict can be explained by the collective fears of the 
future on both sides.  For instance, David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that conflict 
occurs when groups fear for their survival and view the other as a threat thereby creating 
a security dilemma.388 Institutional and economic imperatives are secondary concerns to 
security and survival.  The empirical record outlined below, however, will demonstrate 
that South Sudan’s primary objectives were to obtain political autonomy and economic 
development within a united Sudan. 
From a constructivist perspective, civil wars are a means for ethnic entrepreneurs 
and elites to advance their particular political and economic interests.  Identity and 
preferences are not inherently given, but rather constructed and exploited for certain ends.  
This perspective emphasizes the role of agency in promoting and intensifying ethnic 
differences and the onset of conflict.  Based on this approach, officials from the South 
and Khartoum hijacked ethnic identities and used them to advance their interests.  There 
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is little empirical support for this position.  South Sudan’s preferences were not shaped by 
ethnic entrepreneurs and politicians, but rather by a collective belief that the South 
required federalism.  The historical record reveals that there was a general consensus 
amongst the South Sudanese that political autonomy and economic development were 
imperative for protecting their identity. 
Liberalism provides the best account for South Sudan’s preferences prior to its 
emergence as a de facto state.  The emphasis on political institutions and economic 
factors explains the preference formation of the South and provides an explanation for the 
conflict.  Although security is an important consideration, South Sudan’s preferences 
were formed during the negotiation process for independence with the British and the 
North.  Khartoum’s unwillingness to provide the South with a federal framework pushed 
the South to adopt violence.  Indeed, the South was effectively shut out from political 
positions in Khartoum and it was economically underdeveloped.  The historical 
examination will reveal that the South repeatedly and steadfastly requested federalism 
and economic development as preconditions for a unified Sudan.  The historical record 
will further demonstrate that the civil wars and South Sudan’s emergence as a de facto 
state were not shaped by fixed interests, but rather by unresponsive political institutions 
and poor economic development. 
 
The First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972) 
One of the root causes of the First Sudanese Civil War was the role of European traders 
and the presence of the British in the Sudan.  Richard Gray argues that “much of the 
violence which afflicted the Southern Sudan in the nineteenth century was caused 
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originally not by Northern slavers but by European traders – some of the present 
difficulties also stem not from Northern attitudes but from British policy.”389  Beshir 
Mohammed Said argues that missionaries were expelled from Southern Sudan in 1964 
because of their tendency to “encourage separatism, inflate racial and religious 
difference, interfere in politics and, in particular, raise funds and give food and shelter to 
outlaws.  From the very start they were the instrument and tool of the colonialist policy of 
divide and rule.”390  Said portrays the missionaries as political activists who took it upon 
themselves to represent the interests of the South because they were unwilling to accept a 
unified Sudan ruled by the Muslim North.391   
The British administrators adopted parallel policies of development for the two 
regions.  In the South, tribalism was reinforced and education was offered in the various 
mother tongues along with English.  In the North, Islam and Arabic prevailed.392  Such a 
policy reinforced the economic and political gap between the South and the North.393  
Because the British believed they had plenty of time to create a more equal basis before 
unifying North and South, little was done to mitigate the differences and the antagonisms.  
Instead, the North developed with Islamic and Arabic traditions while the South acquired 
Christianity and English in addition to its traditional religions and languages.  
Additionally, the onset of WWII and the pressure from Egypt and the Northern Sudanese 
for independence prevented the British from achieving some level of equality between 
North and South.394 
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A second cause of the conflict was the creation of an independent Sudan without a 
political framework that accommodated Southern demands.  During the months leading 
up to Sudan’s independence, it became increasingly clear to the South that it would not 
obtain federal status.  In protest, Southern politicians boycotted Sudan’s first parliament 
by vacating their posts in the Legislative Assembly.  As a consequence, Northerners, who 
viewed the North as “inherently superior to the South,” dominated Sudan’s governmental 
apparatus.395 
The immediate cause of the civil war, however, was the North’s unwillingness to 
provide the South with safeguards in the form of a federal framework and the 
appointment of Southerners to administrative positions in the South.  As an example, of 
the eight hundred administrative positions recommended for Sudanization, only six minor 
positions were given to Southerners, which naturally fostered an environment of mistrust 
and hostility.396   From Khartoum’s perspective, Southerners were “not qualified and 
experienced enough for these posts” and the ‘responsibility’ for the South’s lack of 
qualification, according to Beshir Mohammed Said, must be placed on the shoulders of 
the European missionaries and the British administration. 397   Said believes that the 
“political elements” in the South used Khartoum’s Sudanization policy as propaganda to 
‘agitate’ and instil fear in the Southern population.398  Dunstan Wai, however, notes that 
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Southerners viewed their exclusion from administrative posts as a “deliberate and 
malicious plot” to maintain Northern superiority over the South.399 
The two root causes laid the foundations for conflict and several specific incidents 
sparked violence and a rebellion in the South.  First, in July 1955 newly appointed 
Northern officials dismissed three hundred textile workers in Yambio, Equatoria, which 
led to widespread protests and incited gunfire from Northern officials.400  Second, there 
appeared a telegram, allegedly from the Prime Minister al-Azhari, that outlined his plans 
for the South. (The authenticity of the telegram has not been verified.)  It read: “To all my 
administrators in the three Southern provinces: I have just signed a document for self-
determination.  Do not listen to the childish complaints of the Southerners. Persecute 
them, oppress them, ill-treat them according to my orders.  Any administrator who fails to 
comply with my orders will be liable to prosecution.  In three months’ time all of you will 
come round and enjoy the work you have done.”401  Third, the events in Yambio and the 
distressing telegram contributed to suspicion and apprehension in the South and in 
particular at the military garrison in Tori, Equatoria.  Suspicious and fearful, soldiers of 
the Equatorial Corps refused to board lorries to ship them North.  The mutiny resulted in 
the killing of Northern officers in August of 1955.402  At the same time, there were 
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mutinies in the Southern towns of Juna, Yei, Yambio, and Meridi resulting in the deaths 
of 75 Southerners and 361 Northerners.403   
The mutinies were eventually settled and many of the Southern soldiers 
surrendered (and were subsequently tried and killed), but many fled to the bush or 
crossed international borders.404  Britain also played a role in deescalating the conflict.  
Although it refused to intervene militarily, British officials assisted al-Azhari in restoring 
order in the South. 405   Joseph Oduho and William Deng, former South Sudanese 
politicians and leaders of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) during the First 
Sudanese Civil War, place a large burden of the blame for the civil war on British 
shoulders.  Oduho and Deng reveal that Southern grievances towards the British stem 
from two events: first, Britain’s intervention in the 1955 mutiny did nothing to resolve 
the longstanding issues and second, British planes transported Northern troops to the 
South, which Southerners interpreted as British approval of Khartoum’s actions.406   
This last incident sparked the civil war between the North and the South. 
Khartoum’s decision to occupy the South with Northern troops only exacerbated 
hostilities following the mistreatment of Southerners at the hands of Northern soldiers.407  
In addition to political disenfranchisement, the South suffered economically in favour of 
the North.408  The bulk of academic work presents Khartoum as oppressive and brutal in 
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its treatment of the Southern Sudanese from 1955 to 1972.409  According to academics, 
Khartoum’s actions took the form of arbitrary arrests, torture, the destruction of homes, 
forced migration of Southerners to the North, and a general policy of subjugation.410 
The political tension and violence undermined al-Azhari’s NUP government, 
which faced an open political challenge from the opposition.  In response, al-Azhari 
moved to officially declare Sudan’s independence, but his government continued to face 
stern opposition from the other parties who sought a ‘national government.’411  A PDP-
Umma union led by new Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil replaced al-Azhari and his NUP 
party.  Shortly after the 1957 election, all Southern Federal Party (SFP) members 
resigned from the assembly in protest against the government’s unwillingness to meet the 
South’s federal demands. Their spokesman, Saturnino Ohure, addressed the assembly 
with the following remarks: 
The South has no intention of separating from the North for had that been the case 
nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for separation.  The South claims to 
federate with the North, a right that the South undoubtedly possesses as a consequence of 
the principle of free self-determination, which reason and democracy grant to a free 
people.  The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so 
desires, directly or indirectly, through political, social and economic subjection of the 
South.412 
 
In short, although the South was asking for federalism, policies of exclusion would push 
the South to make separatist demands.  By the summer of 1958, however, Sudan’s 
parliament faced dissolution as a consequence of factions within the coalition 
government.  In anticipation of the collapse, Prime Minister Khalil had arranged for the 
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military to take over the government.413  Joseph Oduho and William Deng argue that 
Khalil’s decision to relinquish power to the military was a result of Khartoum’s inability 
to implement a unitary constitution and therefore relied on the military to do so.414  On 17 
November 1958, General Abboud declared a state of emergency.  He announced that the 
parliament and all political parties would be dissolved and gatherings and the media 
would be banned until order was restored in the country.415   
According to academics, General Abboud’s objective was to Arabize and Islamize 
the South through education and social policies and to eliminate demands for 
federalism.416  In response to the state of emergency and oppression of the South, high-
profile politicians, including Saturnino Ohure, Joseph Oduho, and William Deng, and 
large numbers of students fled the South to join other exiles in the bush from 1960 to 
1962.417  These exiles, led by Ohure, Oduho, and Deng, formed the Sudan African Closed 
Districts National Union (renamed the Sudan African National Union – SANU) to 
represent the South’s economic and political interests.418  Its main objectives, according 
to Dunstan Wai, were to publicize Southern Sudan’s oppression to the international 
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community, in particular the US and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and to 
organize a guerrilla movement against Khartoum’s oppressive policies.419   
The SANU did not openly voice its desire for the South’s independence and 
instead, it proclaimed ‘self-determination’ as its objective in order to avoid political 
backlash from neighbouring states and regional organisations that wanted to maintain the 
existing borders for stability.420  In 1963 the SANU announced the formation of the 
“Anya-Nya,” bands of freedom (and separatist) fighters whose aims were to educate and 
free the South from the North.421  Amidst the military regime, strict political censorship, 
and Khartoum’s repression of the South, the Anya-Nya began its assaults on the 
government’s posts in the South in 1962.422  
The Anya-Nya’s activities proved effective at disrupting Sudan’s political and 
economic progress thereby prompting Abboud to launch an inquiry into the conflict.423  
The instability and violence led to increased criticism and dissatisfaction with the military 
regime, triggering mass demonstrations (especially by students) and a general strike, 
which ultimately brought down the military regime.424  The Revolution of 1964 forced 
General Abboud to step down and he was replaced by a transitional national government 
comprised of the NUP, the PDP, the Umma, and the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), a 
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student organization group formed in the 1960s.  The fall of the military regime marked 
the founding of the Southern Front Party by Southern intelligentsia living in Khartoum.425   
The new government of Sudan felt compelled to resolve the conflict with the 
South by offering amnesty to all Sudanese in exile and called for a conference to settle 
Sudan’s political issues.426  The Round Table Conference of 1965 included all Southern 
political parties and associations, Northern political parties, and observers from 
neighbouring states.  Its objective was to “discuss the Southern Question with a view to 
reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the special interests of the South as well as the 
general interests of the North.”427  However, due to intractable differences regarding the 
status of the South and the actions of the Anya-Nya, the conference abruptly ended in two 
weeks. In addition, and although both sides agreed that there must be devolution of 
powers between Khartoum and the South, there was disagreement regarding the 
prerogatives of each government.428 
In 1965 Saturnino Ohure and Joseph Oduho broke away from the SANU, then led 
by Aggrey Jaden, and established the Azania Liberation Front (ALF).429   However, 
pressure from South Sudanese intellectuals and students (i.e., Southern Sudan Students 
Union) compelled the ALF and the SANU to merge into a single entity under the ALF 
banner and to be led by Oduho and Jaden.430  In 1967, Jaden toured the Equatoria to rally 
and secure support from the chiefs of the region and other influential South Sudanese 
officials.  Jaden then convened a meeting of three hundred delegates from the South in 
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order to form a new government that would lead South Sudan. 431   It produced the 
Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) and merged all the rebel factions under 
a single entity called the Anya-Nya National Armed Forces (ANAF).432   
The formation of the SSPG was soon followed by the second national convention 
to discuss the way forward for South Sudan.  The SSPG was renamed the Nile 
Provisional Government (NPG) to be elected in a democratic manner and to protect and 
advance Southern interests. 433   The election of Gordon Muortat as president led to 
divisions due to the inequitable distribution of cabinet posts across the three Southern 
states. 434   Despite the progress however, internal divisions and rivalries – this time 
between Muortat and Joseph Lagu – continued to weaken South Sudan’s liberation 
movement.435  Ultimately, Muortat dissolved the NPG to make way for Lagu’s Southern 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in 1970.436 
North-South relations further deteriorated following the failure of the conference 
and the inability of the North and the South to come to terms on a political settlement.  
Following general elections in Sudan, the Umma party and the NUP formed a coalition 
government led by Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. 437   The government of Mahgoub 
adopted a policy of force aimed at “annihilating” the South’s educated class.438  This 
policy, however, only encouraged more Southerners to migrate into the bush and into 
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neighbouring countries to join the other refugees.  The continued violence and political 
instability in Khartoum once again compelled the military to overthrow the government.  
The bloodless coup d’état of 1969 was led by to the formation of the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) and Colonel Jaafar Mohammed Numayri.439 
Colonel Numayri subsequently banned all political parties, suspended the 
constitution, and dissolved the Supreme Court.440  Abel Alier, a member of the Southern 
Front in Khartoum, advised Numayri that local autonomy for the South would end the 
violence and create stability.441  Despite peaceful overtures and calls of amnesty for 
Southerners abroad from the Numayri government, few Southerners trusted Khartoum.  
These suspicions were heightened by the delay in the implementation of the local 
autonomy policy and political instability in the capital.  Numayri’s regime faced an 
unsuccessful coup d’état from the Communist Party largely as a result of an intervention 
from Libya and Egypt.442  The failed coup against Numayri’s regime and the general 
unrest in the North, however, pushed the Numayri regime to consider a peace settlement 
with the South to avoid a two-front war.443  Furthermore, it became increasingly clear to 
Khartoum and the SSLM that a military victory was unlikely for either side.444  In this 
context, Numayri appointed Abel Alier as the minister responsible for Southern Affairs 
and in charge of initiating the peace settlement.   
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The peace talks were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia beginning in 1971 between 
the SSLM and representatives of Sudan’s central government.445  Negotiations were to be 
conducted with a united Sudan as a precondition.  The Southern representatives sought a 
federal Sudan that would grant the South a regional government and control over other 
policy areas such as education and trade.446  Khartoum, meanwhile, was unwilling to 
grant such extensive autonomy to the South.  Despite the differences, the Addis Ababa 
Agreement was signed March 1972 and included the following terms.  The three 
Southern states were recognized as a “self-governing” region with legislative and 
executive bodies.  The legislative organ, the People’s Regional Assembly (PRA), was to 
be elected by Southerners and would be responsible for legislating issues outlined in the 
Addis Ababa Agreement.  The executive organ, the High Executive Council (HEC), was 
to be led by a President appointed by the President of Sudan on the recommendation of 
the People’s Regional Assembly.  Juba was the capital of Southern Sudan and the 
location for the PRA and the HEC and English was the “principal” language of the 
Southern Region.  Finally, the South would host 12,000 officers represented equally by 
soldiers from the South and the North.  This allowed for the integration of Anya-Nya 
fighters into the Sudanese army.447 
Prominent Sudanese and South Sudanese experts reacted to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement with hopeful but cautious optimism.  Mohamed Omer Beshir, Sudanese 
intellectual and chair of the 1965 Round Table Conference, acknowledged that both sides 
were looking for peace, but warned that the Agreement “was just the beginning of a more 
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difficult and complex task – the promotion of economic and social development in the 
South and the consolidation of the political unity of the Sudan.”448  Writing in 1976, 
Nelson Kasfir, highlighted the North and South’s commitment to the agreement, but also 
noted that Southerners remained distrustful of Khartoum and that the “advantages of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement are withering away, and its legitimacy disappearing.”449   
Bona Malwal, a Southerner and Numayri’s Minister of Culture and Information, 
was less optimistic and cited three issues in the Sudan.  He argued that the role of Islam 
in the government could not work in the long-term, that Sudan must allow for a multi-
party political system, and that the economy was not benefitting the whole of Sudan.450  
Douglas Johnson criticized the Agreement for furnishing the South with “qualified 
legislative authority, poorly defined economic powers, and an ambiguous understanding 
of the security forces.”451  Furthermore, the Agreement was unpopular with Northern 
elites who thought it granted too much autonomy and would encourage separatism in the 
South.  
Despite some reservations, there can be no doubt that the Agreement was 
welcomed following a costly civil war.  Abel Alier, the architect of the Agreement, 
reveals that the civilian population suffered a majority of the deaths during the first civil 
war.  Alier estimates there were 170,000 to 500,000 civilian casualties compared to 500 
to 600 killed soldiers on both sides.452  The Addis Ababa Agreement ended the civil war 
and provided an opening for settling the North-South conflict with a political settlement.  
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Instead, however, the 1972 Agreement turned out to be a temporary solution that failed to 
address the fundamental and root problems in the Sudan.  This is demonstrated by the 
resumption of the conflict in the 1980s with the onset of the second civil war.  The period 
following the Agreement was expected to provide the South with autonomy and to 
provide economic development.453  Instead, the autonomy was limited and the South 
received only fractions of the development budget promised from Khartoum.454  Rather 
than fostering reconciliation and progress, therefore, the period following the 1972 
Agreement was characterized by more broken promises and the unwillingness of 
Khartoum to adhere to the agreement.  These issues were exacerbated by the discovery of 
oil in the South, which contributed to the onset of the second civil war.455 
The above narrative is intended to demonstrate that South Sudan’s primary 
objective was to attain federalism. Although the 1972 agreement outlined self-
government for the South, it did not meet the South’s requests and Khartoum reneged on 
most of the terms outlined in the agreement.  Rather than reconciliation, the 1972 
Agreement further marginalized the South and fostered an environment of mistrust 
between the South and Khartoum.  Despite its collapse and a second civil war, South 
Sudan maintained that federalism would be the solution to the conflict.  Khartoum’s 
unwillingness to address the South’s political and economic grievances resulted in the 
second civil war and the South’s ultimate secession. 
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The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) 
The discovery of oil in Southern Sudan in 1978 heightened Khartoum’s fears regarding 
the breakup of Sudan.  Soon thereafter, President Numayri paid a visit to the US where he 
also met with Chevron officials to discuss the construction of a pipeline, connected to 
Port Sudan, to transport the oil from South Sudan to the international markets.456  This 
sparked demonstrations in the South, which believed that the pipeline ought to be 
connected to Mombasa Port in Kenya.  Numayri and the North were infuriated and 
viewed the issue in terms of North-South divisions.457 Abel Alier notes that “oil became a 
considerable factor in Sudanese politics and contributed in no small way not only to the 
intensification of North-South conflict but also the internationalization of that 
conflict.”458   
The discovery of oil and the issues associated with its extraction and revenues 
contributed to the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the resumption of violence 
between Khartoum and Southern rebels in 1983.  The issue can be traced back to the 
financial details outlined in the Addis Ababa Agreement.  In the Agreement, all central 
government revenues from the South, including those generated from natural resources, 
would fill the Southern government’s coffers.459  Alier believes that Khartoum could have 
requested the South to revisit the issue of revenue sharing, but instead it chose to pursue a 
dishonest policy by altering boundaries so as to annex the oil fields into the North’s 
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jurisdiction. 460   Sudan began to export oil in 1999 and significantly increased its 
production by 2002.461  
The main grievances from the South were Khartoum’s interference in the South’s 
political affairs (including the selection of the South’s leadership and meddling in the 
regional assembly), neglecting the South’s economic development and connecting the oil 
pipeline to Port Sudan, and the redrawing of the South’s boundaries. 462   Another 
contributing factor was Numayri’s decision to implement sharia (Islamic law) in the 
midst of an economic crisis in Sudan.463  It is at this time that we witness the rise of John 
Garang, a US-educated Southerner and a former Anya-Nya officer, who was integrated 
into the Sudanese army following the 1972 Agreement.  As early as 1982 John Garang 
and other Southern officials began assisting the Anya-Nya II rebels by providing them 
with weapons.464  Soon thereafter Garang fled to Ethiopia following a clash between the 
Sudanese army and Southern soldiers in 1983 in the city of Bor, South Sudan.465   
Like the original Anya-Nya, the new movement faced internal divisions. 466  
Garang’s bid to lead the SPLM/SPLA, his Marxist undertones, and commitment to a 
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united Sudan was supported by Ethiopia and prominent Southern officials in exile.467  
Garang’s leadership was opposed by the old order, which believed that the movement 
ought to have a political wing and a military wing.  Douglas Johnson reveals that the 
Anya-Nya II initially referred to different rebel groups operating in the South in the early 
1980s and it would not have an impact on North-South relations until 1983.468  Anya-Nya 
II was originally comprised of the soldiers who were suspicious of Khartoum and 
strongly opposed to integration into a common army with Northerners.469  As such, many 
of these ex-Anya-Nya fighters went into exile and by 1983 Southern police and soldiers 
abandoned their units to join the rebels.470  It is important to note that Garang and the 
SPLM were not demanding independence, but rather the ‘liberation’ of the whole of 
Sudan.471  The second civil war began in April of 1983 with clashes between the SPLA 
and the Sudanese army along the Sudan-Ethiopia border.472  
John Garang outlined the primary cause of the second civil war during his speech 
following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005.  Garang said, 
In our view the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic Arab-
Islamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity constitutes 
the Fundamental Problem of the Sudan and defines the Sudanese conflict. The Sudanese 
state has excluded the vast majority of the Sudanese people from governance, and 
therefore their marginalization in the political, economic and social fields. This 
provoked resistance by the excluded.473 
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These unfavourable conditions were exacerbated by Sudan’s stagnant economy, ongoing 
political repression, and the escalating civil war.  As a consequence, Numayri’s regime 
was overthrown in a military coup d’état that installed Sawar El Dahab.474  The military 
established the Transitional Military Council to rule for a one-year transitional period to 
be followed by elections.  The SPLM, however, refused to end its activities or to 
participate in the scheduled elections without a constitutional conference.475  John Garang 
explained the South’s position with the following words: 
…the Central Problems in the Sudanese war are the dominance of One Nationality; the 
Sectarian and Religious Bigotry that dominated the Sudanese political scene since 
Independence; and the unequal development in the country…unless the Nationality 
Question is solved correctly, the Religious bigotry is destroyed and a balanced 
development for all the regions of the Sudan is struck, war is the only invited option in 
the Sudan.476 
 
Garang and the South were promised a constitutional convention but it never 
materialized.  The frequent broken promises fostered an environment of mistrust between 
the South and Khartoum and, as we will see, this mistrust was one of the factors that 
made secession more appealing than a union with Khartoum.  The elections of 1986 
propelled Sadiq al-Mahdi to power following the formation of a coalition government 
comprised of the Umma party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), the Democratic Unionist 
Party, and other smaller parties. Al-Mahdi failed to convene the constitutional 
convention, refused to repeal Numayri’s sharia policy from 1983, and in fact moved 
closer to the creation of an Islamic state.477  It should be noted, however, that the SPLA’s 
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actions contributed to al-Mahdi’s decision to suspend the peace negotiations.  In August 
1986, the SPLA shot down a Sudan Air airplane and killed all 60 civilians.478   
Like previous governments before him, al-Mahdi’s government was fraught with 
corruption and came under increased criticism by the Sudanese population.  Despite its 
weakness, however, Johnson notes that in 1989 al-Mahdi and the SPLM were moving 
towards negotiating a peace settlement that was thwarted by the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) and a group of army officers who staged a coup against al-Mahdi and installed 
Omar al-Bashir as president.479  The new regime was characterized by strong Islamist 
leanings and sought to implement sharia in Sudan. 480   Bashir formed the National 
Congress Party (NCP) following a split with the NIF in 1999, but preserved the NIF’s 
ideology for continuity.481 
In the meantime, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) resorted to force in 
order to maintain the movement’s internal order and to prevent a breakup.  Douglas 
Johnson argues that Garang’s control over the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
(SPLM) and SPLA relied heavily on support from Ethiopia.482    
The fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, therefore, had severe consequences 
for SPLA’s unity and its ability to wage a war against Khartoum.483  The consequences 
were felt immediately as rival factions (i.e., the SPLA-Nasir led by Riek Machar and Lam 
Akol) within the SPLA began to break away and challenge Garang’s movement.  Machar 
and Akol disagreed with Garang’s objective of securing Southern autonomy within a 
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united Sudan and instead called for South Sudan’s independence.  In addition, Garang 
faced opposition from factions who perceived the SPLA as Dinka-dominated and a threat 
to their tribes.484  To this end, the Nasir faction allied itself with Khartoum in order to 
defeat Garang’s SPLA and move towards independence.  The factionalism within the 
SPLA resulted in tribal rivalries and violence between the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups 
with the Dinka supporting Garang and the Nuer supporting Machar.485  As a consequence 
of its alliance with Khartoum and for its tribalistic structure however, the Nasir 
movement’s support waned.486  
The peace process stalled due to the instability and the wavering of successive 
governments in Khartoum.487  For example, during negotiations held in Nigeria in 1992, 
Khartoum rejected Garang’s proposal for a secular Sudan and a referendum on the 
South’s future.488  One year later, Khartoum offered a federal constitution that did not 
explicitly refer to Islam as the state religion, but the SPLM rejected this proposal and 
instead asked for a secular and confederal framework.489  The issues of religion and 
autonomy appeared to be the main obstacles to a permanent solution.  Sudan’s civil war 
and the threat it posed to regional security prompted the regional organisation Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to initiate peace talks between the two 
sides in 1993.490  IGAD’s initial resolution was accepted by the SPLM but eventually 
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rejected by Khartoum on the grounds that its principles were unacceptable.491  Four years 
later Khartoum signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with Riek Machar’s South Sudan 
Independence Movement and the Fashoda Agreement with Lam Akol’s SPLM-United 
under the auspices of the “peace from within” initiative.  Both agreements recognized the 
South’s right to self-determination and would serve as the basis for the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement.492  
The peace process was then taken up by the US, Britain, Norway, and Italy 
(referred to as the ‘Quartet’) with the appointment of US Senator John Danforth as a 
special envoy.493  IGAD, however, maintained its participation and continued to push for 
a settlement.  Danforth’s involvement sparked immediate results beginning with a 
ceasefire agreement that paved the way for negotiations and greater US involvement.494  
This was soon followed by the 2002 meeting in Machakos, Kenya wherein the two sides 
came to an agreement on the role of religion in Sudan and the issue of self-
determination.495  Under this protocol, the North would adhere to Islamic laws and the 
South would be secular.496 
Although some have argued that US and international involvement was driven by 
the increased production of oil and the desire to isolate Sudan from terrorist 
organizations, it nonetheless encouraged negotiations and mediated the peace 
agreement. 497   The Machakos Protocol on the role of religion was followed by the 
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Agreement on Wealth Sharing of 2004 and other protocols, including the Power Sharing 
Protocol, were finalised and signed into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 
Nairobi, Kenya in 2005.498  The CPA was to be monitored by the United Nations Mission 
in Sudan (UNMIS).  The CPA provided for a six-year interim period that was intended to 
convince Southerners that Sudanese unity was the best option for moving forward.499  
Since 2005, therefore, South Sudan can be categorized as a de facto state.  
South Sudan’s status from 2005 to 2011 fits the definition of de facto state as an 
entity that controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the population, and 
enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but it does not possess de 
jure recognition. During this time, the Government of South Sudan exercised 
administrative authority over the political and economic affairs of three historically 
Southern provinces (i.e., Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile), which were divided 
into ten states.500  The CPA granted South Sudan autonomy for a six-year transitional 
period that was intended to convince the South that a federation with Sudan was the most 
attractive option for the future.  
The CPA included six protocols (or chapters) that outlined the political, 
economic, and security arrangements of Sudan, South Sudan, and other conflict areas 
including Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile.  The Machakos section of the CPA called on 
all parties to defend the unity of Sudan under a democratic framework that would lead to 
a ‘comprehensive solution’ to the political and economic crises in the Sudan and to 
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address the grievances of the South.501  The two subsequent clauses, however, equipped 
South Sudan with self-government and the right to self-determination in the form of a 
referendum to decide its future.502  This process was to be undertaken and implemented 
during the six-year interim period.  Under the power sharing arrangement, Sudan was to 
establish the Government of National Unity with a “decentralized system of government 
with significant devolution of powers.”503  The chapter on wealth sharing outlined the 
principles for distributing Sudan’s wealth and in particular the revenues generated from 
the South’s oil reserves.  Sudan was entitled to 50 percent of the oil revenue generated in 
the South and the remaining 50 percent belonged to South Sudan.504 
Ultimately the CPA was a failure.505  Explanations for the failure of the CPA 
include the lack of mutual trust between Khartoum and the South, the exclusion of other 
groups in the negotiation process (e.g., the negotiations were conducted exclusively with 
the National Congress Party and the SPLM), and the inability to properly implement the 
CPA.506  For example, the interim period from 2005 to 2011 was marred by “hostility 
between Sudan and southern Sudan,” including military clashes and political boycott in 
the National Unity Government by the South.507  It should also be noted that the Darfur 
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war, which broke out in 2003 shortly after the Machakos Protocol, disrupted the peace 
process and took away the international community’s attention from the implementation 
of the CPA.508  For these reasons, in 2011 South Sudan was on the brink of seceding from 
Sudan. 
From a theoretical perspective, South Sudan’s behaviour and preferences are best 
explained by liberalism.  First, institutional factors and economic incentives played a 
significant role in shaping the South’s preferences and behaviour from the first civil war 
to 2005.  South Sudan repeatedly requested federalism and economic development as 
conditions for its continued participation in the union.  Instead of meeting these requests, 
Khartoum further marginalized and oppressed the South, a policy that led to two civil 
wars.  Realism and constructivism also offer some insights into the behaviour of South 
Sudan. First, realist assumptions about the importance of security and survival shed light 
on the behaviour and preferences of Khartoum and the South.  Both actors may have been 
influenced by security imperatives given the environment of mistrust and the brutal civil 
war and violence.  Finally, constructivism and its emphasis on ethnic entrepreneurs help 
to explain the behaviour of South Sudanese officials competing for power and influence 
in South Sudan. 
 
Capabilities 
Sudan’s two civil wars demonstrate that South Sudan did not possess the power or 
capabilities to achieve independence.  The civil wars were long and drawn out conflicts 
that pitted South Sudanese armed groups against the regime in Khartoum.  Although 
Khartoum found it difficult to defeat the armed groups, the South Sudanese found it 
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equally difficult to extract any meaningful concessions from the central government. The 
ensuing stalemate culminated in a negotiated settlement to the conflict. South Sudan 
ultimately became a de facto state through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
in 2005. However limited, therefore, South Sudan possessed sufficient capabilities for 
bringing Khartoum to negotiate and agree to a peace agreement. This achievement 
supports realist claims about the importance of capabilities for survival. At the same time, 
South Sudan’s decision to accept the CPA was shaped by the promise of autonomy, 
economic development, and a more democratic Sudan.  The CPA contained political 
institutions and economic incentives that were appealing to the South and which 
ultimately could have preserved the union of Sudan. 
Liberal assumptions related to political institutions and economic factors provide 
valuable insights into South Sudan’s decision to negotiate and accept the CPA.  As 
outlined above, the CPA furnished South Sudan with extensive political and economic 
autonomy within a united Sudan.  This arrangement was sufficient for appeasing the 
South to maintain de facto status rather than immediately push for independence. 
Liberalism, with its emphasis on institutional design and economic factors, thus provides 
the most thorough explanation for the emergence of South Sudan. The next section will 
further demonstrate the importance of political institutions and economic incentives.  The 
section will reveal that South Sudan held an independence referendum not because it 
possessed the capabilities or because independence is inherently preferable to de facto 
statehood, but because Khartoum failed to abide by the rules of the CPA. 
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The Behaviour of South Sudan 
Preferences 
South Sudan declared independence 1 July 2011 following a referendum that 
overwhelmingly supported secession from Sudan.  The January 2011 referendum asked 
the voters of South Sudan to “confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the 
system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or vote for secession.”509  
The results of the referendum, monitored by the UN and African Union, demonstrated 
that Khartoum had failed to convince the South that unity was the best way forward.  
Approximately 98.8 percent of voters voted in favour of secession and about 97 percent 
of eligible voters cast a ballot. South Sudan’s secession is viewed as a failure of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was intended to give unity another 
chance. 510  
Secession was not inevitable.  Indeed, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the 
extant literature, South Sudan supported federalism as a way to maintain the unity of 
Sudan. John Garang, for one, believed that the solution was an inclusive political system 
that provided the various regions with autonomy.  Garang and the SPLM’s demands 
indicate that the South was willing to forgo independence and maintain Sudan’s unity 
under the right conditions.  Since the 1980s and the 1990s, Garang and the SPLM called 
for economic and political equality for all the people of Sudan.511  In his speech following 
the CPA signing in 2005, Garang said:  
The solution to the fundamental problem of Sudan is to evolve an “all-inclusive Sudanese 
state” which we have called the New Sudan, a “new Sudanese political dispensation” in 
which all Sudanese are equal stakeholders irrespective of their religion, race, tribe or 
gender, and if this does not work, then look for other solutions, such as splitting the 
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country…As is the case in the South, the events in Darfur, Eastern Sudan and elsewhere 
have made it clear that we must have an “all- inclusive Sudanese state” at the national 
level and full devolution of power to the various regions of the Sudan, for otherwise it is 
unlikely that the country would stand any chance of remaining united.512 
 
Given that Garang and his SPLM were willing to settle for autonomy within a united 
Sudan, what explains the secession of the South? 
The South’s decision to secede from Sudan was strongly influenced by the 
domestic politics of Sudan and the South Sudan.  On the domestic front, Khartoum’s 
inability or unwillingness to implement the important provisions of the CPA contributed 
to the secession of the South.  Key provisions included the implementation of a federal 
system, the allocation of resources, a more representative civil service, and a functioning 
democracy with free and fair elections.513  Few of these reforms were implemented and 
ultimately the CPA functioned as a ceasefire rather than a constitution.514  Khartoum’s 
vacillation on implementing democratic practices and the continued violence deepened 
the mistrust and convinced the South that unity would not work.  Asteris Huliaras 
contends that the breakup of Sudan can be attributed to Khartoum and the NCP’s 
unwillingness to democratize.515   This is supported by the SPLM’s suspicions about 
Khartoum’s ability to democratize and establish a federal and pluralistic Sudan. 516  
Brendan O’Leary says, “In Sudan, the South’s potential federalists became committed 
secessionists because they (correctly) estimated that they faced a central power unwilling 
                                            
512
 John Garang, “SPLM Chairman’s Address to Signing Ceremony of the Sudan Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.” 
513
 Asteris Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up of Sudan,” 261. 
514
 Lovise Aalen, “Making Unity Unattractive: The Conflicting Aims of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement,” Civil Wars Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013), 174. 
Asteris Huliaras, “The Unanticipated Break-up of Sudan,” 261. 
515
 Ibid., 264. 
516
 Brendan O’Leary, “The Federalization of Iraq and the Break-up of Sudan,” Government and Opposition 
Vol. 47, No. 4 (2012), 511. 
 155
to make the necessary accommodations to make unity attractive.”517  This issue was 
highlighted by the failure of both sides to form a coalition Government of National 
Unity.518 
The condition of autonomy or a federal framework presupposes that the political 
system in question is democratic or will transition to a multi-party democracy.  There has 
been little chance for democracy to thrive in Sudan since independence.  According to 
Sidahmed, “there are serious doubts about the NCP’s [National Congress Party] 
democratic credentials and its commitment to advancing a democratic transformation of 
the country.”519  After all, a military regime overthrew a democratic government and has 
committed human rights violations against the people of Sudan ever since.520  In addition, 
the historical account of Sudan illustrates its troubled history and unstable political 
system.  Since independence in 1956, Sudan has witnessed three civilian parliamentary 
administrations (1956–58, 1965–69, and 1986–89) all preceded by a transitional period 
and three military regimes (1958–64, 1969–85, and 1989–present).  As a consequence, 
say Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed, the government in Khartoum was not 
able to implement policies that could encourage social, political, and economic 
development.521  
Furthermore, the parliamentary governments were plagued by internal disputes 
that compelled governments to focus on their resources on survival rather than 
implementing effective governance.522  In addition, the frequency and ease with which 
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military coups occurred displays the weak democratic institutions in Sudan. These facts 
support the notion that Sudan’s post-independence experience is understood as a state of 
“perpetual turbulence” as it grappled with unstable political regimes and two long civil 
wars in the South.523  
A second domestic factor that shaped the South’s preference for independence 
was the accidental death of John Garang. 524   John Garang, a committed federalist, 
promoted federalism and the unity of Sudan under the auspices of a ‘New Sudan’ 
following the signing of the CPA.  Garang believed that South Sudan could prosper in a 
united, federal, and democratic Sudan that treated all regions and groups fairly. His death 
paved the way for those, such as Garang’s successor Salva Kiir, the former head of the 
SPLA, who favoured independence.525   Kiir became the leader of South Sudan and 
Sudan’s first Vice-President, but he showed little interest in the unity of Sudan and 
instead focused on the development of the South.526   
Kiir and others, such as Atem Garang, promoted South Sudan’s independence to 
ensure the protection of the South’s religious, economic, and political rights.  On the 
domestic front, South Sudan’s government urged Southerners to vote for independence in 
order to end Northern domination.  For example, in a 2009 speech in Juba, Kiir 
proclaimed: “When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours: you want to vote for 
unity so that you become a second class in your own country, that is your choice…If you 
want to vote for independence so that you are a free person in your independent state, that 
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will be your own choice and we will respect the choice of the people.”527 
A final factor that shaped South Sudan’s preference for independence and 
decision to secede from Sudan is the presence of the old regime.  The case of South 
Sudan demonstrates that political autonomy is insufficient if the ‘old regime’ (i.e., the 
regime responsible for oppressing the de facto state and with which the de facto entity has 
fought a war) holds power at the national level.  The presence of the old regime is a bitter 
reminder of the past, which prevents obstacles to the development of trust between the de 
facto state and the parent state.  For instance, the notion of an autonomous framework for 
the South was not attractive under the Bashir regime given that it repeatedly disregarded 
promises of autonomy.528  The presence of the Omar al-Bashir regime contributed to the 
South’s uneasiness regarding the CPA and the South’s position in Sudan.  After all, 
Bashir was in power for much of the second civil war.   
From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand why the South could not 
trust the regime in Khartoum.  There was a certain level of mistrust between the South 
and the regime in Khartoum that would have been difficult to overcome.  Cecil Eprile 
best sums up the issue of mistrust.  He says, “Southerners were to say – with justification 
– that the North did not keep any promise or give real consideration to the South’s desire 
for federation.  Northerners were to say – also not without justification – that it was never 
quite clear what was meant by ‘federation’ in the Sudanese context.”529  
Realism would argue that South Sudan’s decision to hold a referendum and 
subsequently declare independence is a response to the security dilemma facing ethnic 
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groups in multiethnic states.  The two civil wars and the uncertainty of Khartoum’s 
intentions compelled South Sudan to move towards independence rather than settle for 
autonomy or de facto statehood. The peace settlement could not attenuate the competition 
for security and the enduring ethnic differences between North and South and, as a result, 
the preference for independence is fixed.  The concept of self-help further compelled 
South Sudan to pursue independence in order to survive in a system wherein states cannot 
rely on others for survival.  South Sudan demonstrates, however, that an actor’s decision-
making is influenced by considerations other than security and capabilities.  Regional and 
international factors, domestic politics, and the nature of the parent’ state’s regime also 
play a significant role in shaping de facto state preferences. 
A constructivist explanation would emphasize the role of elites in pushing South 
Sudan towards independence. This notion has some support from South Sudan’s 
behaviour from 2005 to 2011.  Elites such as Salva Kiir and Atem Garang shifted South 
Sudan’s preference after seizing power. Kiir and Atem Garang believed that 
independence was the best policy for South Sudan.  Certainly elites such as Kiir and 
Atem Garang benefited from the South’s independence. Kiir has been the president of 
South Sudan since independence and Atem Garang has held various high-ranking 
governmental positions, including the position of Chief Whip of the South Sudan 
parliament. Still elites, however, operate within and are constrained by the domestic, 
regional, and international systems.  
Although realism and constructivism provide valuable insights, they cannot fully 
explain the secession of South Sudan.  Liberalism’s focus on the role of political 
institutions, economic incentives, and the domestic political system provides a better 
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explanation for the South’s decision to secede from Sudan.  The secession of South 
Sudan can be explained by three primary factors.  First, although the CPA furnished the 
South with political autonomy, Khartoum’s ‘history of bad acts’ (i.e., violence against 
and oppression of the South and broken promises) and its unwillingness to undertake 
meaningful democratic reforms did little to assuage the South’s mistrust and suspicions 
of Khartoum.  Second, the internal divisions within South Sudan demonstrate that 
domestic politics and the struggle for influence and power between actors can shape the 
preferences and behaviour of actors.  Finally, the union with Sudan did not present the 
South with meaningful economic incentives (This point will be further examined in the 
next section.) 
 
Capabilities 
Like Kosovo, South Sudan did not possess the internal military or political capabilities to 
secede from Sudan.  However, South Sudan did not require military capabilities given 
that it possessed the legal framework, in the form of the CPA, to secede from Sudan.  
Still, South Sudan required some degree of capabilities to make the secession successful 
and peaceful.  The South found such capabilities in the form of support from regional and 
international actors, including neighbouring governments and the US.  This support 
bolstered the South’s capabilities and provided the international support necessary for 
independence. 
Neighbouring states played a role in shaping and influencing Sudan’s political 
trajectory since its independence.  In the early stages of the first civil war, the 
international community largely supported the government in the North.  Both the 
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Organization of African Unity and the Arab League supported Khartoum, which they 
recognized as the legal and legitimate representative of Sudan.  These organisations were 
particularly invested in maintaining the territorial integrity of Sudan: The former had an 
interest in discouraging other secessionist and nationalist groups, which were quite 
prevalent in Africa; while the latter remained loyal to its Arab brethren in the North.  The 
major powers also sided with Khartoum in the early stages of the conflict. For instance, 
the Soviet Union provided substantial military aid to Khartoum.  The US publicly stated 
that it would refrain from becoming directly involved in the conflict, but privately 
provided support to Khartoum in the form of economic and military aid.530   
Although most states openly supported Khartoum, the South also received 
clandestine support from neighbouring states sympathetic to its cause.531  For example, 
the Sudan African National Union (SANU) was successful in establishing branches in 
neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Congo and an office in the United Kingdom.532  
The base in Ethiopia became the most effective.  Once it was formed, the SANU initiated 
a diplomatic effort to garner support from neighbouring African countries and established 
lobbies in Europe to procure political and financial assistance.533  When a Soviet-backed 
military junta, the Derg (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and 
Territorial Army), came to power in Ethiopia in 1974, the United States took a stronger 
interest in preserving the stability of Sudan, which it viewed as a regional counterweight 
to bordering Ethiopia.534  By the 1980s, the US saw Sudan as an important strategic ally 
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against Soviet interests in Africa.535  However, by the late 1980s Sudan’s importance for 
Washington declined, as Soviet interests in Africa waned.536   
Under the George W. Bush administration, Washington became heavily involved 
in negotiating a peace settlement during the Second Civil War, in part because doing so 
was related to the broader war on terror.537  During these negotiations, headed by John 
Danforth, the irreconcilable differences between the two sides became apparent, as both 
had become entrenched in their respective positions.  Though Asteris Huliaras argues that 
there “is no evidence that Washington’s involvement was accompanied by an agenda 
favouring partition,” American involvement in the conflict is widely seen (especially by 
the Northern Sudanese) to have facilitated the eventual dissolution of Sudan.538   
African governments were more supportive of South Sudan’s secession. Uganda 
openly supported Sudan’s breakup in response to Khartoum’s support for Uganda’s 
separatist Lord’s Resistance Army.539  Ethiopia also responded to Khartoum’s support for 
Eritrea by supporting the SPLM/A.  According to Belete Belachew Yihun, Ethiopia 
played a significant role in contributing to the breakup of Sudan.540  Sudan’s support for 
the Eritrean secessionist movement pushed Ethiopia to adopt policies aimed at 
destabilising Sudan, including “unconditional support to the SPLM/A.” 541   In short, 
Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s internal affairs and support for the South Sudan 
contributed to the instability and the secession of the South.  Regional and international 
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actors contributed to the secession of the South. 
As a result of the tremendous support for the South from regional and 
international governments, Khartoum had few options for preventing the South from 
holding the referendum and seceding.  Three factors in particular impeded Khartoum 
from taking action against the South.  First, under the CPA, the South was entitled to hold 
a referendum on independence in January 2011.  Second, the regime in Khartoum was 
under intense pressure from the international community for its human rights abuses (e.g., 
in 2010 the International Criminal Court issued charges of genocide against Omar al-
Bashir) and for its support of terrorism.542  Finally, US and broader international support 
for the South meant that Khartoum had few options in responding to the secession.543 
The behaviour of South Sudan also lends support to the hypotheses outlined in 
this dissertation. Hypothesis one declares that a de facto state will pursue independence 
when the parent state is unwilling to provide ‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of 
political institutions (e.g., autonomy and federalism).  The case of South Sudan offers 
some new insights regarding this hypothesis.  The presence of the old regime is a major 
roadblock to progress and unity for the de facto state and the parent state.  In addition, 
without democracy, the parent state has little chance of convincing the de facto entity to 
forgo independence.  
Hypothesis two states that a de facto state will stop short of independence when it 
has secured autonomy from the parent state and the de facto status offers more economic 
and political benefits than full independence.  In terms of the political benefits, 
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O’Ballance notes that Khartoum appeared to be willing to grant autonomy under the 
auspices of the 2005 CPA to the South along the same lines as the 1972 Agreement.  
However, the South believed that such an agreement was inequitable given that it would 
have allowed the North to reap economic benefits from the South’s natural resources.544  
As mentioned above, a continued union with Sudan was a political risk that the South 
was no longer willing to make.   In terms of the economic benefits, the South concluded 
that the union with Sudan would in fact hurt the South’s economic development.  The 
South was endowed with vast natural resources, and in particular oil, that it could export.  
In other words, South Sudan did not believe the CPA advanced its economic and political 
interests and the union, therefore, did not present the South with any meaningful 
economic incentives from a weak Sudanese economy. 
Appendix II presents the economic performance of Sudan (1994-2012) and South 
Sudan (2008-2012).  The strong growth Sudan experienced from 1999 to 2010 was 
largely fuelled by oil exports from the South.  Since the secession of the South, the World 
Bank estimates that “oil production has fallen by three quarters, revenues have more than 
halved and the economy is in recession.” 545   The South also incurred significant 
economic costs related to its secession following the shutting down of the oil pipelines.  
However, South Sudan has rebounded strongly in 2013 and its economic outlook is 
positive for the coming years as oil production resumes to post-shutdown levels.546   
Khartoum, therefore, offered Juba little economic incentives for maintaining the 
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union.  For instance, the CPA stipulated that revenues generated from oil production were 
to be divided equally between South Sudan and Khartoum following a ‘payment of 
stabilization.’  That is, as the oil-producing region the South was entitled to an initial two 
per cent of the oil revenue and the remaining revenue was then to be divided equally 
between the Government of South Sudan and Khartoum.  In addition, the South was 
entitled to 50 percent of all non-oil revenue collected in Southern Sudan by Khartoum.547  
The issue is that the South sits atop large quantities of oil reserves.  Therefore, a union 
with the South is economically attractive from Khartoum’s standpoint, but certainly not 
from Juba’s perspective.  The CPA, in effect, took away 50 percent of the South’s oil 
revenue.  
Ultimately, South Sudan’s secession was not inevitable. Indeed, the breakup of 
Sudan was a direct result of Khartoum’s actions and unwillingness to accommodate the 
South’s political and economic needs. In other words, the appropriate political institutions 
and economic incentives would have contributed to the unity of Sudan.  The South’s right 
to secession was grounded on Khartoum’s refusal to make concessions to the South and 
its failure to uphold the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the 2005 CPA.  One could 
counter argue that the CPA provided the necessary political and economic framework for 
South Sudan, and yet it failed to stop the South’s secession.  However, one of the primary 
reasons for the collapse of the CPA was the presence of the old regime.  The presence of 
the Bashir regime contributed to a sense of mistrust between Khartoum and the South.  
The South found it difficult to participate in a union with a regime it could not trust. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that South Sudan’s secession from Sudan was the product of 
political miscalculations from successive regimes in Khartoum.  Since independence, the 
South’s requests for political and economic autonomy within a federal Sudan were 
rejected by oppressive regimes in Khartoum.  Decades of political repression and civil 
war ultimately pushed the South to secession.  The chapter relied on empirical and 
theoretical grounding to make the argument that South Sudan’s decision to secede from 
Sudan was the result of decades of political conflict due to Khartoum’s unwillingness to 
make concessions to the South.  Empirically, the chapter outlined the political 
relationship between the South and Khartoum since Sudan’s independence.  This 
historical and political account demonstrates that a political solution was viable in the 
Sudan, but that instability in Khartoum and the unwillingness of successive governments 
to furnish the South with autonomy, ultimately led to Sudan’s breakup.   
Theoretically, the chapter outlined the central assumptions of realism, 
constructivism, and liberalism in order to explain South Sudan’s preferences and 
behaviour.  The chapter concluded that South Sudan’s preferences and behaviour were 
shaped by the absence of political institutions, poor economic development, and the 
regional and international contexts.  The chapter further argued that South Sudan’s 
behaviour was not the product of security imperatives or capabilities, as realists would 
argue.  The explanatory power of realism was strongest in the Kosovo case.  Still, realist 
assumptions also offer some useful insights into the case of South Sudan.  At the same 
time, the two cases demonstrate that the explanatory power of liberalism is increasingly 
stronger from Kosovo to South Sudan.  Where we can really see this explanatory power 
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of liberalism, and the weakness of realism, is in the Iraqi Kurdistan chapters.  Iraqi 
Kurdistan demonstrates that realism provides a rather weak explanation, while liberalism 
provides a very powerful explanation.  These findings and theoretical ideas will be 
examined and substantiated in the next chapter with a case study looking at Iraqi 
Kurdistan. 
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Chapter 5: Iraqi Kurdistan I 
According to the existing literature, the ultimate objective of de facto states is 
independence.  At the same time, parent states want to reintegrate the de facto entity into 
its territory.  The potential outcomes of de facto states, therefore, are limited to secession 
or reintegration (peaceful or forceful).  Existing research takes the preference for 
independence as fixed and gives little consideration to de facto statehood as a long-term 
solution.  This research asks if there are conditions under which de facto states may forgo 
independence in favour of the status quo.  The primary objective of this chapter is to 
provide the historical context for the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.  The case of Iraqi Kurdistan 
will further demonstrate that de facto state preferences are neither fixed nor 
predetermined.   
The chapter will proceed as follows.  Section one will trace the history of Iraqi 
Kurdistan beginning with the creation of modern Iraq and the turbulent political 
relationship between Baghdad and the Kurds.  Section two will examine the origins of 
Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto state by tracing the history of the Kurds in Iraq, including 
the two rebellions of 1961 and 1974 and the Kurdish role in the Iran-Iraq War.  In order 
to understand Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour during this period (1960s to 1990), the section 
will identify Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and capabilities before it gained de facto status 
in 1991.  The objective is to determine Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation and the 
degree to which capabilities influenced its decision-making (i.e., did Iraqi Kurdistan stay 
with Iraq because it wanted to or because it had to?).  
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s Early History 
Iraq was cobbled together at the end of World War I from three former Ottoman Empire 
provinces of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad.  According to one source, the British seized 
control of Basra and Baghdad from the Ottomans and devised an arrangement with Sharif 
Hussein of Mecca to destabilize the Ottoman Empire.  In return for orchestrating an Arab 
revolt against the Ottomans, Sharif Hussein was promised an Arab state.548  Mosul was 
not mentioned in this agreement.549  There is speculation regarding Britain’s decision to 
include Mosul in the Iraqi state.  Academics argue that British policymakers did not 
believe a nascent Iraqi state would be viable without the predominantly Kurdish Mosul 
province.  Mosul province was significant for two reasons. First, its population would 
counteract the majority Shiite population in Baghdad and Basra, and second, Mosul’s oil 
provided Iraq with economic viability and Britain with a source of oil. 550  Iraq was 
comprised of a majority Shiite population in the south, a large Sunni minority in the west, 
a large Kurdish minority in the north, and other minority groups (i.e., Christians, Jews, 
and Turkoman) throughout the country.  Control over the government apparatus was 
given to the Sunni minority for its loyalty to the British, which also allowed the British to 
retain influence in Iraq’s policymaking.   
From the beginning, therefore, there was little in common between the three major 
groups in Iraq.  In fact, King Faisal of Iraq lamented the lack of an Iraqi identity in the 
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early 1930s.  Faisal believed that the missing Iraqi identity and the divisions between the 
Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds would make governance difficult.  In his words: 
This government rules over a Kurdish group most of which is ignorant and which 
includes persons with personal ambitions who call upon this group to abandon the 
government because it is not their race.  [It also] rules a Shia plurality which belongs to 
the same ethnic group as the government.  But as a result of the discriminations which the 
Shiis incurred under [Sunni] Ottoman rule which did not allow them to participate in the 
affairs of government, a wide breach developed between these two sects.  Unfortunately, 
all of this has led Shiis…to abandon a government which they consider to be very bad…I 
say with my heart full of sadness that there is not yet in Iraq an Iraqi people.551 
 
These divisions presented problems for King Faisal immediately following the creation of 
Iraq, a process that had failed to satisfy the political needs of the Shiites and the Kurds.  
For example, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres between Britain and Turkey contained two 
articles relevant to the Kurdish question.  Articles 62 and 64 outlined the provisions for 
the creation of an independent Kurdish state carved out of territory from modern-day 
Turkey and including “areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary 
of Armenia…and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia.” 552  
However, these were never honoured. A three-member delegation from Europe was to 
draft a treaty in order to implement this article.  The 1920 treaty, however, was replaced 
by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which made no mention of the Kurdish question.  An 
effective Kurdish response to the post-World War I developments was impossible due to 
the geographically divided and tribal Kurdish society.  The educated and politically 
conscious groups in Kurdish society emerged only after Britain had committed Mosul, 
and the Kurds, to Iraq.553  Since its inception, Iraq has been divided by what Ofra Bengio 
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calls “a clash between two national movements – the Iraqi Arab and the Kurdish.”554  
Whereas Baghdad preferred a centralized Iraq, the Kurds, from the beginning, demanded 
self-government.   
Kurdish opposition to a centralized Iraqi state manifested as early as 1918 with 
Shaikh Mahmud Barzanji, the British appointed governor of the Kurdish areas around 
Sulaymaniya.555  Barzanji attempted to extend his power, against British directives, over 
the whole of Mosul province, only to be defeated by the British. 556   Although 
unsuccessful, Barzanji’s rebellion provided fodder for Kurdish nationalists in Iraq.  In 
particular, the Kurds did not welcome an Arab government that would attempt to impose 
its will on Kurdish tribes.  Indeed, David McDowall recounts a clash from 1927 between 
Baghdad and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan who resented governmental intrusion into his 
territory and tribal affairs.557  Following two unsuccessful military incursions into Barzan, 
Iraqi forces, along with British air support, finally occupied Barzan in 1932.  Shaikh 
Ahmad fled to Turkey, but his brothers Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, continued 
the Barzan rebellion against Baghdad and the British. 558   Although this battle was 
between the Barzan tribe and Baghdad, it set the stage for the Barzanis to take up the 
Kurdish struggle. 
Baghdad believed it could ignore the Kurds and their demands for linguistic and 
political rights because of their apparent disorganization and division.559  This was largely 
true until the 1930s when a class of educated Kurdish professionals actively promoted 
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Kurdish nationalism. 560   Baghdad’s oppressive policies encouraged young Kurdish 
professionals to organize into groups and societies.561  The educated class, however, was 
small and its societies were unable to attract the larger tribal and rural Kurdish 
populations.  Iraqi Kurds became increasingly vociferous in the 1930s and 1940s to 
oppose Baghdad’s policies and expressed their right to self-determination.562   These 
developments coalesced in the early 1940s with a conflict between the Barzani tribe and 
the government in Baghdad.  Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s escape from detention in 
Sulaymaniya prompted Baghdad to issue an ultimatum for Barzani to turn himself into 
Baghdad.563  Following several failed attempts at rapprochement from 1943 to 1945, 
Baghdad decided to launch a military assault against Mustafa Barzani and his alliance of 
tribes.564  The government was unable to capture Barzani, but it did succeed in driving 
him out of Iraq and into exile in Mahabad, Iran. 
Barzani’s two years in exile in Iran were formative for his personal development 
and for Kurdish nationalism. Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP – originally 
called the Kurdish Democratic Party) of Iraq was established as a branch of the KDP-Iran 
after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1946.565  Mahabad, a city in Iran with a 
majority Kurdish population, fell to Kurdish nationalists of Iran with Soviet backing 
following the Soviet’s occupation of northwestern Iran. 566   The Kurds of Mahabad 
established the KDP-Iran in 1945 and with Soviet support, the Kurdish Republic of 
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Mahabad was declared in 1946.567  Although Mahabad’s independence was short-lived 
(less than one year), its establishment was nonetheless significant for Kurdish 
nationalism.  First, the struggle for Mahabad encouraged the formation of the KDP in 
Iran and subsequently in Iraq.  The KDP has been one of the principal political parties, 
along with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), for advancing Kurdish nationalism in 
Iraq.  Second, Mulla Mustafa Barzani emerged as a key figure during the struggle to 
defend the republic, whereby he established himself as a hero and the leader of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq. 
However, Barzani’s time in Mahabad revealed that Kurdish nationalists would 
find it difficult to organize under one umbrella. For example, Barzani’s relationship with 
Qazi Muhammad, the leader of the KDP-Iran, became increasingly strained and 
eventually resulted in an uncooperative alliance.568  The discord between Barzani and the 
KDP-Iran encouraged Barzani to create the KDP in Iraq.569  The emergence of the KDP 
provided Iraqi Kurds with a voice for their political and economic grievances.570  The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq held its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946 
and elected Mustafa Barzani as its president-in-exile.571   The KDP grew in popularity 
and attracted a large membership, including leftist elements, under the leadership of 
Ibrahim Ahmed.572  The party functioned with Barzani in exile for the better part of a 
decade.   
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For his involvement in the Mahabad Republic, the government in Iran wanted to 
capture and punish Barzani for treason.  As a result, Barzani and his close followers were 
forced into exile in the Soviet Union.573  Despite his absence, Barzani always maintained 
a strong grip on his position as the president of the KDP.  It is not clear how Barzani 
spent his time in the Soviet Union, but he became increasingly popular in Iraq and his 
movement gained significant support during his absence.574  In fact, he gained legendary 
status among the masses and solidified his dominant position as the leader of not only the 
KDP, but also the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.575   
During Barzani’s exile in the Soviet Union, intellectuals such as Ibrahim Ahmed 
led the newly formed KDP-Iraq.576  Initially, Barzani faced some internal opposition from 
top party officials, but his reputation and strong following allowed him to consolidate 
control over the party.  Individuals such as Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani eventually 
acquiesced to Mustafa Barzani’s tight control.  Barzani’s desire for total control over the 
KDP, however, would lead to discontent and ultimately a split between those who 
supported Barzani and those who supported Ahmed and Talabani.  At the time, however, 
Barzani needed an organization and the KDP needed a strong leader, which led to a 
“marriage of convenience” between the intellectuals on the one hand, and Barzani and the 
masses, on the other.577  The KDP seized upon the economic discontent of the 1950s to 
                                            
573
 Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, 36. 
574
 Some believe that Barzani undertook military training and sent propaganda broadcasts to Iraqi 
Kurdistan. A more conspiratorial belief holds that Barzani became a KGB agent acting covertly in the 
interest of the Soviet Union.  See Kamal Said Qadir, “The Kurds and the KGB: The Secret History of the 
Barzani Dynasty,” Anti War (August 31 2006). 
575
 Dana Adams Schmidt, Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), 104.  
576
 Gareth Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 66. 
577
 Edmond Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, 39. 
 174
increase its size and support base.578  Although Iraq benefitted from oil revenues, little of 
it reached the lower segments of society.579  Hoping to improve their socioeconomic 
welfare, many Kurds from the rural areas joined the KDP.  Barzani returned from exile to 
a transformed KDP in 1958.   
On 14 July 1958, the Free Officers, a group of military officers, overthrew the 
Iraqi monarchy in a coup d’état and established a republic.  The Free Officers, led by 
Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem, hoped to rebuild a democratic and more tolerant Iraq 
that was no longer subservient to British influence.  Although the group was mostly 
Sunni, its members cut across ethnic and religious lines in an effort to promote pan-Arab 
nationalism in line with the pan-Arabists in Egypt and Syria.  Despite their apparent pan-
Arabism, the Free Officers were also in contact with the KDP before the coup to further 
their support base.580  Kamiran Berwari, academic based in Iraqi Kurdistan, notes that 
Kurds were hopeful that the republic would provide Kurds with the political space 
necessary to participate in Iraq.  He says, “The 1958 revolution changed the Kurdish 
situation in Iraq.  Iraq transformed from a monarchy to a republic and this change opened 
the political space for the Kurds to openly debate political issues, Kurdish officials 
returned to Baghdad, and Mulla Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq from the Soviet 
Union.”581  Indeed, the Iraqi republic recognized the Kurds and Arabs as partners and, as 
a sign of goodwill, Qassem pardoned Mustafa Barzani and released many Kurds from 
prison.582   
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The period of cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurds was short-lived, as 
relations between the KDP and Qassem soon deteriorated.  Perhaps the main reason for 
the fallout was Qassem’s uneasiness about Barzani’s and the KDP’s growing popularity 
and Kurdish demands for autonomy.583  By 1960, Qassem sought to undermine Mustafa 
Barzani’s growing strength by arming Barzani’s tribal enemies and encouraging conflict 
between them.584  In 1961, when Barzani requested autonomy for the Kurdish region, 
Qassem rejected Barzani, pushing the Kurds and Baghdad to the brink of war.585  The war 
between Baghdad and its Kurdish population was the first outbreak of large-scale 
violence between the two groups and set the stage for decades of conflict and on-again, 
off-again violence.  The next section will outline the wars and their significance in 
shaping the Kurdish relationship with Baghdad. 
 
The Origins of Iraqi Kurdistan as a De Facto State 
Preferences 
This section will outline Iraqi Kurdistan’s position in Iraq from the early 1960s to the 
early 1990s in an effort to identify Kurdish preference formation.  More specifically, the 
section will explore the following question: What accounts for the preference formation 
of the Kurds during this period?  The September 1961 revolt was initially sparked by 
clashes between tribes and the Qassem government.  Landowners and tribal aghas 
(leaders) opposed Qassem’s Agrarian Reform Law, which was aimed at reducing the 
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wealth and power of the land owning tribes.586  Landlords and aghas in the Kurdish areas 
rebelled against the reform law in order to maintain their advantageous position.  Barzani 
and the KDP were eventually pulled into the conflict following inter-tribal fighting 
between the Barzanis and government-backed tribes, but also due to Qassem’s decision to 
bomb the Barzanis.587  Barzani’s involvement in the revolt was more circumstantial than 
calculated.588  Mustafa Barzani attacked Qassem’s weakened tribal allies and secured 
control of the Kurdish region.  In response to an ambush on an Iraqi military convoy by 
one of Barzani’s allies, Qassem retaliated with airstrikes against Kurdish rebels, including 
Barzani and his village.589   
On September 24 Qassem banned the KDP and thereby forced it into rebellion.  
The war between the rebels (comprising tribes and the KDP) and Baghdad was 
characterized by intermittent clashes over a period of three years without a decisive 
winner.  In an effort to break the deadlock, Qassem offered full amnesty for the rebels 
and economic development for the Kurdish region. 590  Barzani countered that Kurdish 
autonomy must be entrenched in the Iraqi constitution as a precondition to a ceasefire.591  
In fact, Barzani publicized his demands in order to demonstrate that the Kurds were 
demanding autonomy, not independence.592  Qassem refused Barzani’s demands. 
The war continued until the Baath party overthrew Qassem’s regime in 1963.   
The Baath party in Iraq was an offshoot of the Baath party in Syria, founded by Michel 
Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, and Salah Baitar, a Sunni.  The party was founded on the 
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ideology of pan-Arab nationalism and socialism and it sought to unite all Arabs 
regardless of their religion or ethnicity.  It emerged in Iraq in the late 1940s and grew 
significantly in the early to mid-1950s.  Its first major political undertaking was a small 
part in the 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy.  The Baathists disapproved of 
Qassem’s policies and turned their efforts to assassinate him.  David McDowall notes that 
the KDP agreed not to attack the Iraqi army while the Baath concentrated its efforts on a 
coup against Qassem in Baghdad.593  The 1963 coup propelled the Baath party into power 
with Ahmad Hasan al Bakr as the Prime Minister and Saddam Hussein as an emerging 
figure of the party.  The Baathist government was short-lived, as Abdul Salam Arif 
ousted it from power in November of 1963.594   
During this time, Barzani unilaterally negotiated a ceasefire with Arif that 
worsened the divisions between Barzani and Ahmed and Talabani.595  Barzani’s decision 
not to consult with other party leaders, especially the likes of Ahmed and Talabani, split 
the KDP between Barzani’s faction and those who wanted more consensus in the party’s 
decision making.  These disagreements highlighted the internal divisions within the KDP. 
The divisions were exacerbated by disagreements between the tribal elements, led by 
Barzani, and the urban intelligentsia, led by Ahmed and Talabani.596  Barzani and his 
supporters hoped to create a party that was loyal to the leader and therefore could not 
tolerate individuals such as Ahmed and Talabani who hoped to create a party that was 
more modern and consensual.  The split was a consequence of the power struggle 
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between traditional (Barzani) and the modern (Ahmed and Talabani) elements in the 
KDP.  The rift was serious enough that Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani attempted to 
remove Barzani as party leader.597  By that time, however, Mulla Mustafa Barzani had a 
firm hold on the KDP to the point that he expelled Ahmed and Talabani and their 
followers from the party.598   
Barzani was unable to reach an agreement with Arif and as a consequence the 
Kurds and Baghdad engaged in skirmishes throughout the 1960s. Arif died in a plane 
crash and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Rahman Arif in 1966.  With help from 
military officials, the Baath party removed Rahman Arif from power in a bloodless coup 
in 1968.599  It should be noted that although the Baath party in Iraq came to be dominated 
by Sunnis, it was not always the case.  In fact, the early Baath party in Iraq included 
members of all religious and ethnic groups, but became Sunni-dominated over time as 
Shiites associated pan-Arabism with Sunni Arabs.  As a result, there is a tendency to view 
the Baath rule in Iraq in terms of Sunni ideology, but this is not completely accurate.  
Although it is true that the Baath party came to be controlled by Sunnis, the party’s 
official ideology was always pan-Arabism and socialism.   
The Baathists believed that their socialist, humanitarian, and non-ethnic and non-
sectarian principles provided the foundations for negotiating peace with the Kurds.600  
More practically, however, the Baath Party understood that it had to settle domestic 
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issues in order to effectively confront regional threats (i.e., Iran and Israel) and to 
promote its vision of pan-Arab nationalism.601 Following several rounds of negotiations 
and provisional agreements, the KDP and the Baath government signed an accord that 
ostensibly met the demands of the Kurds.   
The 1970 March Manifesto, negotiated by KDP officials and Saddam Hussein, 
outlined the political and social rights of the Kurds in Iraq.  The most important articles 
of the agreement included the linguistic rights, governmental posts for the Kurds, 
governmental officials in Kurdish areas would be Kurdish, the Iraqi constitution would 
recognize the Kurds as an official nationality, and the Kurds would be furnished with 
self-government in areas with a majority Kurdish population.602  In short, the agreement 
provided the Kurds with political autonomy – in addition to economic development – and 
assurances of cultural and linguistic protection.   
Despite the promise of a lasting peace, broken promises from both sides 
ultimately led to the collapse of the March Manifesto of 1970. Barzani demanded 
increased military and political freedom for the Kurds and demanded the removal of all 
Iraqi army contingents from the Kurdish region.603  The Baathists refused to implement 
the Manifesto due to disputes over the Kurdish region’s territorial delineation.604  The 
most significant dispute centered on the city of Kirkuk.  Kirkuk, then as now, is a main 
source of tensions between the Kurds and Baghdad.  For instance, in the 1970s the 
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Baathists altered the demographics of Kirkuk to increase the Arab population so that it 
would not fall under Kurdish control.605   
In addition, Edgar O’Ballance notes that while Baghdad accused Barzani of 
collaborating with Iran, Barzani, in turn, accused Baghdad of increasing its army 
presence in the Kurdish region, which contravened the agreement.606  Edmund Ghareeb 
argues that the prospect for a permanent peace and the implementation of the 1970 accord 
did not come to fruition partly due to the meddling of Iran, Israel, and the US, all of 
whom aided and encouraged Barzani to capture all Kurdish territories and to secure 
further concessions from Baghdad.607  The US, with encouragement from its ally the Shah 
of Iran, supported the Kurds against the Baathist regime, which was hostile to US 
interests in the region and receiving support from the Soviets.  Iran, in particular, was 
heavily involved in aiding the Kurds against Iraq to weaken the regime in Baghdad.  Iran 
and Iraq shared a mutual animosity for each other and Iran hoped to use the Kurds as a 
proxy to destabilize Iraq.  The animosity had more to do with geopolitical factors and 
regional competition rather than the religious differences between the Sunni-dominated 
regime in Iraq and the majority-Shiite Iran.   
Iran’s suspicions increased when the Baathists, who wanted to spread their idea of 
pan-Arabism in the Persian Gulf, seized power in Baghdad.608  Iran sought to establish 
itself as the major power in the region and therefore aided the Kurds to weaken Iraq.609  
Iran’s support to Barzani and the Kurds angered Baghdad and engendered a fear amongst 
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the Baathists that the Kurds would secede from Iraq.610  Academics agree that military aid 
and diplomatic support from these governments likely influenced Barzani’s decision to 
jeopardize the peace with Baghdad in favour of more concessions.611 
In an effort to salvage the peace, Baghdad offered Barzani and the Kurds the 
Autonomy Law in 1974, which Barzani rejected as it effectively stripped the Kurds of the 
self-rule promised to them in the 1970 accord.612  The 1974 accord did not include 
control over Kirkuk and it omitted important articles outlined in the 1970 agreement.613  
Barzani later revealed that the Kurdish decision to reject Baghdad’s offer of autonomy 
was the promise of weapons from the US.  Barzani said, “without American promises, we 
would not have acted the way we did.  Were it not for the American promise, we would 
never have become trapped and involved to such an extent.”614  Barzani and the Kurds 
believed they could secure further concessions from Baghdad with more military 
capabilities supplied by the US and Iran.  However, as it was, the Kurds were left to their 
own devices and were militarily weak compared to Baghdad.   
It is in this context that Baghdad offered Barzani and the Kurds the 1974 
Autonomy Law, which reduced Kurdish political, cultural, and economic authority.615  
With assurances from Iran and the US, Barzani rejected Baghdad’s offer and instead, 
chose war.  The Kurds were easily defeated when, in March 1975, Iran and Iraq 
negotiated the Algiers Agreement on border issues and other disputes between the two 
sides, including an end to the Shah’s aid to the Iraqi Kurds in exchange for Iran’s control 
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of the Shatt al-Arab boundary.616  Without support from Iran and the US, the Kurds were 
easily defeated by Baghdad.   
Several consequences followed.617  First, the defeat allowed Baghdad to establish 
and extend its control over the Kurdish region.  Second, Barzani’s health quickly 
deteriorated to the point that he was no longer able to lead the KDP and the Kurds.  
Barzani later died in March 1979 in a hospital in Washington, D.C..  Finally, the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), co-founded by Jalal Talabani, Nawshirwan Mustafa (current 
leader of Gorran), and others, emerged as a key political party in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Jalal 
Talabani and his supporters formally established the PUK on 1 June 1975.618   The 
emergence of the PUK initiated a long period of competition for support and resources in 
the Kurdish region between the KDP and the PUK.  Although both parties were fighting 
for the same cause against a common adversary in Baghdad, they refused to unite.  The 
Iraqi Kurds were rather quiet and under control until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in 
1980.  Baghdad effectively maintained control over the Kurds from 1975 to 1980 and 
attempted to assimilate the Kurds in order to prevent a future rebellion.619  To this end, 
Baghdad attempted to assassinate the Barzanis, including Massoud Barzani, to weaken 
the Kurdish leadership.  In addition, Baghdad moved large numbers of Kurds from the 
Kurdish region to Arab villages to indoctrinate them with a sense of Iraqi identity.620   
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran ushered in significant changes in Iran and 
which greatly affected Iraq and the Kurds.  First, it replaced the Iranian monarchy with an 
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Islamic government.  Second, it altered the dynamics between Tehran and the Kurds of 
Iraq.  Finally, Saddam Hussein viewed the turmoil and instability in Iran as an 
opportunity to retake the Shatt al-Arab territory that Iraq had relinquished in the 1975 
Algiers Agreement.  To this end, in September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a 
surprise attack against Iran with the hope of scoring a swift victory.621  Instead, Saddam 
became embroiled in a drawn out and bloody war.  Kurds, both in Iran and in Iraq, 
viewed the onset of the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to exploit weakened governments 
and militaries in Tehran and Baghdad.  In turn, Iran encouraged Iraqi Kurds to fight 
Baghdad and, Iraq, likewise, used the Iranian Kurds to fight Tehran.  Rather than 
focusing on their objective of securing political and economic rights from their respective 
governments, the Kurds became pawns in a proxy war.  By 1982 the Kurds were able to 
liberate and seize control of Kurdish areas from the Iraqi military.622  At the same time, 
the KDP and the PUK were fighting each other for influence in the Kurdish areas of Iraq.  
The infighting between the KDP and the PUK pushed Jalal Talabani and his PUK to 
negotiate a ceasefire agreement with Baghdad and Saddam Hussein.623  In exchange for 
Kurdish autonomy, which never materialized, Baghdad called on the PUK to cease its 
assault against the Iraqi army and instead to battle the KDP.624 
The Iran-Iraq War was a brutal war of attrition that dragged on for eight years.  
The 1987 UN Resolution 598 called for a ceasefire with little effect.  Then unexpectedly, 
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in July 1988, Iran and Iraq accepted the ceasefire and ended the war.625  The peace with 
Iran allowed Saddam to focus his attention on the Kurdish insurrection.  Prior to the 
implementation of the ceasefire, Saddam Hussein had launched an operation, known as 
the Anfal Campaigns, against the Kurdish region of Iraq.  His objective was to reclaim 
control of Kurdish territories and to punish the Kurds for treason.  The operation 
culminated in the gassing of the town of Halabja on 16 March 1988. 626   Exact casualty 
figures of the campaign are difficult to ascertain; conservative estimates range from 
50,000 to as many as 100,000, while others place the figure well over 150,000 victims.627 
Middle East Watch, the authoritative source on the Anfal Campaigns, notes that 
over 4,000 villages were destroyed to ensure that security and support for the Kurdish 
Peshmerga (military) were not possible.628  Although there was little condemnation from 
the international community at the time, it was cited by the George W. Bush 
administration as one of the reasons for the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  In addition to a high 
death toll, the campaign resulted in the displacement of over 100,000 Kurds, who sought 
refuge in Turkey and Iran.629  Baghdad’s assault on the Kurds, and in particular the 
gassing of Halabja, gave impetus to the KDP and the PUK, and other political parties in 
the Kurdish region, to form the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) to more effectively challenge 
Baghdad.630 
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Throughout the struggle against Baghdad, the Kurds maintained a preference for 
autonomy rather than independence.  Although independence is the dream of Kurdish 
nationalists, the Kurds noted that they would be satisfied with political and economic 
autonomy as they would be sufficient for protecting Kurdish political interests and 
culture and language.  A realist explanation would frame the conflict between Iraqi 
Kurdistan and Baghdad in terms of security imperatives and survival.  The conflict, 
according to realist assumptions, is a result of the fixed and enduring ethnic differences 
between the Kurds in the north and the Arab-controlled Iraq.  That is, the Kurdish fear for 
their survival and Baghdad’s concern for Iraq’s territorial integrity created a security 
dilemma that triggered the outbreak of war between the two sides.   
In this light, institutional and economic imperatives are secondary to security and 
survival.  The empirical record outlined above demonstrates that Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
primary objectives were to obtain political autonomy and improve the Kurds’ economic 
conditions within a united Iraq.  It is true that there were collective fears on both sides, 
but the overriding concern from the Kurdish perspective was the institutional makeup of 
Iraq and the unwillingness of Baghdad to meet Kurdish requests. 
Constructivists, meanwhile, downplay the role of structure or security 
considerations in explaining civil war and ethnic conflicts.  Instead, constructivists view 
civil wars as a way for ethnic entrepreneurs and elites to advance their particular political 
and economic interests.  The seemingly fixed and conflictual ethnic identities are in fact 
constructed and exploited by elites.  The conflict between the Kurds and Baghdad is not a 
consequence of security concerns, but rather a result of elites mobilizing and using ethnic 
identity to achieve particular political and economic ends.  There is little empirical 
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support for this approach.  Ethnic entrepreneurs did not shape Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
preferences.  Instead, Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation was a culmination of several 
factors that included flawed political institutions, oppressive policies from Baghdad, and 
political and economic grievances.  What is more, the historical record demonstrates that 
there was a general consensus amongst the Kurdish population that political autonomy 
and economic development were necessary for Iraqi Kurdistan to thrive in Iraq. 
Liberalism provides the best account for Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences from the 
early 1960s to the early 1990s.  Liberalism’s emphasis on political institutions and 
economic factors explains the preference formation of Iraqi Kurdistan and the outbreak of 
the violence between the Kurds and Baghdad.  Although security considerations should 
not be overlooked, the Kurds clearly outlined their preferences throughout the 1960s and 
the 1970s.  From this perspective, it was not the structure and security concerns that led 
to the outbreak of conflict, but rather Baghdad’s unwillingness to deliver on meaningful 
political autonomy for the Kurds. Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences were the result of a 
Kurdish desire for political autonomy, a desire for economic development, and a Kurdish 
population that pressed its leadership and political parties for increased political rights in 
Iraq. 
 
Capabilities 
Realist explanations would argue that Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to settle for autonomy 
rather than full independence was due to insufficient capabilities.  The following section 
will address the extent to which capabilities and power influenced Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
decision to demand autonomy rather than independence.  That is, did the Kurds settle for 
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autonomy because they did not possess sufficient capabilities to secede from Iraq?  
During the first revolt in 1961, the Kurds possessed little military capabilities.  Edgar 
O’Ballance reveals that the Kurdish fighters (the Peshmerga) were poorly organized and 
their weapons were “small arms, mortars, bazookas, grenades, and light machine-
guns.”631  The Iraqi military, on the other hand, possessed air power and modern weapons 
against the weaker Kurds.  The Kurdish position was marginally improved in the 1970s 
during the 1974 revolt.  The Kurds now possessed more light artillery and some heavier 
arms.  Still, Kurdish military capabilities were considerably weaker than the Iraqi 
military’s capabilities.  In addition, the Kurds possessed little organizational and 
communications capabilities through the 1950s to the 1960s.   
The above narrative demonstrates that the Kurdish population was organized 
along tribal rather than nationalistic or political lines.  Given the Kurds’ deficient 
capabilities, independence was not an option. However, the Kurds have consistently 
maintained that independence is not their objective.  Instead, the Kurds have consistently 
requested political and economic autonomy within a federal Iraq.  This preference has 
changed very little since the early 1960s and late 1970s.  That is, although the Kurds 
desire independence, they have always maintained their willingness to stay in a unified 
Iraq under the right conditions.  Capabilities, therefore, did not shape Kurdish preferences 
for independence. 
The Kurdish preference for autonomy over independence is further substantiated 
by Kurdish actions in the early 1990s.  Following regional elections, the Kurds 
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unilaterally declared the Kurdish area a federal region of Iraq.632  Moreover, in 1992 the 
Kurds hosted the Iraqi National Congress (an umbrella organization that included most of 
the groups that opposed Saddam Hussein) at a conference in the Kurdish region.  During 
the conference, Barzani and Talabani signaled that the Kurds would settle for federalism, 
which would furnish the Kurds with autonomy and preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity.633  
The Kurds, therefore, strived to acquire political and economic autonomy within a federal 
Iraq.  According to liberal assumptions, political institutions and economic incentives 
influence actors’ behaviour.  This is true of the Iraqi Kurds.  The Iraqi Kurdish leadership 
has always maintained that the Kurds will work in a unified Iraq under the right political 
institutions and economic development.  More capabilities, therefore, will not change 
Kurdish calculations regarding independence.   
The Kurds have clearly articulated their position and objectives since the 1940s 
with the creation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).  From the 1940s through the 
1980s, Kurdish leaders – including Mustafa Barzani, Massoud Barzani, and Jalal 
Talabani – frequently outlined political autonomy and economic development as Kurdish 
objectives.  Indeed, they overtly stated that independence was not their objective even 
though it was the Kurdish dream.  The demand for autonomy was a result of Baghdad’s 
oppressive policies against the Kurds who did not share a common identity with the Arab 
majority.  From the Kurdish perspective, therefore, political autonomy was essential for 
protecting not only the Kurdish identity, but, more importantly, the Kurds’ political and 
economic interests. 
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The Iran-Iraq War took a heavy financial toll on Iraq.  In an effort to recuperate 
the financial losses, Saddam mistakenly believed he could occupy Kuwait and control its 
vast oil reserves. 634   Saddam believed the US would acquiesce to his annexation of 
Kuwait, as the US public could not tolerate a long war and incur casualties.635  However, 
Saddam’s decision to invade and occupy all of Kuwait instead of only the Rumaila oil 
field prompted a quick response from the US and the international community.  
Sanctioned by the UN, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm to end Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait on 17 January 1991.  Security Council Resolution 687 ended the war 
and imposed UN provisions on Baghdad.  The Kurds believed they could extract political 
and economic benefits from a weakened Baghdad.  The Kurds were further encouraged 
by George H. W. Bush to rise up against Saddam in order to overthrow his regime. 636 
Ultimately, the Kurds secured autonomy but at a considerable cost to the civilian 
population.  The first two weeks of the uprising were successful, as the Kurds reclaimed 
control of Kurdish territory, namely the provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya, 
from the Iraqi military. 637  A counteroffensive from Baghdad was certain.  Saddam 
initially hesitated because he believed, like the Kurds, that the US would provide the 
Kurdish uprising with assistance.638  Baghdad countered the Kurdish uprising with brutal 
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force once it was certain that the US would not support the Kurds.639  Saddam was able to 
put down the Kurdish uprising with relative ease and following the exodus of over two 
million refugees into Iran and Turkey and facing an imminent massacre, the international 
community, led by the US and the UK, implemented a no-fly zone over the Kurdish 
region of Iraq.640  The US and the UK, therefore, inadvertently furnished the Kurds with 
autonomy and provided the opening for the Kurds to establish a de facto state.  The Kurds 
benefitted from the newfound autonomy and in 1992 the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) held 
elections, with the support of Barzani and Talabani, for the formation of a parliament to 
govern the Kurdish region.641   
Following these events, Iraqi Kurdistan fulfilled all the criteria of de facto 
statehood as defined in this project.  Recall that a de facto state controls a defined 
territory, provides an array of services to the population, and enters into diplomatic and 
economic relations with other states, but it does not possess de jure recognition.  Post-
1992 Iraqi Kurdistan certainly met all the criteria outlined in the definition.  Iraqi 
Kurdistan was abandoned by Saddam Hussein’s regime and thereby handed the newly 
formed Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) a defined territory.  The KRG then setup 
a functioning government that provided the population with services, including education 
and health care, and established diplomatic relations with foreign governments.  Yet, 
Iraqi Kurdistan did not declare independence or seek recognition as an independent state, 
and therefore, did not possess de jure recognition. 
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Following the elections, Baghdad condemned the Kurds for conspiring to 
breakaway from Iraq, but Barzani and Talabani were quick to deny the accusation.  
Talabani, for example, declared that the Kurds “do not want to break away from Iraq; we 
want a democratic Iraq.”642  The KDP and the PUK agreed to share power following 
elections that resulted in 50 seats for each party.643  Despite issues of corruption and voter 
fraud, the process was considered “fair and free.”644  Following the elections, the Kurdish 
parliament unilaterally proclaimed the Kurdish area a federal region of a unified Iraq.645  
Following this declaration, Massoud Barzani explained that the Kurds were not moving 
towards secession, but rather securing federalism for the Kurds.  He did note that 
independence was on the table but only if Iraq were to revert back to its old policies 
against the Kurds.  He said, “what leads to partitioning Iraq is the use of chemical 
weapons, genocide campaigns, racial discrimination and similar racist and chauvinistic 
(blind ethnic bigotry) measures.”646  This continues to be the policy of Barzani and the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  The KRG has frequently maintained that it is 
content with its de facto status.647  Despite the assurances from Barzani and the KRG, 
neighbouring Iran, Syria, and especially Turkey were on high alert following the 
emergence of a de facto Kurdistan and the first elections.  The United States also voiced 
its opposition to an independent Kurdistan. 
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The official US position, then as is it now, is a united Iraq.  The policy, at least in 
the official sense, has remained unchanged in this regard.  The KRG, for its part, has 
always maintained that it will not break away from Iraq. 648   The US has regularly 
maintained that it prefers a united Iraq for at least two reasons.  First, US officials are 
concerned that a partitioning of Iraq will lead to instability in the Middle East and in 
particular with Iraq’s neighbours Turkey and Iran.  The fear is that an independent 
Kurdistan will destabilize Iran and Turkey’s sizable Kurdish populations, which could 
potentially create more unrest and violence in the region.  In addition, the secession of 
Iraqi Kurdistan will further strengthen the Shiites in Iraq and this will increase Iran’s 
influence in Baghdad.  Second, the US supports a unified Iraq in line with the policy and 
interests of its historic ally Turkey.  Although the Turkey-US relationship has become 
strained at times over the past decade, the two continue to share a strong interest in 
maintaining stability in Iraq. 
 
The Evolution of Iraqi Kurdistan: 1994-2003 
KDP-PUK Civil War649 
This section will examine Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation following its emergence 
as a de facto state.  Specifically, the section asks: Did Kurdish preferences changed from 
autonomy to full independence following the creation of a de facto state?  Before 
proceeding to discuss its preferences, however, the section will provide a brief outline of 
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s evolution following its de facto statehood.  Not all was well inside the 
Kurdish region following the establishment of a de facto state and the first elections to 
form a government.  The internal divisions within the KRG between the KDP and the 
PUK exacerbated the already complicated historical relationship between the two parties.  
By 1994 tensions between the KDP and the PUK over the administration of the Kurdish 
region boiled over into armed clashes.  The longstanding divisions between Barzani and 
the KDP, on the one hand, and Talabani and the PUK, on the other, engulfed the Kurdish 
into a civil war that lasted four years.  The root causes of the civil war can be traced back 
to the early divisions within the KDP.   
From its inception until the consolidation of control by Barzani, the KDP was 
divided between the urban and educated intelligentsia, led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal 
Talabani, from the Sulaymaniya region on the one hand and the largely traditional and 
tribal members, led by Barzani, from the Duhok region on the other hand.  Harvey Morris 
criticizes such reductionist characterizations and instead argues that both parties are at the 
same time ‘modern political movements’ and hold ‘quasi-tribal’ tendencies.650  Although 
Morris’ description of the KDP and the PUK may not be inaccurate, there is some truth to 
the characterization of a tribal KDP and a more modern PUK; a notion that is 
corroborated by academics and analysts in Iraqi Kurdistan.651 
The 1994 civil war was sparked by a minor dispute between the Barzanis and a 
tribe allied with the PUK, which led to large scale fighting between the two parties.652  
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Gareth Stansfield, however, argues the civil war was a ‘premeditated’ act on the part of 
both parties. 653   In response to PUK victories and control over the capital of Erbil, 
Massoud Barzani called on Saddam Hussein for military support to retake Erbil from the 
PUK.654  The offensives and counteroffensives continued until a 1998 agreement, which 
originated in the Kurdish region and was ultimately mediated by Washington.  At the root 
of the conflict is control over administration of the Kurdish region of Iraq.  The PUK and 
the KDP continue to vie for power and control over their respective territorial 
jurisdictions. 
Analysts in Iraqi Kurdistan criticize the KDP and the PUK for initiating the civil 
war and erecting a corrupt political system that perpetuates their dominance.  In 
particular, critics accuse the KDP and the PUK of using Kurdish nationalism to advance 
their personal interests.  During an interview with the author, Kamiran Berwari, professor 
at the University of Duhok, noted that the civil war of the 1990s seriously undermined 
and debilitated the Kurdish nationalist movement.  “If these parties represent the Kurdish 
people and genuinely want to advance the Kurdish cause then why did they initiate a 
Civil War that killed thousands and destroyed the Kurdish region?” asks Berwari.655  He 
contends that the interests of the Kurdish population are secondary to the interests of the 
KDP and the PUK and their leadership.   
Kameran Mentik, professor at Salahaddin University – Hawler, echoes Berwari’s 
sentiments in labeling the political parties corrupt and tribalistic.  He notes that, “We 
have two families [Barzani and Talabani] who rule Kurdistan and who advance their 
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interests first; it is clear for everyone.  The positions of the parties make this clear.  His 
son [Massoud Barzani’s son Masrour] is the head of security and his nephew [Nechervan 
Barzani] is the Prime Minister.”656   Mentik goes on to suggest that the Kurdish regional 
elections are fraught with ‘cheating and fabrication.’657   
Mentik and Berwari noted that the main political parties often buy or pressure 
individuals to vote for them.  The 2005 and 2009 Kurdish region elections were fraught 
with irregularities and widespread cheating.  The 2013 election, however, was mostly free 
and fair.  As international observer for the Iraq High Electoral Commission during the 
Kurdish region’s parliamentary election, I did not witness any forms of pressure or 
irregularities.  However, there were accusations of cheating and irregularities, but these 
were not substantiated and most observers, including myself, concluded that the election 
was the freest and fairest in the Kurdish region’s history.658 
From the late 1990s until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds were left 
to their own.  During this period, the Kurdish region developed effective, although at 
times corrupt, political institutions for administering the Kurdish territory and population.  
Economically, however, the Kurds had little success as they faced a double embargo: one 
from the central government in Baghdad and a second from the UN sanctions against 
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Iraq.  Economic issues continue today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is increasingly becoming a 
rentier state characterized by corruption and nepotism.659   
Kurdish political and economic fortunes changed dramatically in 2003 with the 
US invasion of Iraq.  As noted by Adeed Dawisha, the reason behind the invasion of Iraq 
was to overthrow Saddam’s regime for possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 
and its links to international terrorism, both of which posed a direct threat to the US and 
its allies.660  Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, made the case for invading Iraq and 
removing the threat Saddam posed to the US and the international community to the UN 
Security Council in February 2003.  Following the invasion, it was discovered that Iraq 
did not possess WMDs thereby undermining the US’s purported reasons for invading.  
However, it is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate the legitimacy of the US 
motivations for invading Iraq.  The point here is to simply outline the events that took 
place in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq.  There were certain elements both within the 
US and outside that encouraged war against Iraq.   
Many academics and analysts have rightly emphasized the significant role of the 
neoconservative elements in the US and within the George W. Bush administration for 
orchestrating the war against Saddam Hussein.661  The terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, provided the Bush administration and the neoconservatives with the pretext for a 
war with Saddam.662  The neoconservative ideology is strongly committed to the spread 
of democracy as a means of promoting peace and, for these ideologues, Iraq would serve 
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as the model for spreading democracy throughout the Middle East.663  Neoconservatives 
such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld were influential in the Bush administration 
and encouraged the removal of Saddam Hussein.   
The invasion of Iraq was also supported by Iraqi exiles.  The Bush administration 
and the neoconservatives were encouraged and lobbied by Iraqi dissident and leader of 
the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi.  The Iraqi National Congress, formed with 
US assistance in the early 1990s with the express purpose of supporting groups opposed 
to Saddam Hussein, lobbied hard for Saddam’s removal.  Chalabi was a wealthy and 
influential Shiite who was actively lobbying the US to remove Saddam Hussein since 
1991.664  Although Chalabi is a Shiite Muslim, he is portrayed as a liberal and more self-
serving than a proponent of Shiite interests.665  There is no doubt, however, that Shiites in 
Iraq welcomed the prospect of regime change and a democratic system that would propel 
them to power given their demographic superiority.  The Shiite Arabs comprise about 60 
percent of Iraq’s population, while the Sunni Arabs comprise about 15-20 percent, the 
Kurds comprise approximately 18 percent, and the remaining numbers are made of 
Turkoman, Assyrian, Yezidi, and other minorities.   
Perhaps the Sunni Arabs were one of the few groups that did not look favourably 
upon the removal of Saddam Hussein.  This is understandable given that they stood to 
lose the most and would find themselves as a minority following almost a century in 
power.  Most worrying for the Sunni Arabs was the uncertainty attached to the removal 
of Saddam and the post-invasion Iraq.  Sunni trepidations about post-Saddam Iraq were 
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seemingly confirmed by the belief that they were excluded from the drafting of the Iraqi 
constitution (this will be discussed in greater detail in the coming sections).  
The Kurds also hoped and lobbied for the removal of Saddam Hussein.  Prior to 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq the US approached the Kurds, in a meeting between George W. 
Bush and Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, about the possibility of overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein.666  Barzani and Talabani offered assistance in the form of providing 
intelligence and for the US military to use the Kurdish region as a front against Saddam’s 
regime.  The Kurdish offer of support became particularly significant when on 1 March 
2003, Turkey’s parliament blocked a motion to allow the US to deploy combat ground 
troops into Iraq from Turkish territory.  Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to provide support 
for the US invasion strengthened Kurdish-US relations and provided the US with a 
northern front.667  The Kurds presented a united front and declared their intention to 
support and participate in the US-led invasion and the rebuilding of Iraq.  
Following the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the US took on the difficult 
task of rebuilding Iraq’s political system.  The US found it difficult to create a political 
system that could balance the demands of the three major groups (i.e., the Sunnis, the 
Shiites, and the Kurds) in Iraq.  Political power was now in the hands of the Shiites who 
were historically mistreated by regimes in Baghdad.  In an effort to ensure that the Kurds 
and the Sunnis were not excluded from the political process in Iraq, the US created a 
political system that requires consensus and participation from all major groups.  For 
instance, the post of president is customarily reserved for the Kurds and the speaker of 
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the Iraqi parliament is customarily a Sunni.  The Kurds were able to secure many high 
positions in Baghdad during the creation of Iraq’s new political system in 2005. 
The Kurdish success during the negotiations was largely due to the willingness of 
the KDP and the PUK to set aside their rivalry and form a united front during the 
negotiations for the post-Saddam Iraq.  The improved relations between the KDP and the 
PUK allowed the Kurds to provide the US with the support necessary for undertaking the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. 668   The KDP and the PUK signed what they called the 
“unification agreement” of 2006, which effectively divided the administration of Iraqi 
Kurdistan and the KRG equally between the two parties.669  The unification agreement 
originated in 2005 when the Kurdish factions united under a single list for the 2005 
elections and captured 26 percent of the overall vote in Iraq.670  By going to Baghdad as a 
united front, the Kurds strengthened their position during negotiations for Iraq’s 
permanent constitution. 
The drafting of the Iraqi constitution is criticized by many academics for its 
hastiness, its reification of ethnic and religious divisions, and the exclusion of the Sunni 
population. 671   David Ghanim notes that the constitution was “written under highly 
charged political atmosphere, sectarian divide, and ethnic animosity, which is hardly a 
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proper condition for drafting a constitution that can be considered an anchor for the 
future.”672  What emerged, according to the critics, was a constitution negotiated between 
the US and the Kurds, which was then imposed on the Arabs.673  Much of the criticism 
against the drafting of the constitution is directed at the Kurdish bloc for taking advantage 
of their inexperienced and disorganized Arab counterparts.674   
Henri Barkey and Ellen Laipson suggest that the Iraqi constitution is a power-
sharing pact between the Kurds and Shiites given the absence of the Sunnis in the 
negotiation process.675  In fact, Barkey and Laipson note that the only demand the Kurds 
did not entrench in the constitution was a legal right to secede from Iraq.  In particular, 
Kurdish demands for federalism exacerbated the position of the Sunnis and, according to 
Barkey and Laipson, “their demands have complicated the quest for a unified, stable and 
peaceful Iraq.”676  The issue of federalism is a main source of tension between Erbil 
(capital of Iraqi Kurdistan) and Baghdad.  Many academics and Iraqis view federalism as 
an imposition from the outside.  Its legitimacy is questioned given that it was enacted 
under US occupation and there was political opposition against the adoption of 
federalism.677 
The drafting is further criticized for the heavy US influence.678  Critics note that 
the constitution has disenfranchised the Sunni bloc and weakened the central government 
in Baghdad.  Critics also take issue with the adoption of federalism.  Feisal Istrabadi, for 
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one, describes the notion of federalism as the “most emotionally charged issue, bar none” 
in Iraq leading up to the constitutional negotiations and says Kurds were the principle 
instigators in pushing for its adoption.  Istrabadi suggests that the Kurds could have 
continued to practice autonomy as “no one wanted to turn the clock back and reassert 
centralized control over Iraqi Kurdistan.”679  Such criticisms, however, fail to consider the 
Kurdish perspective.  The Kurds were unwilling to participate in a unitary and centralized 
Iraq following decades of repression at the hands of Baghdad.   
From the Kurdish perspective, a loose federal structure is imperative for their 
participation in the post-Saddam Iraq.  Even a decade following the overthrow of the 
Baath regime, the Kurds remain uneasy about Baghdad’s centralizing tendencies and 
rhetoric against Kurdish autonomy.  In short, the KRG and the Kurdish population do not 
fully trust Baghdad.  Entrenching federalism in the constitution, rather than relying on the 
goodwill of Baghdad, provides the Kurds with the legal framework with which to 
safeguard their rights and protect their interests.  Despite criticisms and accusations that 
they will secede, the Kurds continue to support a united Iraq.   
During interviews with the author, Kurdish officials, from the KDP and the PUK, 
clearly indicated that the Iraqi constitution and the notion of a partnership between Arabs 
and Kurds are particularly important for Kurdish officials.  Most officials identified Iraq’s 
unwillingness to view and treat Kurds as partners as a source of tension between the 
Kurdish region and Baghdad.  Indeed, most Kurdish officials view post-2003 Iraq as a 
voluntary union between two nations (i.e., Arabs and Kurds).  This point was most 
clearly articulated by Omed Sabah, the speaker for the Presidency of the Kurdish region.  
“If Baghdad wishes to preserve the unity of Iraq, it must treat the Kurds as real partners.  
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There is a difference between being a partner and a participant.  Currently, the Kurds are 
only participants…If Iraq is run like a dictatorship, it will not last.  The only reason Iraq 
would disintegrate is if it returns to dictatorship.  Nothing else.”680  Furthermore, although 
Nezhat Hali, Iraqi Kurdistan’s Director of Intelligence, does not believe that Baghdad’s 
policies will solve the Kurdish issue, he does indicate that the Kurdish region is willing to 
stay with Iraq if Kurdish interests are not marginalized and its interests are protected.681 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the history of Iraqi Kurdistan since the creation of modern Iraq 
following WWI.  It illustrated that the relationship between the central government in 
Baghdad and the Kurdish population has been fraught with political and military 
conflicts.  The Kurds faced successive regimes that adopted oppressive policies aimed at 
debilitating Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and economic development.  In response to such 
policies, the Kurds requested political and economic autonomy as measures to protect 
their interests.  Following decades of conflict and two major rebellions, the Kurds 
acquired de facto statehood in 1991 and embarked on political and economic 
development in the Kurdish region. 
 Iraqi Kurdistan’s position was further improved with the 2003 US-led invasion of 
Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein.  Given the Kurdish aspirations for 
independence and a nonexistent central government in Baghdad, many observers 
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expected the Kurds to declare independence.  Instead the Kurds have fully participated in 
the rebuilding of post-Saddam Iraq and have directed their resources on improving the 
political and economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan.  The subsequent chapter will explain 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour and its decision to forgo independence in favour of the status 
quo. What accounts for the KRG’s willingness to maintain the unity of Iraq?  What were 
the factors that shaped the Kurds’ decision to forgo independence and participate in a 
united Iraq?  The answers to these questions will be provided in two parts in the next 
chapter.  The first part will provide an account of Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and 
capabilities from 2005 to June 2014 and the second part will examine Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
position since June 2014 with the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS 
also known by its loose Arabic acronym Daesh) in Iraq. 
 Theoretically, this chapter supports liberal assumptions regarding the importance 
of political institutions and economic incentives.  In particular, the chapter demonstrates 
that Iraq’s political and economic institutions did not reflect the ambitions of the Kurdish 
population.  As a consequence of political repression and economic underdevelopment, 
therefore, the Kurds became increasingly vociferous in their demands for political and 
economic autonomy.  The post-2003 period confirms the notion that appropriate political 
institutions can mitigate grievances on the part of a minority group.  The ‘new’ Iraq 
possesses the institutional framework to maintain Iraq’s unity.   
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Chapter 6: Iraqi Kurdistan II 
During Iraq’s 2005 national elections, an unofficial referendum was held in which voters 
in Iraqi Kurdistan were asked if they preferred independence to a union with Iraq.  
Approximately 98 per cent of voters voted in favour of independence.  This unofficial 
referendum demonstrates the degree to which Iraqi Kurds support independence.  There 
is also near consensus amongst members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) regarding the question of independence.  Omar 
Hawrami, KDP member of Kurdistan parliament from 2009-2013, declares that 
independence is the principal objective of the KRG.  Within the Kurdish region, the KRG 
is working to establish good governance. But as a grand strategy, revealed Hawrami, the 
“objective is to establish an independent Kurdistan.  The Kurdish people will always feel 
incomplete without a Kurdish state.  My belief is that the people will continue to demand 
independence.” 682   Given the unequivocal position on independence, why has Iraqi 
Kurdistan not declared independence? What accounts for the Kurdistan Regional 
Government’s (KRG) decision to forgo independence and maintain Iraq’s unity?  The 
Kurds have, on more than one occasion, saved Iraq from the brink of collapse.  Since the 
overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the rebuilding of Iraq’s political system and 
institutions, Iraqi Kurdistan has had two openings to secede from a powerless Baghdad. 
This chapter will outline the two openings and explain Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision 
to champion Iraq’s unity.  Section one will examine the first opening that materialized in 
2005 following the US-led invasion of Iraq.  It will ask the following: What accounts for 
the Kurdish decision to maintain the unity of a weakened and militarily powerless 
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Baghdad?  And to what degree did capabilities influence the Kurdish decision?  The 
second opening appeared in June 2014 with the incursion of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) into Iraqi territory.  Rather than pushing for independence, the Kurds saved 
Iraq from collapse. The empirical evidence will demonstrate that Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
decision to stay in a united Iraq is deliberate and calculated. Iraq’s political institutions 
and economic prospects have convinced Iraqi Kurdistan that the status quo is more 
attractive than independence. 
The chapter is laid out in two sections.  Section one will outline Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
preferences and capabilities from 2005 to the summer of 2014.  The section will examine 
the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan and ask whether its decision-making regarding 
independence is influenced by its capabilities or other factors.  Section two will examine 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour since June 2014.  The primary objective of this chapter is to 
explain why Iraqi Kurdistan turned down two opportunities to secede from Iraq.  The 
chapter relies on primary data collected from interviews with officials from Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  The chapter will conclude with an explanation for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision 
to maintain the status quo and therefore preserve the unity of Iraq.   
 
The Behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan as a De Facto State (2005-2014) 
Preferences 
A survey of the political developments from 2005 to June 2014 will help shed some light 
on the Kurdish decision to participate both in rebuilding the political system and 
maintaining the unity of Iraq.  From 2003 to around 2006, Iraqi officials and the US 
focused on the political reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq.  The challenge for the US 
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and Iraqis was how to accommodate the demands of the Sunnis, Shiites, and the Kurds.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many academics have criticized the Iraqi 
constitution for being hastily drafted and for disproportionate Kurdish influence.683  Many 
Arab politicians and political parties, including Shiites, view the constitution as an 
imposition from the outside.684  Feisal Istrabadi, Andrew Arato, and Reidar Visser, for 
example, describe the constitutional process as a failure for its hastiness and exclusion of 
the Sunni Arabs.685   
According to this argument, the drafting of the constitution was largely dictated 
by the Kurds, who had found an ally in the Shiite political party, Supreme Council of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, later renamed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq).  
The Kurdish objective, according to Visser, was to “destroy Baghdad as a capital that the 
territorial fragmentation of Iraq would become inevitable.”686  Upon closer examination, 
however, Kurdish constitutional demands were not aimed at destroying Iraq, but rather 
aimed at protecting the Kurdish region’s political development and security.  According 
to Kurdish officials, the Kurdish objective during the constitutional negotiations was to 
safeguard the Kurdish region’s de facto status and autonomy against a centralizing and 
aggressive Baghdad.  As a Kurdish official noted, the Kurds “decided to be a main pillar, 
along with the Sunnis and Shiites, for rebuilding Iraq.”687  Given the Kurds’ history and 
experience with brutal regimes in Baghdad, Kurdish constitutional demands were not 
unreasonable.  The Kurds secured most of their demands, including federalism, the ability 
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to maintain their separate standing army, the recognition of Kirkuk as a disputed territory, 
and the ability to develop their natural resources.688 
Many of the Kurdish successes in post-Saddam Iraq can be attributed to the 
organization of the Kurds in the prelude to the constitutional negotiations and subsequent 
elections.  The KDP and the PUK agreed to set aside their historic differences in order to 
secure the political and economic preferences of the Kurds.  The Kurds were prepared 
and possessed leverage to secure their demands during the drafting of the constitution.  
The Kurdish position of power began to change in 2007.  The Kurds continued to push a 
decentralized agenda, but non-SCIRI Shiites in Baghdad began to push back against 
Kurdish insistence on its natural resource development and the issue of Kirkuk.689  The 
pushback was initiated by Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to 
September 2014, who sought to strengthen Baghdad’s powers in governing the oil sector 
and resolving the Kirkuk issue.  The Kurdish-Shiite alliance was expedient for both 
groups for achieving their political objectives in Baghdad.  The Kurds could push through 
their demands with the support of the Shiites and in turn the Shiites could rely on the 
support of the Kurdish bloc to form the government in Baghdad.  The alliance began to 
unravel between 2008 and 2009 following Maliki’s attempts to extend Baghdad’s powers 
over natural resources and the repeated postponement of the Kirkuk referendum.   
One of the main sources of conflict between the KRG and Baghdad from 2005 to 
2014 was the struggle over constitutional powers.  Both sides have been pushing and 
pulling for influence in their respective jurisdictions.  From the Kurdish perspective, the 
Iraqi constitution is a compromise by the Kurds to save Iraq.  The Kurds demanded 
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certain provisions in the constitution in order to check Baghdad’s powers and proclivity 
for centralization.  Kurdish officials were clear that their constitutional demands were a 
precondition for participating in a unified Iraq.  Furthermore, officials are unsatisfied 
with Baghdad’s track record vis-à-vis the constitution and insist that the future of Iraq 
depends on Baghdad’s adherence to the constitution.690  This idea is best articulated by 
Omed Sabah when he says, “If the Iraqi government wishes to preserve the unity of Iraq 
it must adhere to the law of the land.  The last paragraph of the Preamble [of the 
constitution] indicates that the unification of Iraq is voluntary and its preservation 
depends on adherence to the constitution.  To preserve the unity of Iraq, Baghdad must 
implement all articles in the constitution.”691 
In particular, the KRG has insisted on its right to develop the Kurdish region’s 
natural resources without permission from Baghdad and the KRG has demanded the 
implementation of Article 140 to resolve the longstanding Kirkuk issue.692  Iraq, during 
this period, became increasingly centralized as Baghdad attempted to broaden its 
jurisdiction and increase its influence over the KRG.  Another main source of tension 
between Baghdad and the KRG since 2005 has been the status of Kirkuk.  The disputed 
territory was set to be resolved in 2007 but has been indefinitely postponed, as neither 
Baghdad nor the KRG is willing to relinquish claims to the territory.  A potential 
resolution to the settlement of Kirkuk, which would be amenable to all sides, is to grant 
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the territory special status within Iraq. 693   The issue of Kirkuk has become further 
complicated following the invasion of ISIS into Iraq and the seizure of Kirkuk by 
Kurdish security forces.  The issue is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be 
resolved easily. 
The KRG’s relations with Baghdad became increasingly strained at the beginning 
of 2010.  Nouri al-Maliki, the Shiite Prime Minister of the day, and his supporters hoped 
to regain much of the political power Baghdad had lost following the drafting of Iraq’s 
constitution.  One of the areas in which Baghdad hoped to reassert itself is control over 
natural resources, and in particular oil, and the revenues generated from them.694  The 
Kurds have always maintained that Article 112 of the constitution outlines the regional 
government’s supremacy in the development of, and collection of revenues from, oil 
extraction.695  The disputes between the two sides have also led to military posturing on 
more than one occasion over the disputed territories on the border of the Kurdish 
region.696   
Academics and analysts expected the disputes between the Kurds and Baghdad to 
worsen following the complete withdrawal of US forces.697  Tensions culminated in 2011 
when Massoud Barzani and the Kurdish bloc in the Iraqi parliament attempted to remove 
Maliki in a vote of non-confidence following accusations from Sunnis and Kurds that 
Maliki was consolidating power following the withdrawal of US forces in late 2011.  
                                            
693
 Stefan Wolff, “Governing (in) Kirkuk: Resolving the Status of a Disputed Territory in PostAmerican 
Iraq,” International Affairs Vol. 86, No. 6 (2010): 1361-1379. 
694
 Michael M. Gunter, “Arab–Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq,” 1625-1626. 
695
 Ibid., 1626. 
696
 Ibid., 1628. 
697
 See David Romano, “Iraqi Kurdistan: Challenges of Autonomy in the Wake of US Withdrawal,”; 
Mohammed M.A. Ahmed, Iraqi Kurds and Nation-building (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 197-
200. 
 210
This move was ultimately rejected by the then President Jalal Talabani because it did not 
have the required number of signatures from parliamentarians.  
Despite their differences and the seeming intractability over power and resources, 
the KRG understands that it is more beneficial to compromise with Baghdad than to 
challenge it.698  The Kurdish preference, therefore, from 2005 to 2014 was to function 
autonomously in a united Iraq.  This preference was demonstrated by the Kurdish 
willingness to participate in constitutional negotiations and to fully participate in the 
formation and functioning of the governments in Baghdad.  Throughout the past decade, 
the Kurds have maintained that they will continue to support and work within a united 
Iraq if Baghdad respects the constitution.  Kurdish actions since 2005 demonstrate a 
genuine willingness to maintain Iraq’s unity.  The Kurds have supported successive 
Shiite-dominated governments following elections in 2005, 2010, and most recently in 
2014.  In return for their support, the Kurds were appointed to various high-profile 
portfolios, including the post of president, foreign minister, and other cabinet positions in 
the governments formed in 2006 and 2010. 
Kurdish officials reasoned that the Kurds have too much to lose by seceding from 
Iraq.  Susan Shahab, leader of the governing coalition in the Kurdistan National 
Assembly from 2009-2013, believes that this is a golden time for the Kurds and therefore 
the question of independence can be shelved.  She argues that, “Economic independence 
and the ability to reconstruct infrastructure is the first priority.  Forging good relations 
between the KRG and Iraq and neighbours is a second priority.”699  Shahab understands 
that the Kurdish population desires independence, but she also recognizes that it would 
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not be prudent to jeopardize the Kurdish region’s favourable position.  Shahab effectively 
lays out the conditions under which the Kurdish region would be willing to stay with 
Iraq.  She says, “First of all, Baghdad must adhere to the constitution. Second, we must 
be treated as partners in Iraq.  Third, there are many problems in resolving disputes with 
Baghdad and in particular the resolution of Article 140.”700 
Abdulsalam Berwari, a long serving member of the KDP and member of the 
Kurdistan parliament from 2009-2013, provided interesting insights into the KDP’s 
objectives and the Kurdish population’s aspirations.  Berwari believes that because the 
Kurdish region’s position in Iraq is uncertain, economic and security imperatives 
outweigh other issues for Kurdish citizens.701  Abdulsalam Berwari was adamant that 
independence is the end goal of the KDP and that the Kurdish region’s current position is 
a reflection of geopolitical realities rather than a willingness to stay with Iraq.  “We 
believe that the conditions are not yet right for independence,” explains Berwari, “We are 
surrounded by three states that have their own Kurdish minorities and the international 
community’s (i.e., the US and the EU) interests do not align with Kurdish independence 
given the small territory and population.”702  This is a longstanding argument made by 
Kurdish leaders. Independence is not practical given the unfavourable environment in 
which the Kurds find themselves. The benefits of the status quo, as it were, are too great 
to give up for the risks associated with a possible secession. 
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Capabilities 
According to realist assumptions, de facto states must possess the military power 
necessary to secede from the parent state and survive as an independent state.  Based on 
this approach, the Kurds did not possess adequate capabilities between 2005 and 2014 to 
secede from Iraq.  Without military capabilities, de facto states stand little chance of 
surviving let alone achieving independence.  Military power is essential because de facto 
states cannot rely on other actors for help in achieving independence.  In short, 
capabilities determine whether a de facto state achieves independence or if it is 
reintegrated into the parent state.  Constructivists, meanwhile, emphasize the importance 
of agency and international norms.  De facto states must navigate the rigid international 
norms against secession and the international preference for state sovereignty.  Based on 
constructivist notions then, independence is a difficult option for Iraqi Kurdistan given 
the inviolability of state sovereignty and the international norms against secessionist 
movements.  Such norms, however, have not prevented other de facto states (e.g., 
Kosovo, South Sudan, and Eritrea) from declaring independence and securing recognition 
from the international community.  Realism and constructivism, therefore, do not provide 
a complete explanation for Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour. 
Indeed, one could make the case that between 2005 and 2014 the Kurds possessed 
sufficient capabilities to secede from Iraq.  Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime the government in Baghdad was weakened politically and militarily, while the 
Kurds possessed the political, economic, and military capabilities to establish an 
independent Kurdistan.  Gareth Stansfield, for one, argues that the domestic and regional 
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conditions were suitable for Kurdish independence.703  He argues, “the combination of 
local cohesion, popular Kurdish development, Iraqi state weakness, and the overlapping 
of economic and geopolitical interests between the Kurdistan Region and one-time 
opponents gives the current trajectory more durability than the Kurds have enjoyed in 
previous times when it looked as though they could challenge the established state 
system.”704  The KRG has established political institutions that furnish Iraqi Kurdistan 
with the capacity to administer the region and deliver basic services to the population.  
Iraqi Kurdistan is also economically viable, as it sits atop vast oil and gas reserves, 
leading some analysts to call it Iraqi Kurdistan’s “most promising asset.”705  Finally, the 
KRG possesses a capable military that can provide security and defense for Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  Yet, we should not expect the Kurds to forsake all their gains for something 
uncertain. 
Despite a clear preference for the status quo, academics and analysts are often 
quick to announce Kurdish independence as imminent any time a KRG official asserts 
Kurdish rights to self-determination.706  It is true that Massoud Barzani and other Kurdish 
officials (e.g., Nechervan Barzani, President Massoud Barzani’s Chief of Staff Fuad 
Hussein, and other high-ranking officials) maintain that the Kurds reserve the right to 
determine their political future.  However, it is equally true that Kurdish officials have 
repeatedly maintained that although independence is the Kurdish dream, the Kurds will 
remain in a democratic and federal Iraq.  For decades, academics have argued that Iraqi 
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Kurdistan would declare independence “when they deemed the time propitious.” 707  
Michael Gunter, for example, does not believe that a decentralized Iraq, with an 
autonomous Kurdish region, is a long-term solution.  He maintains that it is only a matter 
of time before the majority Arab population of Iraq organizes itself and imposes its will 
on the Kurds.708    
Kurdish officials, including Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan, 
and Jalal Talabani, the former president of Iraq, insist that Iraqi Kurdistan will maintain 
the status quo under the right conditions.  In a 2008 opinion editorial in the Wall Street 
Journal, Massoud Barzani called Iraqi Kurdistan a model for the rest of Iraq.  Barzani 
affirmed that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is “committed to a federal, 
democratic Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors.”709  In addition, Barzani responds to 
critics who accuse the KRG of operating outside its constitutional limits by developing 
the Kurdish region’s oil resources.  Barzani argues that the KRG is “proceeding entirely 
in accord with the Iraqi constitution, implementing provisions that were brokered by the 
U.S.” 710   Jalal Talabani also opposed independence in 2005 because it was not 
‘practical.’711   
The KRG functions with a high degree of autonomy within a federal Iraq, but at 
the same time, the Kurds play a prominent role in the rest of Iraq vis-à-vis their presence 
in Baghdad.  Indeed, the Kurds have held in the past and continue to hold significant 
posts in the Iraqi government. For example, in the 2005 and 2010 cabinets, the Kurds 
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held the posts of president, deputy prime minister, and foreign minister and, in the most 
recent 2014 cabinet, the Kurds have retained the post of the president, deputy prime 
minister, and have been given the minister of finance post amongst other ministries.712 
According to some Kurdish officials, capabilities will not determine Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s fate.  A group of officials, which can be labeled ‘soft-secessionists,’ claims 
that Iraqi Kurdistan will secede from Iraq but under the right conditions.  This group 
includes individuals such as, Abdulkhaliq Bapiri, head of the KDP’s first branch in 
Duhok, Bayiz Talabani, KRG Minister of Finance and the Economy from 2009-2013, and 
Mohammed Ihsan, KRG Minister of the Kurdistan territories outside the Kurdish region.  
There are also more hardline officials among the soft-secessionists.  The hardliners 
include Parizad Shaban, Kurdish member of Iraq parliament and Renas Jano, KDP MP in 
Baghdad.713  ‘Soft-secessionists’ insist that not only is independence a legal right, but it is 
also normatively desirable given the history of the Kurds and the uncertainty regarding 
the future of Iraq.  Despite such firmness, however, ‘soft-secessionists’ insist that 
separation from Iraq must be achieved in a peaceful and amicable way. 
Even this group, however, is willing to work within a federal Iraq for now.714  
Omer Nuradini, KDP member of Kurdistan parliament, aptly outlined the KDP’s (and by 
extension the KRG’s) approach to its future in Iraq. He says,  “The KDP’s strategy for 
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secession is a ‘soft’ secession.  It does not want to unilaterally or violently separate from 
Iraq.  It is working towards a diplomatic and agreeable strategy with which Baghdad will 
agree.”715  Nuradini believes that Iraqi Kurdistan hopes to breakaway from Iraq under 
mutually acceptable terms to maintain friendly relations.  Other KDP officials, including 
Abdulkhaliq Bapiri and Mohammed Ihsan, shared these sentiments. (Bapiri serves as a 
high-ranking KDP official and as a member of the party’s leadership council.)  “We want 
our national issue to be solved democratically and peacefully…we don’t want to go 
through that avenue [use of force] as much as there is a chance to do it democratically,” 
asserts Bapiri.716   
The PUK’s strategy is a similar one.  Long-serving PUK member and the KRG 
Minister of Finance and the Economy from 2009-2013, Bayiz Talabani, indicated that 
Kurdish gains should not be risked with imprudent policy based on emotion.  He adds, 
“We must carefully consider whether or not the Kurdish region is ready to take the step in 
becoming a state.  We should not rush this decision.  We have a territory that has a 
parliament, a government, and stability and security to serve the Kurdish region and its 
people… We have built a strong foundation for a future state.”717  This faction stresses the 
importance of achieving independence in a democratic and peaceful manner in order to 
safeguard the Kurdish region’s political, economic, and diplomatic progress.  
Many who fall into this camp believe that independence is a natural right of the 
Kurds and that the push for independence will not wane.  Indeed, even asymmetrical 
federalism and other political accessions on the part of Baghdad will not persuade ‘soft-
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secessionists’ to stay in a federal Iraq.  “If there is an opportunity to separate from Iraq 
peacefully, we would go for it without thinking twice,” notes Bapiri.718  Mohammed Ihsan 
offered a simple, but insightful way for understanding the Kurdish mentality.  He 
announces, “Look, our policy is to work for the best, prepare for the worst.  This is the 
Middle East.  When you wake up in the morning, you should have plan A and B.”719  
Kurds view independence as a right and a protective measure against the region’s 
instability.  In short, there are no conditions under which the Kurds would be willing to 
stay with Iraq in the long term, say ‘soft-secessionists,’ but they also insist that any 
secession must be peaceful and democratic. 
Critics in Iraqi Kurdistan retort that the KDP and the PUK are using the dream of 
Kurdish independence to preserve their positions of power.  As evidence, Kamiran 
Berwari says one ought to look at the track record of the KDP and the PUK, which, 
according to him, demonstrates their unwillingness to push for independence.720  Mentik 
echoes these sentiments.  He adds, “If you study our history, especially in the last fifty 
years, you will see that the leader [Barzani] has fought all other Kurdish groups.  For 
example, the KDP has fought Kurds in Iran, Turkey, and even Kurds in Iraq…There is a 
difference between what one says and what one does.  They always talk about 
independence and building a state, but in practice it is a different story.”721  This criticism 
was a common one amongst those who questioned the Kurdish leadership’s desire for 
independence.  The critics argue that the KDP and the PUK use the rhetoric of 
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independence to appease the population’s desire for a Kurdish state, but in practice 
neither party has made Kurdish independence a policy goal during election campaigns. 
Kamiran Berwari and Mentik raise an interesting point regarding the KDP and the 
PUK’s policy platforms during elections.  During my observations of the 2013 
parliamentary election, neither the PUK nor the KDP offered a clear and explicit plan for 
achieving independence.  In fact, the question of independence was a non-issue during 
the election. Massoud Barzani raised the issue during a campaign speech in Duhok but he 
refused to explicitly mention independence.  In vague and uncertain terms, Barzani 
suggested that although the KRG has made significant progress in the economic and 
security spheres, it would continue to work on achieving ‘something greater.’  It is widely 
inferred that Barzani was referring to independence.  The central issues of the election 
were security, the economy, and improving governance in Iraqi Kurdistan. Similarly, 
during the 2014 federal election, Kurdish political parties did not mention independence 
as an objective and instead the major political parties, including the KDP, the PUK, and 
Gorran promised to advance Kurdish interests in Baghdad and to ensure that Baghdad 
continues to provide the Iraqi Kurdistan with the 17 percent revenue of Iraq’s budget to 
which it is entitled. 
Others criticize the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP) in particular, for advancing and protecting their interests rather 
than those of the Kurdish region and its population.  These criticisms come from 
opposition political parties, including the Change Movement (also known as Change List 
and Gorran) and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU).  Gorran was founded in 2009 in 
response to the (real and perceived) corruption and nepotism in Iraqi Kurdistan’s politics.  
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A 2006 strategic agreement effectively divided the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan 
between the KDP and the PUK.722  The agreement would serve as the basis of the KRG 
cabinets from 2006 until the regional elections of September 2013 and contributed to the 
emergence and success of Gorran.  Nawshirwan Mustafa, who was second to Jalal 
Talabani in the PUK, broke away and formed Gorran in opposition to Talabani’s decision 
to forge an alliance with the KDP and Massoud Barzani.723  As a response to the PUK’s 
perceived nepotism, Nawshirwan Mustafa and his followers split from the PUK to form 
Gorran in 2009.724  Gorran capitalized on the disenchantment against the KDP and the 
PUK to secure significant support from voters.   
Kardo Pirdood Muhammed, Gorran’s caucus leader in the Kurdistan National 
Assembly (KNA) from 2009-2013, for example, criticizes the KRG for neglecting the 
Kurdish region’s institutional and social development.  In particular, Muhammed 
contends that the policies of the KDP and the PUK have led to the politics of exclusion 
where members and supporters of other parties feel like second-class citizens. 725  In this 
way, Gorran is presented as the alternative to the exclusionary policies of the KDP and 
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).  “Gorran is calling for an effective government 
that works within effective and accountable institutions.  We must make all Kurdish 
citizens feel a part of the nation and the political system,” argues Muhammed.  The critics 
argue that members and supporters of the PUK and the KDP are made to believe that they 
are ‘better’ Kurdish citizens.  Gorran presents itself as modern reformist party that is 
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inclusive.  “The main difference between Gorran and the PUK and the KDP is that they 
create an environment wherein membership in a political party is more important than 
citizenship in the Kurdish region,” claims Muhammed.726   
Gorran and its members are less firm than their KDP and PUK counterparts on the 
question of independence.  In fact, one of Gorran’s main objectives is to improve Kurdish 
relations with Baghdad through mutual cooperation in the areas of security, territorial 
disputes, implementation of the Iraqi constitution, and the economy.727  Whereas the KDP 
and the PUK representatives claim to be unabashedly pro-independence, Gorran’s 
members are more reserved on this issue. Instead, Gorran stresses the importance of 
institutional reforms to develop the economy and governance.  Members of Gorran did 
not explicitly reject the notion of Kurdish independence but rather insist that internal 
reforms must take place to lay the foundations for a potential Kurdish state.  When asked 
how Gorran would respond to the Kurdish population’s desire for independence, 
Muhammed replied that, “if the people want independence, we must first reform our 
government to achieve independence…I believe that the internal reforms will be helpful 
in leading to Kurdish independence…Kurdish people have long struggled for national 
autonomy, but once we [have] achieved political autonomy we must fight corruption, 
inequality, and establish an effective judicial system to strengthen our democracy.”728   
Ali Hamah Salih is a leading member of Gorran and was elected to the KNA in 
the September 2013 regional election.729  Salih indicated that the PUK and the KDP 
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divide the administration and budget of the Kurdish region between themselves with few 
opportunities for those who are not members of the parties.730  Salih further argued that 
the popularity of the KDP and the PUK has increasingly waned during each election.  
Salih agrees that the KDP and the Barzani family are popular with the population, but it is 
also becoming more intolerant of the corruption and in need of economic opportunities.  
For example, Salih points to the revenue generated from the Ibrahim Khalil border 
crossing on the border of Turkey that is unaccounted for.  He argues that the KDP 
essentially buys votes especially in Sulaymaniya province.  Salih raised an important 
issue that was not highlighted by other officials.  He noted that Iraqi Kurdistan does not 
have defined borders.  “How can it become a state if it does not have a clearly defined 
territory and borders?” asks Salih.731  He believes that if an independent Kurdistan will 
consist of the existing three provinces, such a move is pointless because it has been 
effectively independent for 30 years. 
Other Gorran members, including Evar Ibrahim and Barzo Majeed, emphasized 
the importance of further developing the Kurdish region’s economy, passing a regional 
constitution, and implementing widespread change to the region’s political and social 
structures.  Evar Ibrahim, Gorran member of the Kurdistan National Assembly since 
2014, for example, noted that Gorran believes reform is necessary before independence 
can be achieved.  She says, “Gorran is happy to have an independent Kurdistan, but first 
we need to organize ourselves.”732  Ibrahim describes the KRG as gendalchi (corrupt) and 
nepotistic.  “It is obvious that the KDP and the PUK have failed to meet people’s 
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demands. As always, they look out for their own interests first. Until now they haven’t 
been able to solve their own problems, they’re still divided over the security and 
intelligence administration,” she noted.733   
Gorran’s objective, according to its members, is to uncover the injustice in society 
and to make the financial transactions of the KRG transparent.  Ibrahim’s criticism of the 
KRG reflects Gorran’s core principles and objectives in trying to identify and expose 
what they believe is rampant corruption in the Kurdish region.  Barzo Majeed, Head of 
Gorran for Erbil Governorate and member of Kurdistan parliament, notes that prior to the 
emergence of Gorran, the KRG passed legislation without opposition.  Such legislation, 
in his words, “was in the interest of two parties [the KDP and the PUK]. There was no 
opposition in the parliament. The expenditure of the budget was also problematic as the 
two parties were dividing it between themselves and there was little transparency.”734  In 
short, Gorran and its members strongly disagree with the way in which the Kurdish 
region is being governed. 
The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) also criticizes the policies of the KRG.  The 
KIU was officially formed in 1994 but its roots can be traced back to the 1970s.  Its 
formation coincided with the onset of the KDP-PUK civil war, from which the KIU 
benefited.  The KIU condemned the KDP and the PUK for killing Kurds and Muslims 
and for forging expedient alliances with the governments in Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara, 
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The KIU identifies the rights of Kurdish people 
as one of its main objectives, including the right to self-determination and the return of 
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the disputed areas under Kurdish control. 735    The KIU’s general principles also 
emphasize the need for Islamic values and in particular the implementation of Sharia as 
the ultimate guarantor of those values.736  It is on these grounds that the KIU criticizes the 
KRG.  Specifically, the KIU and its members attack the KRG (and the KDP and the 
PUK) for nepotism, corruption, and lack of transparency.  Bayan Ahmed Hasan, KIU 
member of Kurdistan parliament from 2009-2013, criticizes the KRG for failing to 
advance Kurdish interests.  She states, “First, we still have two administrations [the KDP 
and the PUK], two ruling parties that have not been able to accept other political parties 
and our people continue to suffer as a result.  They don’t recognize other parties, they 
prop up puppet political parties whose job it is to support them in the parliament.”737  
Ismaeel Ravendi, a member of the KIU’s counselling board, meanwhile, characterizes the 
KRG as ineffective, corrupt, and undemocratic.738 
Non-partisan officials also emphasized that Iraqi Kurdistan can function within a 
united Iraq.  Abdulhakeem Khasroo and Ali Kareem provided balanced analyses of the 
political situation of the Kurdish region, on the governance of the KRG and, the practices 
of the KDP and the PUK.  Abdulhakeem Khasroo is professor of political science at 
Salahaddin University – Hawler (Erbil).  Professor Khasroo indicated that independence 
is not the top priority for the Kurdish population despite what some politicians and 
political parties suggest.  “In terms of public opinion, independence is not at the top of 
the list, especially if Kurdistan continues to function as a de facto state.  The most 
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important thing for us is to maintain good relations with Baghdad and build a strong 
economy…The Kurdish population desires security and economic growth.  Based on 
research and observations during elections in the Kurdish region, none of the political 
parties has mentioned independence as a goal,” he contends.739  Khasroo supports his 
point by suggesting that Kurds would be willing to work within a democratic and federal 
Iraq.  He says, “if we maintain our current status, we would not have any problem as long 
as we are safe and secure and economically viable.”740  Khasroo further notes that the 
KDP and PUK’s apparent appeal and strength are tenuous.  Indeed, he argues that voters 
desire change, but view the opposition parties (i.e., Gorran and KIU) as less capable than 
the governing parties.741   
The KDP and the PUK’s undemocratic practices are an open secret in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  For example, Ali Kareem, the Head of the Kurdistan Institute for Human 
Rights, suggests that it is difficult for opposition parties and their members to secure 
positions in the Kurdish region due to the policies of the KDP.  “Sometimes if one is 
loyal to or a member of the opposition it is difficult to receive governmental positions and 
one cannot participate in any governmental activities.  Generally, [opposition] parties are 
ignored.  There are very few members of opposition political parties holding official 
positions in public institutions.” 742   He further criticizes the KDP and the PUK for 
perpetuating the region’s tribal and traditionalistic society.  “We have a negative culture 
and tradition of dealing with political parties.  For example, the tribal system is often 
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viewed as an alternative to the government.  The KRG (and the PUK and the KDP) are 
viewed as a special instrument or tools for the use of its members and not as general 
public institutions.  This creates bad relations between the government and other political 
parties,” reflected Kareem.743 
The Kurdistan Communist Party, which has a seat in the Kurdistan National 
Assembly (KNA), also views Iraqi Kurdistan’s development as more important than 
independence.  Barevan Abdulrahman, the Communist Party’s Duhok representative, 
outlined his party’s broad goal as protecting the “new reality in Kurdistan.”  This entails 
the implementation of democracy, the development of civil society, an effective 
institutional administration in Iraqi Kurdistan, and to foster good relations between Erbil 
and Baghdad. 744   Abdulrahman suggested that independence has taken a backseat to 
political and economic development in the Kurdish region.745  Mohammed Amed, former 
MP in the KNA and a high-ranking official in the Communist Party, also indicated that 
his party hopes to see a “free, democratic, and plural Iraq.”746  Although the population 
wants independence, it also wants jobs, social services, and an effective government.747 
The period from 2005 to the summer of 2014 was a critical one for Iraqi 
Kurdistan.  Instead of pushing for independence, the Kurdistan Regional Government 
fully participated in the rebuilding of Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan’s main reason for preserving 
the status quo is that post-Saddam Iraq has been largely accommodative to its political 
and economic goals of the Kurds.  These findings suggest that the de facto state literature 
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has overlooked the importance of economic development and political accommodation.  
Whereas the body of literature asserts that independence is the ultimate goal of all de 
facto states, the case of Iraqi Kurdistan suggests that there are conditions under which the 
status quo may be satisfactory, or even preferable. 
 How can we explain the seemingly contradictory positions on Kurdish 
independence?  On the one hand, officials were adamant that independence is the 
endgame, but on the other hand, they outlined the conditions under which Iraqi Kurdistan 
would stay with Iraq.  I believe that the status quo (i.e., de facto statehood in a federal 
Iraq) satisfied Iraqi Kurdistan’s objectives.  After all, the status quo furnishes the Kurds 
with all the benefits of an independent state without any of the risks associated with 
seceding from the parent state.  Without such accommodations, Kurdish officials clearly 
indicated that the Kurdish region would push for independence.  In fact, Massoud 
Barzani has, on more than one occasion, declared that without federalism and respect for 
the democratic process, the Kurds will seek independence.  In a 2011 interview, Barzani 
said, “I repeat it once again, as I always have, as far as Iraq follows the current 
constitution, we would not think of division and establishing an independent state. 
Abiding by this constitution is for the benefit of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, 
particularly in this current situation.”748   
 
 
The Behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan Since June 2014 
Preferences 
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s second opening for independence materialized following the invasion of 
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) into Iraq.  This section will examine the ways in 
which the ISIS presence in Iraq has changed Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and especially 
the decision for independence.  The section will briefly outline the emergence of ISIS in 
Iraq and the Kurdish reaction to the shifting geopolitics in Iraq.  It will include an 
analysis of the ways in which ISIS has changed the political dynamics and calculations of 
Iraqi Kurdistan.  It will demonstrate that although the presence of ISIS poses significant 
political, security, and economic challenges to the Kurdish region and Iraq, Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s preference regarding independence has not changed.  To be sure, Iraqi 
Kurdistan will protect its political and economic interests, but it will also continue to 
promote a united and federal Iraq.  Although ISIS poses new challenges to the unity of 
Iraq, it is a threat that may ultimately prove to be a source of unity between the KRG and 
Baghdad. 
From June to September 2014, ISIS overran the Iraqi military in northern Iraq and 
captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul.  ISIS is a Sunni terrorist group that emerged 
following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war that erupted in 2011.749  
From the early 2000s to 2006, it operated under the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq. It has 
since developed into a large and well-funded terrorist organization that poses a serious 
threat to Iraq and Syria.  ISIS’s ultimate objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate 
(i.e., an Islamic state) in the greater Middle East.  To this end, the group attacked and 
captured large swaths of territory in northern Iraq, as it faced little opposition from the 
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Iraqi military responsible for defending the territories.  As a consequence, Iraqi Kurdistan 
found itself surrounded by the terrorist organization seeking control over all of Iraq.  
Initially, the situation looked favourable for the Kurds who were able to seize territory 
abandoned by the Iraqi military, including the hotly disputed city of Kirkuk.   
Shortly thereafter, in early July 2014, Massoud Barzani announced that the KRG 
would hold, first, a referendum to decide whether Kirkuk would remain a part of Iraq or 
be incorporated into the KRG and, second, a subsequent referendum on Kurdish 
independence.  Massoud Barzani defended the KRG’s decision to hold the independence 
referendum by highlighting the Kurds’ efforts at preserving Iraq’s unity.  He says, “We 
spared no effort to help make this new Iraq work.  But unfortunately it has failed.  So our 
question to our doubters is just that: How much longer should we wait, and how much 
longer should we deny our destiny for some unknown future?”750  The referendums were 
abandoned following ISIS attacks on Kurdish civilians and territory.  Since late June 
2014, therefore, Iraqi Kurdistan, and its military force the Peshmerga, has been locked in 
military battles against ISIS. 
Many academics, analysts, and pundits declared that Kurdish independence would 
be imminent after ISIS’s incursion into Iraq and Barzani’s declaration to hold an 
independence referendum in June 2014.751  The referendum, however, has been postponed 
and the Kurds have agreed to participate in the government in Baghdad.  Rather than 
breakup Iraq, the threat posed from ISIS seems to have provided a common goal and 
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strengthened relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad.  In a November 2014 forum 
in Erbil, the Prime Minister of the KRG, Nechervan Barzani, downplayed Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s independence plans by revealing that independence is not a top priority.  
Instead, he reiterated the KRG’s commitment to Iraq, but qualified it by noting that the 
Kurds will ask for more autonomy.  He declares, “Federalism has failed and if we can’t 
establish federalism, we are asking for additional autonomy, not for the destruction of 
Iraq.”752  The Kurdish decision to participate in the formation of an Iraqi government 
demonstrates the Kurds’ willingness, and indeed their desire, to make Iraq work.  The 
ISIS crisis may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for the future unity of Iraq.   
Kurdish leaders were persuaded to join the unity government in Baghdad 
following Baghdad’s promise to treat the Kurds as partners and to furnish Iraqi Kurdistan 
with more economic autonomy.  The Kurdish decision was a deliberate and calculated 
one following conditions imposed on and agreed to by Baghdad.  The Kurds agreed to 
join on the condition that Baghdad treat the Kurds as partners and adhere to and 
implement the Iraqi constitution.  This has been the Kurdish position since the creation of 
the constitution in 2005.  During interviews with the author, many Iraqi Kurdish officials 
reiterated this point.   
Most KDP officials subscribe to a pragmatic approach to the independence 
question.  This group includes Najeeba Ibrahim and Abdulhamid Bavi, KDP members of 
Iraq parliament, Kareem Sinjari, senior KDP member and the KRG Minister of the 
Interior, Omed Sabah, Speaker for the Presidency of the Kurdish region, Abdulsalam 
Berwari and Omer Nuradini, KDP members of Kurdistan parliament, Susan Shahab, 
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PUK member of Kurdish parliament, Nezhat Hali, Director of Parastin (the KRG’s 
intelligence) Agency, and Hemen Hawrami, Head of the KDP’s Foreign Relations 
Office.753 
Ibrahim and Bavi represent the Kurdish region in the federal parliament of Iraq 
and believe that the current federal arrangement could be a long-term solution, but that it 
is ultimately up to Baghdad.  Ibrahim emphasized the importance of federalism in 
preserving the unity of Iraq.  “I don’t think there is any other solution.  If anyone tries to 
centralize Iraq, it will not be successful,” she explained.754  Bavi added that Kurds are 
willing to be a part of Iraq because the status quo furnishes the Kurdish region with 
political and economic autonomy.  However, Bavi also indicated that the Kurdish region 
and its population are uneasy about Baghdad’s centralizing overtures and believes that 
such a policy can lead to Iraq’s disintegration. 755   As noted above, the notion of a 
dictatorial Iraq has not faded from the Kurdish consciousness.  Kurds are apprehensive 
about the centralizing policies of Baghdad.  As Bavi noted, during his time in Baghdad, 
he has observed an environment of mistrust that has, to date, prevented reconciliation.756 
Hemen Hawrami spoke resolutely about Iraqi Kurdistan’s status in Iraq and its 
relationship with Baghdad.  Like other pragmatists, Hemen declares that the Kurdish 
region will be a part of Iraq if it is “democratic, pluralistic, and federal.”757  Baghdad’s 
adherence to the Iraqi constitution is a condition for Kurdish participation in Iraq.  Karim 
Sinjari, KRG Minister of the Interior, says, “There must be respect for the constitution, a 
                                            
753
 Although the KDP’s Foreign Relations Office is independent from the KRG’s Department of Foreign 
Relations, it likely initiates much of the KRG’s foreign policy. 
754
 Author interview with Najeeba Ibrahim, Iraq Council of Representatives Member – Kurdistan 
Democratic Party. Duhok, Iraq.  21 May 2013. 
755
 Author interview with Abdulhamid Bavi, Iraq Council of Representatives Member – Kurdistan 
Democratic Party. Duhok, Iraq. 31 May 2013. 
756
 Ibid. 
757
 Author interview with Hemen Hawrami. 
 231
realization and acceptance that Iraq is a federal and pluralistic entity that must be 
democratic.”758  The aforementioned mistrust can only be assuaged with adherence to and 
implementation of the law of the land.  Kurdish officials noted that decades of 
dictatorship fostered unease amongst the Iraqi population in general and the Kurds in 
particular.  Sinjari added that Iraq’s unity depends on respect for the principles of 
pluralism, federalism, and democracy as outlined in the constitution.759  These sentiments 
were echoed by Omed Sabah, who notes, “If they [Sunnis and Shiites] follow the 
constitution, we [Kurds] will remain with Iraq. If, however, they stray from the 
constitution, the Kurds have many options going forward, including constitutional 
rights.”760 
The third condition for continued Kurdish participation in Iraq is the resolution of 
the disputed territories.  Article 140 of the constitution outlines a resolution for the 
disputed territories; the most important of which is Kirkuk, not least for its vast oil 
reserves.  The disputed territories were scheduled to be resolved in 2007, but the article 
continues to be postponed without a firm deadline.  Kurdish officials believe that 
Baghdad is unwilling to implement the article because it does not want to relinquish 
control of Kirkuk’s vast oil reserves to the KRG.  Kurdish claims to Kirkuk and the other 
disputed territories are based on the presence of a majority Kurdish population in the 
areas.  According to Kurdish officials, therefore, Kurdish claims to the territories are 
based on historical grounds and not the desire to control the vast oil reserves.  Such 
claims often refer to the 1957 Iraqi census (the last reliable census), which confirms the 
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Kurds as a majority with a population of 48 percent.  Baghdad, for many reasons, to be 
discussed later, continues to vacillate on this issue.   
Many KRG officials, therefore, acknowledge that the Kurds would be willing to 
stay with Iraq under the abovementioned conditions.  Nuradini reasserts that, “If the 
federal government adheres to the Iraqi constitution and grants the Kurdish region 
significant rights and autonomy it may be possible to keep the Kurds with Iraq.  If 
Baghdad makes the Kurds a real partner, there is a chance to stay with the rest of Iraq.  
But it must be a political and economic setup similar to that of Quebec and Canada.  In 
this way, there are major benefits to stay with Iraq.”761  Similarly, Ihsan Amedi, KDP 
member of Kurdistan parliament from 2005 to 2009, believes that Iraq’s unity can be 
preserved if Baghdad furnishes the Kurds with political autonomy and treats the Kurds as 
‘partners’ in the Iraqi union.762  In short, the Kurds are willing to accept the status quo as 
it provides them with “the status of an independent state without any risks.”763 
If Baghdad fails to meet these conditions, the KRG’s Minister for Parliamentary 
Affairs, Mawlud Bawmulad announces, then “the Kurds will have the right to go for a 
referendum.”764  This view is shared by Hoshyar Zebari, member of the KDP and the 
current Finance Minister of Iraq.  In a July 2014 interview, Zebari said, “Currently, the 
Kurdish leadership is working on two tracks. One is to give another chance to the Iraqis, 
to want to build a new Iraq based on constitution, coexistence and real partnership.  This 
is our last attempt at forming a new government that would eliminate marginalization and 
injustice.  If that happens, then it would lead to a new situation. If it relapses into the 
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former situation, Iraq would no longer be a state.”765  Zebari and other Kurdish officials 
have committed themselves to working within a united Iraq and now expect the 
government in Baghdad to deliver on its promises and commitments to the Kurds.  
Although it may be too early to judge, the Erbil-Baghdad relationship has 
significantly improved since the invasion by ISIS.  Prior to ISIS, one of the central 
concerns for the Kurds was the increasingly authoritarian Nouri al-Maliki.  Faced with 
strong opposition from the Kurds and other factions in Iraq, al-Maliki reluctantly 
abandoned his bid for a third term as prime minister of Iraq.  Al-Maliki was replaced by 
Haider al-Abadi who, since coming to power, has demonstrated his commitment to 
forging a partnership with the Kurds.  In a December 2014 editorial in the Wall Street 
Journal, al-Abadi noted that his government is committed to defeating the ISIS threat, 
which can be achieved by uniting Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish factions.766   
In addition, al-Abadi contacted Massoud Barzani to give his support and praise 
for the Kurdish Peshmerga and their fight against ISIS.767  The Kurds and al-Abadi’s 
government also reached an agreement on oil and the KRG’s budget from Baghdad.  The 
agreement calls on the KRG to export 250,000 barrels of oil per day to Baghdad and in 
exchange the Kurds will be permitted to export about 300,000 barrels of oil per day 
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through the pipeline connecting Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey’s Ceyhan port.768  In return, 
Baghdad will release the KRG’s share of the Iraq budget of 17 percent.  These are 
significant developments in a relationship that has been strained for the past several 
years.  These were two of the main points of contention between the Kurds and the al-
Maliki administration and placed a serious strain on the Erbil-Baghdad relationship.  Al-
Abadi’s diplomatic overtures and gestures and the agreement on oil have improved the 
relationship and more importantly, suggest that the union can be salvaged through 
diplomacy and cooperation. 
 
Capabilities 
The invasion of Iraq by ISIS and the subsequent military clashes with the Kurdish 
Peshmerga has revealed that Iraqi Kurdistan’s military capabilities are limited.  ISIS’s 
modern and heavy weaponry, which it captured following the withdrawal of the Iraqi 
military from northern Iraq in June 2014, proved to be superior to the Peshmerga’s light 
and outdated artillery.  As a consequence, ISIS made advances into the disputed 
territories on the border of the Kurdish region, only to be stopped by a combination of 
US-led airstrikes and counterattacks on the ground by the Peshmerga.  Certainly, the 
Peshmerga have demonstrated a commitment to defeating the ISIS threat, but it would 
difficult, if not impossible, without the military support from the US and several other 
states, including Canada and the UK.   
Based on this assessment of the KRG’s capabilities, Iraqi Kurdistan does not 
possess the military capabilities to secede from Iraq.  Once again, realist assumptions 
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argue that capabilities are the primary factor for determining whether or not a de facto 
state will declare independence. Without sufficient capabilities, therefore, Iraqi Kurdistan 
will not secede from Iraq.  Although such an argument is not entirely inaccurate, it 
overstates the importance of capabilities and the degree to which the KRG’s 
independence decision is shaped by them.  Iraqi Kurdistan may not possess strong 
military capabilities, but it may not need such capabilities to secede from a militarily and 
politically fragile Iraq.  Indeed, this chapter outlined two openings for Iraqi Kurdistan to 
declare independence when Baghdad was powerless.  Instead of seceding from Iraq, the 
Kurds saved its parent state from the brink of collapse on both occasions.  Realism cannot 
account for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to maintain Iraq’s unity following the crisis of June 
2014. 
Constructivism, meanwhile, does provide some insights into the behaviour of 
Iraqi Kurdistan. Nationalism can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy where ethnic identity, 
although constructed, is hardened over time and compels leaders to declare independence. 
In the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the sense of nationalism has certainly been hardened over 
time and there is a desire for independence. However, Kurdish elites successfully appease 
demands for independence by highlighting the benefits of the status quo and the need for 
protecting Kurdish interests. 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, critics of the Kurdistan Regional Government 
often accuse Massoud Barzani and the leadership of other political parties of using 
Kurdish nationalism and the dream of statehood to maintain their hold on power and to 
advance their economic interests.  These elites have been criticized for mobilizing the 
Kurdish population by appealing to their ethnic identity and thereby exploiting Kurdish 
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nationalism to achieve their objectives.  It is true that the Kurdish elite have benefitted 
from Kurdish nationalism, but they have also made sacrifices.  The Barzanis and 
Talabanis have lost thousands of people from their tribes in the military conflicts against 
Baghdad.  For example, in 1983, 8,000 members of the Barzani clan disappeared and 
were subsequently murdered by the Saddam Hussein regime.769  Indeed, one could argue 
that independence would better serve the personal interests of these elites. If elites use 
nationalism to advance their personal interests then what explains the behaviour of the 
Kurdish leadership? 
The point is this: The summer of 2014 presented the Kurds with the opening to 
declare independence from Iraq, and instead Iraqi Kurdistan cooperated with Baghdad to 
maintain the unity of Iraq.  Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour is best explained by liberalism 
and in particular the role of political institutions and economic incentives. Kurdish 
demands for political autonomy have been largely met within the framework of a 
constitutionally defined federal Iraq and there are economic benefits to a union with Iraq.  
Hypothesis one stipulates that a de facto state will pursue independence when the 
parent state is unwilling to offer ‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of political 
institutions, such as autonomy and federalism.  Iraqi Kurdistan has not only secured 
federalism, but functions with a significant degree of autonomy from the central 
government in Baghdad.  Moreover, the Kurds occupy high profile posts in the central 
government, including the presidency, minister of finance, and deputy prime minister.  
Such political posts allow the Kurds to protect and advance Iraqi Kurdistan’s political, 
economic, and cultural interests.  Baghdad’s ‘history of bad acts’ remains top of mind for 
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the Kurds, but two factors mitigate this issue. Saddam Hussein’s regime, which was 
responsible for much of the violence perpetrated against the Kurds, has been removed.  
Although it still faces serious challenges, Iraq appears to be undergoing meaningful 
democratic reforms.  Second, the union with Iraq provides Iraqi Kurdistan with economic 
benefits that it would otherwise not have.   
Hypothesis two contends that material factors, including economic incentives and 
political benefits, can persuade a de facto state to forgo independence.  Economically, 
Iraqi Kurdistan is better off in a union with Iraq than it would be as an independent state.  
The economic benefits from a union with Iraq are quite significant.  The KRG is entitled 
to 17 percent of Iraq’s annual budget based on its population.  (The KRG is entitled to 13 
percent as a proportion of its population and an additional four percent as reparations for 
Baghdad’s historic mistreatment of the Kurdish population.)  In 2013, the 17 percent 
translated into about $20 billion.  At the same time, the KRG possesses access to and 
control over vast natural resources from which it can generate additional revenues.  In 
this way, Iraqi Kurdistan not only receives a significant sum of money from the central 
government, but it also has the autonomy to pursue its own economic initiatives.   
The World Bank forecasts that Iraq’s GDP will grow at a rate of 5.9 per cent in 
2014 and a slightly higher rate of 6.7 per cent in 2015.770  In addition, Iraq’s Central Bank 
estimates that Iraq’s GDP per capita will grow to approximately $10,000 by 2015.771  
These figures will likely be lower as a consequence of the ISIS invasion of Iraq.  
However, the point here is to show that the overall economic picture for Iraq is positive.  
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That is, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s economy has experienced strong 
growth (see Appendix III at the end of this chapter for Iraq’s and Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
economic figures).  The trend is expected to continue.  Based on this positive outlook, 
Iraqi Kurdistan stands to benefit from Iraq’s strong economic growth. 
In short, Iraqi Kurdistan’s position in Iraq, although precarious at times, is 
constitutionally entrenched and provides the Kurds with meaningful political autonomy 
and significant economic benefits. Given these conditions, we should expect Iraqi 
Kurdistan to continue to function in a united Iraq despite the emotional and national 
appeals for independence.  Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and economic position vis-à-vis 
Iraq will persuade the Kurds to maintain Iraq’s unity.   
In addition, the role of international support is a factor in shaping Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s decision.  Regional governments, including Turkey and Iran, are opposed to 
the breakup of Iraq.  The US is also tirelessly working to ensure that Iraq remain united.  
However, the lack of international support has not discouraged de facto states from 
declaring independence. For example, Eurasia’s de facto states (i.e., South Ossetia, 
Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh), the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus, Chechnya, Taiwan, and many other de facto states have declared independence 
even in the knowledge that international and regional support would not materialize.  The 
point here is that international support does not independently influence a de facto state’s 
decision regarding independence. The discussion below will elaborate on the role of 
regional states and the US.   
Regional and international actors have contributed to Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to 
stay in a united Iraq.  Michael Gunter notes that should the federal and democratic project 
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fail in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan will surely move towards independence. 772   He notes, 
however, that the KRG must persuade the US, Turkey, and other regional powers (i.e., 
Iran) that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not lead to instability in the region.773  
The policies of Turkey, Iran, and the US converge on the unity of Iraq.  All three actors 
have promoted, albeit for different reasons, the territorial integrity of Iraq.  The KRG has 
worked to reassure these governments that Iraqi Kurdistan is not on the path to 
independence.  In a 2012 interview with Time magazine, Nechervan Barzani noted that 
the oil pipeline from the Kurdish region to Turkey’s Ceyhan port is not a prelude to the 
breakup of Iraq. 
Furthermore, Nechervan has reiterated that Kurds will not seek independence if 
Baghdad adheres to the Iraqi constitution.  He says, “We have a constitution in this 
country. We will not take any other step until we lose hope in that constitution. There is 
no doubt if and when we lose hope that the constitution is not adhered to, certainly there 
are other options.”774  Nechervan further noted that Kurdish independence has never been 
so viable, but there remain challenges.  According to Nechervan, Kurdish independence 
is unlikely and, indeed, impossible without support from a regional neighbour, referring 
to Turkey, and the US.775  Turkey, therefore, will play a major role in the future of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. 
Following the establishment of the safe zone in Iraqi Kurdistan and the regional 
elections that formed the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey began to take 
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an active role in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Turkey hoped to increase its influence on the KRG 
ostensibly to prevent the breakup of Iraq and to maintain a tight control over its own 
Kurdish population.776  Turkey fears that Iraqi Kurdish autonomy will ultimately lead to 
independence, which will lead to unrest with its own Kurdish population and threaten 
Turkey’s territorial integrity.  This fear is a mainstay of Turkey’s policy in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.   
In 1969, a Turkish political commentator articulated Turkey’s unease vis-à-vis 
northern Iraq.  He says, “The autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq is the first step towards an 
independent Kurdish state in the Middle East…What if [the Kurds in Iraq] put forward 
some claims on Turkish territory…The Kurdish problem, which was until yesterday a 
domestic affair of Iraq, is now about to knock at our door.”777  Turkey’s Iraq policy, 
therefore, is to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state that will threaten 
Turkey’s sovereignty.  Åsa Lundgren says, “Ankara’s strong objections to Kurdish self-
rule and the insistence that Iraq remains intact – is not…based on concern about the unity 
and sovereignty of Iraq…[it is] about the unity and sovereignty of Turkey.”778  In an 
effort to pre-empt Kurdish independence and to effectively battle the PKK, Turkey 
engaged with Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1990s. 779   In doing so, Turkey has 
unintentionally contributed to the survival and development of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Turkey 
has always supported the territorial integrity of Iraq and it has declared that a single group 
(i.e., the Kurds) cannot decide Iraq’s future.780 
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Despite the obstacles, Turkey’s relationship with the KRG blossomed in the mid-
2000s following a series of diplomatic gestures between Massoud and Nechervan Barzani 
on the one hand and the current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the 
other.  The rapprochement has economic and political benefits for both parties.  For 
example, Turkey’s decision to connect Iraqi Kurdistan’s new pipeline to its Ceyhan line 
provides the KRG with a source of revenue independent from Baghdad.  Yet, it does not 
resolve Iraqi Kurdistan’s territorial predicament.  After all, Iraqi Kurdistan is landlocked 
and must rely on Turkey for its economic wellbeing.  Turkey’s willingness to import Iraqi 
Kurdistan’s oil signals a significant shift in Turkey’s policy towards the KRG and Iraq.  
From Baghdad’s perspective, the status quo, although not ideal, is perhaps better than the 
alternative of losing Iraqi Kurdistan.  Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway argue that 
“Baghdad doesn’t want to lose Kurdistan and its oil, and Kurdistan isn’t ready to face the 
challenges of independence, including a short-term loss of oil revenue; damage to 
Kurdish relations with Turkey, which prefers to deal with a semiautonomous region 
rather than an independent Kurdish state; and a long, costly process of obtaining 
international recognition.”781  
Iran is similarly fearful that an independent Kurdistan on its border will lead to 
instability amongst its own Kurdish population.  Iran is host to about 6-7 million restive 
Kurds and Tehran is forced to confront sporadic military clashes with the militant 
Kurdish group, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK).  Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy has 
prompted neighbouring Kurds in Iran to make similar political and economic demands 
from Tehran.  As a result, Iran is on high alert and wary of the prospect of an independent 
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Kurdistan on its border.  To this end, Iran is working closely with Shia political leaders in 
Iraq and Tehran also has close ties with the PUK.  Iran provided the PUK with military 
assistance to fight ISIS in June 2014.782  In exchange for military and political support, 
Iran expects the PUK to promote a united Iraq.  It is no surprise then that the PUK’s party 
program underscores the need to “maintain and promote the democratic, federal and 
parliamentary systems of Iraq.”783  Iran will continue to influence the domestic politics of 
Iraq to promote stability on its border. 
Finally, the US has been involved in the Kurdish region since it established the 
no-fly zone in 1991.  Successive US administrations have firmly maintained that Iraq’s 
territorial integrity is a priority of the US.  This has not changed since the overthrow of 
Saddam Hussein.  Indeed, if anything, the US is even more committed to the unity of 
Iraq.  Most recently during the ISIS crisis, the US Secretary of State John Kerry visited 
Massoud Barzani to encourage the Kurds to participate in a unity government in Baghdad 
and to forgo independence.784  Washington’s “one Iraq” policy will continue to shape the 
US’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan.785  There is no reason to believe US policy will 
change anytime soon.  Indeed, the KRG’s Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Mawlud 
Bawmurad, revealed that the Kurds’ decision to form a government with their Arab 
counterparts in Baghdad was due to pressure from the US and Iraqi Kurdistan’s security 
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imperatives. 786   That is, Washington offered the Iraqi Kurds military assistance in 
exchange for Kurdish participation in the government in Baghdad.  Bawmulad reveals 
that: “The US president, his vice president and most of America had made it a condition 
that, unless there is an inclusive government in Baghdad, they wouldn’t be willing to 
fight terrorist groups and the IS in Iraq. So the Kurds had to go to Baghdad.”787  Renas 
Jano, a KDP member of parliament in Baghdad, reveals that the US assured the Kurds 
that should Baghdad fail to meet its conditions (i.e., treating the Kurds as partners and 
adhering to the constitution), the Kurds could pull out of the government in Baghdad 
paving the way for independence.788  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter relied on empirical and theoretical grounding to argue that Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
decision to maintain its de facto statehood is deliberate.  Empirically, the chapter 
demonstrates that Iraqi Kurdistan’s relationship with the rest of Iraq, and especially with 
governments in Baghdad, has been shaped by a dark history of political and military 
conflicts.  The Kurds have endured decades of oppression and have engaged in two civil 
wars against regimes in Baghdad in an attempt to secure political autonomy.  The Kurds 
inadvertently gained de facto statehood in 1991 and Iraqi Kurdistan has since functioned 
as a de facto state within Iraq.  Although the academic literature on de facto states 
contends that independence is the end goal of de facto states, Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour 
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challenges this notion.  Indeed, Iraqi Kurdistan passed on two opportunities to secede 
from Iraq since 2003. De facto statehood and the current political framework in Iraq 
provides the Kurds with sufficient political accommodation and significant economic 
benefits.  In other words, Iraqi Kurdistan functions as an independent state in everything 
but name.  The chapter argued that if Baghdad meets Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and 
economic demands, Iraqi Kurdistan would continue to function as a de facto state within 
a united Iraq.   
Theoretically, the chapter argues that liberalism best explains the preferences and 
behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Although realism and constructivism also offer insights 
into the preferences and behaviour of de facto states, they do not provide a thorough 
explanation for the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan.  Realism’s emphasis on power, security, 
and capabilities cannot account for Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to function as a de facto 
state within a united Iraq.  Constructivist notions of ideas and norms also fail to explain 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour. Liberal assumptions about political institutions and 
economic factors provide the best explanations for Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference for de 
facto statehood rather than full independence.  The explanatory power of liberalism is 
most evident in this case.  Liberal assumptions and ideas clearly account for and explain 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and behaviour. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This project was guided by several questions related to the emergence and evolution of de 
facto states.  The questions included: Why and how do de facto states emerge? Why do 
some de facto states unilaterally declare independence while others do not?  And finally, 
what are the implications for Iraqi Kurdistan?  The central question is why Kosovo and 
South Sudan declared independence while Iraqi Kurdistan continues to function as a de 
facto state.  The underlying theme of the project is to identify the conditions under which 
a de facto state will forgo independence in favour of the alternatives: The status quo or a 
federal arrangement with the parent state.  The project argued that de facto states will 
forgo independence: When the appropriate political institutions are adopted by the parent 
state; there are economic incentives to remain with the parent state; and when the 
domestic, regional, and international environments oppose independence.  When a parent 
state lacks the institutional capacity and economic prosperity to accommodate the 
requests of the de facto state, disgruntled groups will often turn to independence to pursue 
their interests.  The complete argument is laid out in Chapters 2 to 6. 
Chapter 2 outlined the emergence and evolution of de facto states and provided 
the theoretical grounding for the thesis.  The chapter outlined the theoretical and 
empirical explanations posited from the existing literature and offered new insights 
informed by theory from international relations.  Theoretically, the findings lend the most 
support to the liberal view that de facto state preferences and behaviour are shaped by 
political institutions, economic factors, and the domestic, regional, and international 
contexts.  Although realist and constructivist assumptions also provide insights into the 
preferences and behaviour of de facto states, they are insufficient for a thorough 
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understanding of de facto state behaviour.  Realism overlooks the role of the domestic 
political structure and economic interests and institutional design.  Constructivism, 
meanwhile, overstates the power of nationalism on de facto state preferences and 
behaviour.   
The chapter found that liberalism provides the best theoretical explanation for the 
emergence of de facto states.  It found that the role of institutions, economic factors, and 
the domestic political system play a significant role in the origins and objectives of de 
facto states.  In other words, de facto states often emerge as a result of the parent state’s 
unwillingness to adopt the institutional framework necessary to appease a minority 
group’s political and economic grievances.  There are many ways in which the parent 
state can appease the minority group, including representation in the executive or 
legislature of the state, granting the minority with political, civil, and economic rights 
previously denied, or adopting a federal system that furnishes the minority with political 
and economic autonomy. 
Empirically, Chapter 2 found that international interventions often play a key role 
in the emergence de facto states, including Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo.  The chapter 
supports the existing literature’s explanation that most de facto states emerge from civil 
wars that end in a stalemate.  In many cases, weak parent states do not possess the 
capacity to prevent the establishment of de facto states and therefore they cannot bring 
the de facto state back into the fold.  In sum, the chapter concluded that de facto states 
emerge in one of two ways: civil wars between a minority group and the parent state, or 
international interventions.  In terms of the outcome of de facto states, the empirical 
record revealed that five de facto states were forcefully reintegrated and four have been 
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peacefully reintegrated.  We can also add Iraqi Kurdistan to the list of de facto states that 
have been peacefully reintegrated into the parent state.  After all, Iraqi Kurdistan, 
although a de facto state, functions as an autonomous region within a federal and united 
Iraq.  Additionally, although the existing literature argues that gaining independence is 
very difficult for de facto states, the empirical evidence suggests that graduating to 
independence is as common as forceful or peaceful reintegration.  To date, five de facto 
states have graduated to full independence. The chapter found that the most de facto 
states maintain the status quo and are neither defeated nor persuaded into re-joining the 
parent state. 
Chapters 3 to 6 provided the empirical evidence to support the theoretical claims.  
The project adopted Mill’s method of difference to identify the similarities and 
differences and to evaluate the variation between the three cases.  Mill’s method was 
complemented by in-depth case studies on Kosovo, South Sudan, and Iraqi Kurdistan.  It 
must be emphasized that case studies, by their nature, limit one’s ability to generalize.  
However, this limitation does not preclude researchers from understanding and 
explaining the behaviour of de facto states.  The case studies attempted to identify the 
conditions that shape a de facto state’s preferences and behaviour.  
The research found that de facto state preferences are shaped less by capabilities 
or a sense of nationalism and more by political institutions and economic factors.  
Political institutions, often in the form of autonomy and federalism, provide minority 
groups with the political framework for advancing and protecting their interests.  The 
preference for the status quo is bolstered if the parent state possesses a strong economy 
and the de facto state receives economic benefits from the union with the parent state.  
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The empirical data and the three case studies clearly demonstrate that de facto states will 
push for independence if the parent state is unwilling to furnish the minority group with 
political autonomy and if it does not possess a strong economy. Additionally, the research 
found that mitigating factors play a role in influencing de facto states. The mitigating 
factors include the de facto state and parent state’s domestic political scenes, the role of 
regional and international actors, and finally, the presence or absence of the ‘old regime.’   
The cases of Kosovo and South Sudan illustrate the above points very clearly.  
The parent states, Serbia and Sudan, repeatedly showed unwillingness to provide Kosovo 
and South Sudan, respectively, with the level of autonomy that was requested.  As a 
consequence, Kosovo and South Sudan were convinced that only independence would 
protect their political and economic interests.  In the case of Kosovo, it is true that Serbia 
offered Kosovo significant autonomy following international mediation.  However, from 
Kosovo’s perspective, this offer was ‘too little too late’ and Kosovo found it difficult to 
trust Serbia following decades of political and military conflict.  Moreover, Kosovo did 
not stand to gain any economic benefits from Serbia.  As a result, Kosovo declared 
independence in 2008. 
Serbia possessed the policy tools for preserving its territorial integrity but decades 
of mismanagement of the Kosovo question and broken promises ultimately led to its 
undoing.  Serbia’s unresponsive political system paved the way for Kosovo to make 
independence demands and for the international community to provide support.  Decades 
of oppression and violence against Kosovo provided the international community with 
the pretext for intervening and supporting Kosovo’s independence. The international 
community based its support for Kosovo on decades of Serbian oppression and 
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unwillingness to accommodate Kosovar Albanian minority. Had Serbia provided Kosovo 
with the degree of autonomy the Kosovars were requesting from the 1950s to 1980s, 
secession would have been difficult, as the international community would not have a 
reason to intervene in Kosovo.  
South Sudan faced similar circumstances in Sudan.  Following two prolonged 
civil wars, the government in Sudan offered the South significant autonomy, 
representation in the central government in Khartoum, and promises of democracy. South 
Sudan, however, had little reason to trust a regime that had reneged on similar promises 
in the past. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, therefore, did little to assuage 
South Sudanese concerns over an oppressive regime in Khartoum.  Finally, whereas 
Sudan possesses a weak economy and few prospects, South Sudan possesses vast oil 
reserves that could provide the economic development it was seeking.  South Sudan 
declared independence following an independence referendum that received about 97 
percent support from the voters. 
Although the case of Iraqi Kurdistan does not have the same outcome as Kosovo 
and South Sudan, it further supports the conditions outlined above.  That is, a de facto 
state will forgo independence when a parent state adopts the appropriate political 
institutions and when it possesses a strong economy.  Since the 2003, Iraq has been 
transformed into a democracy, albeit with shortcomings, with a federal constitution that 
furnishes Iraqi Kurdistan with significant political and economic autonomy.  Moreover, 
those who committed the bad acts against the Kurds have been completely removed from 
the power apparatus in Baghdad.  Iraq also has experienced a significant economic boom 
since 2005 and Iraqi Kurdistan is a major beneficiary of the economic progress.  Iraqi 
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Kurdistan stands to receive billions of dollars annually from Baghdad and, in addition, 
the Kurds generate their own revenues from oil sales.   
Drawing on field research, Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that Iraqi Kurdistan is 
willing to continue as an autonomous entity if Baghdad treats the Kurds as partners in a 
democratic Iraq.  In addition, Iraqi Kurdish officials indicated that the constitution of Iraq 
must be adhered to and implemented and that Baghdad must respect Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
political and economic autonomy.  These findings suggest that independence is not the 
end goal of de facto states, but rather a means to political autonomy and economic 
development.  The implication, of course, is that under the right conditions de facto states 
can be persuaded to forgo independence.   
There were also mitigating factors that facilitated the secession of Kosovo and 
South Sudan, but not Iraqi Kurdistan. First, regional and international governments 
provided Kosovo and South Sudan with the diplomatic support, in the form of 
recognition, necessary for statehood.  In the case of Kosovo, it also received extensive 
economic, military, and administrative support on its way to independence. Iraqi 
Kurdistan, on the other hand, faces strong opposition from regional and international 
governments.  Kurdish independence would be a difficult task without support from Iran, 
Turkey, and the US.  Second, the presence of the Bashir regime in Sudan and remnants of 
the Milošević regime in Serbia heightened South Sudan and Kosovo’s mistrust for the 
parent state.  South Sudan and Kosovo found it difficult to maintain a union with regimes 
responsible for violence directed at them.  In Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime has facilitated cooperation and trust between the Kurds and governments in 
Baghdad. 
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The empirical record shows that the preferences and behaviour of de facto states 
are shaped by institutions, economic incentives, and domestic and international politics.  
Political institutions play an important role in mollifying minority demands for political 
representation and autonomy.  Institutions such as federalism or autonomy could  
The implications of these findings are particularly noteworthy for Iraqi Kurdistan 
and Iraq’s future.  The Kurds and successive governments in Baghdad were locked in 
political and violent conflict for more than four decades.  During this period, from the 
1960s to the 1990s, the Kurds demanded and fought for political autonomy from an 
oppressive and often violent Baghdad.  There seemed little hope for the future of a united 
Iraq with a partnership between Kurds and Arabs.  However, the removal of Saddam 
Hussein’s regime in 2003 and the emergence of democracy have renewed hopes for a 
democratic, federal, and peaceful Iraq.  Although the union is characterized by political 
disagreements and at times high tensions, including military posturing, there is promise 
for a peaceful and prosperous future.  Iraq has made great political and economic strides 
since 2005 – a success that has been shared with Iraqi Kurdistan.   
Iraqi Kurdistan also functions with significant political autonomy and receives 
economic support from Baghdad.  Baghdad’s willingness to furnish the Kurds with 
political and economic autonomy has extended the unity of Iraq and ensured regional 
stability.  The existing arrangement, therefore, is workable in the medium-term and could 
conceivable provide a long-term solution for the future of Iraq.  Kurdish dreams of 
independence can be shelved, at least for now, in favour of a more pragmatic and 
beneficial political arrangement. 
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A second implication is that Iraqi Kurdistan could move towards independence 
should Baghdad fail to adhere to the Iraqi constitution and uphold Iraqi Kurdistan’s 
political and economic autonomy.  Should the Kurds move towards independence, 
officials in Baghdad and others will criticize the Kurds for not making a sincere effort to 
preserve Iraq’s unity.   Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, however, that Iraqi Kurdistan has 
made every effort to participate in a federal and democratic Iraq.  Indeed, the project 
illustrated that Iraq Kurdistan has saved Iraq from the brink of collapse on two occasions 
in the past decade alone.  The Kurds have demonstrated their commitment to a federal 
and democratic Iraq and could therefore justify secession on these grounds. 
These findings may also aid policymakers in formulating effective solutions for 
managing de facto states and their relationships with the parent state.  The emergence of 
de facto states is often a violent process and their existence challenges the sovereignty of 
the parent state and international norms.  However, this does not suggest conflict is 
inevitable.  Indeed, the findings here argue that de facto states can be managed in a 
peaceful manner under the right conditions.  Policymakers must carefully balance the 
requests of de facto states with the rights of the parent state. This is particularly important 
given the role of international support in facilitating secession.  Powerful states can use 
their position of power to reduce the scale of violence in multiethnic states.  This is can 
be achieved in one of two ways. One, international actors can support the minority ethnic 
group and facilitate its secession in a peaceful way.  Two, powerful states can mediate 
between the de facto state and the parent state and create the institutional framework for 
coexistence. 
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Facilitating a de facto state’s independence should not be taken lightly as it can 
often lead to more instability in the region in which the secession is occurring.  Such an 
act can also encourage and embolden other minorities to make claims to secession and 
create more political instability.  As a result, this policy should not be taken lightly 
because it can lead to a domino effect and create instability. For instance, the 
international community’s support for the secession of Kosovo provided Russia with the 
pretext for supporting the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to secede 
from Georgia in 2008.  When and if the international community chooses to intervene in 
the domestic affairs of a state to protect a minority, it must carefully consider the rights of 
the parent state.  Without diplomacy and negotiations with the parent state, international 
involvement can further divide the de facto state and the parent state.  Kosovo is a case 
and point.  The international community facilitated the secession of Kosovo despite 
Serbia’s protestation and as a consequence, Serbia and other states have opposed 
Kosovo’s inclusion into international organizations. 
Where international actors choose to encourage unity, it is important that 
policymakers take note that the presence of the old regime can hinder political 
cooperation and unity between the de facto state and the parent state.  The thesis does not 
suggest or promote regime change.  Instead, the international community can work with 
the parent state and the de facto state to encourage negotiations for the peaceful removal 
of the old regime.  The international community should not, however, undermine the 
parent state by encouraging dissident groups in the state to remove the regime as such 
action can be counterproductive and lead to conflict.  Instead, the international 
community should provide the parent state and the de facto state with resources and a 
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forum for negotiations and encourage diplomacy.  In particular, the international 
community could provide the parent state and the de facto state with assistance for 
creating the institutional framework that would provide the conditions for cooperation. 
There are also lessons for states that fear the breakup of their territorial integrity 
when ethnic minorities make autonomy requests.  The cases here demonstrate that heavy-
handed policies do not work. Rather than ignore the political requests of ethnic 
minorities, governments would be well advised to open dialogue and provide the political 
framework necessary for accommodating minorities.  Political accommodation is the best 
tool available to states for maintaining their territorial integrity.  In addition, by 
accommodating autonomy requests, the international community cannot use humanitarian 
grounds to intervene on behalf of and support ethnic groups that attempt to secede. 
Finally, the findings outlined in this project also have implications for the existing 
and future research agendas. The findings suggest that the existing literature has 
overlooked the ways in which de facto state preferences are formed and how this process 
influences de facto state behaviour.  The existing literature assumes that de facto states 
prefer independence across time and space.  The findings here question the notion that 
independence is the ultimate goal of de facto states and that they will not settle for 
anything short of it.  Instead, my research concludes that independence is one of many 
options for de facto states.  Under the right conditions, de facto states will preserve the 
status quo.  Many de facto states have been functioning as such for more than two 
decades.  This demonstrates that de facto statehood can be a long-term solution and not 
merely a way station to something else.   
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The lessons to be drawn from the findings of this project are twofold. First, 
political actors do not have fixed preferences.  The preferences of individuals, groups, de 
facto states, and states are neither fixed nor the result of exogenous factors.  Instead, the 
research demonstrates that various factors, including institutions, economics, and 
domestic politics, shape preferences and behaviour. This lesson is significant for 
understanding and researching de facto states. The existing literature has characterized de 
facto states in one of two ways: At one extreme de facto states are viewed as irrational 
entities whose policies are driven by the fervor of nationalism and at the other extreme de 
facto states are compelled by the security dilemma to seek independence.  My research 
presents an alternative view by showcasing the complexity of de facto states and the ways 
in which these entities form preferences. 
Second, a ‘tenuous’ and uncertain status, such as de facto statehood, although 
undesirable, can provide political stability and serve as a medium to long-term solution.  
Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto status has provided the Kurds with a sense of security, 
economic well being, and political recognition.  One could also make the case that 
Kosovo would be in a better political and economic position as a de facto state.  Many of 
the challenges facing Kosovo are a result of its unilateral declaration of independence, 
which has hardened Serbia’s resolve to block Kosovo’s integration into the international 
community.  As a consequence, Kosovo is struggling economically as demonstrated by 
the exodus of Kosovar migrants to Europe. Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other hand, has 
experienced strong economic development and growth despite its de facto status. 
I intend to pursue these findings with my further research.  First, I hope to 
examine the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).  It has been a de 
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facto state since the 1980s and actively sought recognition from the international 
community.  It is recognized only by Turkey and it has largely struggled economically. 
More recently, the prospect of unification with Cyprus has become increasingly attractive 
for the TRNC.  In fact, in a 2004 UN-mandated referendum, almost 65 percent of Turkish 
Cypriots voted in favour of unification.  What accounts for the TRNC’s shift in 
preferences from independence to unification and what is the role of institutions and 
economic incentives?   
 A second project will examine the case of Taiwan as a model of sorts for other de 
facto states such as Iraqi Kurdistan.  Although a minority of states recognize Taiwan (it is 
officially recognized by 21 states), it effectively functions as an independent state. It 
mints its own coin, issues its own passports, and controls its defense and foreign policy, 
and yet Taiwan is not recognized by the US or international organizations such the UN.  
This arrangement has been in practice since 1979 and appears to be a viable long-term 
solution to the dispute over its status.  Is Taiwan a unique case or can it serve as a model 
for other de facto states? 
Finally, I intend to further explore the internal dynamics of Iraqi Kurdistan to 
better understand its preference formation. In particular, I hope to shed light on the 
preferences and values of the general population by conducting a social, political, 
economic, and religious survey in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Such data will offer more insights into 
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour and preferences and complement the research and findings 
from this thesis.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix I: Economic Performances of Kosovo and Serbia (1990-2012) 
 
Kosovo789 
 
Year GDP ($) GDP Per Capita ($) GDP Annual Growth (%) 
2012 6,445,201,981 3,568 2.7 
2011 6,636,703,418 3,706 4.5 
2010 5,750,799,437 3,239 3.2 
2009 5,634,824,257 3,199 3.0 
2008 5,771,473,142 3,303 7.2 
2007 4,743,437,689 2,736 8.3 
2006 3,918,176,308 2,279 3.4 
2005 3,743,116,980 2,194 6.0 
2004 3,639,935,348 2,135 2.6 
2003 3,355,083,117 1,970 6.0 
2002 2,702,427,047 1,588 -0.7 
2001 2,535,333,632 1,490 27.0 
2000 1,849,196,082 1,088 2.7 
1999 1,909,129,923 685 -22.8 
1998 2,826,937,025 1,006 -8.5 
1997 3,198,955,565 1,137 7.7 
1996 3,465,043,853 1,241 8.7 
1995 5,382,372,119 1,960 8.1 
1994 2,484,741,820 933 0.0 
1993 2,433,830,382 958 -24.7 
1992 3,164,182,744 1,319 -25.3 
1991 4,136,797,027 1,830 -11.0 
1990 4,489,386,272 2,443  
  
                                            
789
 The data for the years 2000 to 2012 are from the World Bank and the data for 1990 to 1999 are from the 
United Nations. 
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Serbia790 
 
Year GDP ($) GDP Per Capita ($) GDP Annual Growth (%) 
2012 37,488,935,010 5,190 -1.7 
2011 43,291,846,196 5,964 1.6 
2010 36,990,001,284 5,073 1.0 
2009 40,249,479,880 5,498 -3.5 
2008 47,760,580,366 6,498 3.8 
2007 38,952,093,544 5,277 5.4 
2006 29,221,081,587 3,943 3.6 
2005 25,234,408,773 3,391 5.4 
2004 23,649,854,234 3,169 9.3 
2003 19,550,781,969 2,614 2.7 
2002 15,102,567,925 2,014 4.1 
2001 11,390,468,619 1,518 5.3 
2000 6,082,791,506 809 5.3 
1999 17,632,705,913 2,338 -11.2 
1998 16,204,161,184 2,141 0.7 
1997 21,380,951,576 2,795 10.1 
1996 18,662,409,858 2,448 7.8 
1995 17,498,398,432 2,294 6.1 
1994 16,220,248,574 2,128 2.5 
1993 15,486,053,510 2,034 -30.5 
1992 21,781,363,485 2,864 -27.2 
1991 29,607,638,155 3,898 -9.8 
1990 32,369,820,042 4,099 -8.0 
 
  
                                            
790
 The GDP and the GDP per capita from 1997 to 2012 and the GDP Growth are from the World Bank.  
The GDP and GDP per capita from 1990 to 1996 are from the United Nations. 
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Appendix II: Economic Performances of South Sudan and Sudan 
South Sudan791 
Year GDP (Billions $) GDP Per Capita ($) GDP Annual Growth (%) 
2012 10,220,256,857 943 -47.55 
2011 19,145,887,852 1,844 1.57 
2010 15,178,973,598 1,527 4.24 
2009 11,853,474,305 1,245 4.31 
2008 15,264,618,786 1,674  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
  
                                            
791
 All data are from the World Bank. 
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Sudan792 
 
Year GDP ($) GDP Per Capita ($) GDP Annual Growth (%) 
2012 58,768,800,833 1,580 8.43 
2011 63,997,129,027 1,538 8.58 
2010 64,849,930,758 1,422 5.86 
2009 52,839,990,731 1,191 5.81 
2008 54,082,389,393 1,253 6.61 
2007 45,456,460,335 1,083 1.38 
2006 35,159,250,985 862 1.38 
2005 26,524,992,225 669 -0.70 
2004 21,457,886,199 557 46.50 
2003 17,646,271,397 472 -41.30 
2002 14,803,423,335 407 -7.80 
2001 13,182,872,555 373 -6.60 
2000 12,257,299,163 356 -4.30 
1999 10,682,027,627 319 24.80 
1998 11,250,220,583 346 34.80 
1997 11,681,179,553 369  
1996 9,018,303,154 293  
1995 13,830,369,880 462  
1994 12,793,798,349 440  
  
                                            
792
 All data are from the World Bank. 
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Appendix III: Economic Performances of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq 
 
Iraq793 
 
Year GDP (Billions $) GDP Per Capita ($) GDP Annual Growth (%) 
2013 222,879 355 403 6,670 3.95 
2012 210,279,947,256 6,455 8.43 
2011 180,606,795,374 5,687 8.58 
2010 135,488,471,368 4,376 5.86 
2009 111,659,988,889 3,702 5.81 
2008 131,611,819,294 4,472 6.61 
2007 88,837,727,881 3,091 1.38 
2006 65,141,035,028 2,321 1.38 
2005 36,743,640,204 1,342 -0.70 
2004 25,509,364,916 956 46.50 
 
 
Iraqi Kurdistan794 
 
Year GDP (Billions $) GDP Per Capita ($)795 GDP Annual Growth (%) 
   2013796    
2012 29,500,000,000 4,600 12 
2011 23,600,000,000 4,452  
2010 22,000,00,000 4,300  
2009 19,250,000,000 4,100 4.3 
2008 17,350,000,000 4,200 1.5 
2007 8,500,000,000 2,000  
2006 6,250,000,000 1,500  
2005 3,750,000,000 800  
2004 2,000,000,000 500  
 
 
 
  
                                            
793
 All data are from the World Bank. 
794
 GDP Annual Growth was not unavailable for 2004-2007 and 2010-2011. 
795
 Data for the GDP Per Capita were collected from the KRG’s Statistics Office. 
796
 Data were not available for 2013. 
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